Officer Turnover in the Village Public Safety Officer Program

Darryl S. Wood

Turnover among the law enforcement officers serving in Alaska Native villages has been a problem since long before statehood, with the Village Public Safety Officer (VPSO) program not immune from the problem: a typical VPSO will remain employed in the program for only slightly less than two years. This article considers the findings of a study conducted to examine this problem. It first takes a look at just how big the problem of turnover among VPSOs is. It then discusses the results of a survey which investigated why some VPSOs are more likely to leave the program than others. The main finding of the research is that officers without strong connections of marriage, family, or culture in the community they serve are the officers who are most likely to terminate their employment with the program.

Providing police and public safety services to the isolated Alaska Native villages spread across the state is a daunting challenge. With rates of intentional and accidental violent death much higher than those found in urbanized areas of Alaska and the U.S. as a whole, these villages certainly require a police and public safety presence. However, the terrain, climate, and a lack of roads connecting these villages, along with relatively small population sizes, have precluded a “traditional” method of dealing with their law enforcement and public safety needs. Instead, the VPSO program has been developed over the past 20 years as a localized response to the broad range of public safety needs in Alaska Native villages. VPSOs—whose five-part task bundle includes law enforcement, fire fighting, water safety, emergency medical assistance, and search and rescue—can be best thought of as public safety “jacks-of-all-trades.” The program has been heralded for its trifurcated management structure—that is, oversight by local village governments, regional nonprofit corporations, and the Alaska State Troopers—which allows for local control over the day-to-day provision of services at the village level.

Despite these innovations, the problem of officer attrition has hindered the VPSO program in much the same way as it affected earlier efforts at providing police services to Alaska Native villages. Basically, those individuals who are responsible for policing Alaska Native villages do not have particularly long careers doing so. A study undertaken by the UAA Justice Center, funded by the National Institute of Justice, examined the turnover problem in the VPSO program and attempted to isolate some of the possible reasons for the extreme levels of turnover among VPSOs.

Data

Two primary data sources were drawn upon to come to an understanding of VPSO turnover. Information about turnover rates and the amount of time officers spend in the program was obtained from lists of current and former VPSOs published by the Alaska Department of Public Safety. The measures of factors considered as possible reasons for turnover, as suggested by prior research on the VPSO program and by administrators closely associated with the program, were gathered by a self-administered survey of 113 (out of a possible 184) current and former VPSOs.

Compared with what is found in police agencies across the state and in the remainder of the nation, turnover rates in the VPSO program are quite high. The research identified a number of factors that, when present, can mitigate or exacerbate the problem of turnover among VPSOs.
Review Essay: A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion

Sharon K. Arai

A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion
by Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer

A Natural History of Rape by Thornhill and Palmer is grounded in Darwinian theory. The authors argue that rape is a sexually motivated behavior, not an act of power and control. Rape is viewed as adaptation to historical environmental changes, although the two authors do not agree as to whether rape is an adaptation designed to increase males’ reproductive success or whether it is an adaptive by-product that facilitates males’ access to consenting females. Both authors agree, however, that the rape adaptation in human males is psychological. As support, they use the example of male scorpionflies who have a natal organ (clamp) located on the top of their abdomen that, as far as the authors can tell, was designed specifically for rape. This organ is only used to gain sexual access to unwilling female scorpionflies when males have no nuptial gift (hardened salvia or a dead insect). Human males do not have a similar rape organ, but the authors argue that the rape adaptation is found in the male psyche.

However, it is not only the male psyche that leads to rape. Thornhill and Palmer spend Chapter 2 discussing the evolution of sex differences that create an environment conducive to male rape. In short, in this environment females control access to what males want—sex—for whatever purpose—copulation or reproduction. It was this situation that set the conditions for male competition for voluntary sexual access to females or involuntary sexual access in the form of rape. While the two authors do not agree which of two competing evolutionary hypotheses is correct—that rape is a byproduct of men’s adaptation for the pursuit of casual sex with many partners, or that rape is an adaptation in and of itself—they do view rape as being centered in men’s evolved sexuality. Their argument seems to be that under the right set of environmental conditions, all men will rape. As a social scientist I do not believe that all men will rape, and if I were a man I would find this book highly offensive. Thornhill and Palmer argue that if females were less discriminating and agreeable to more sexual activity with males, there would be no need for the rape adaptation. Likewise, if males were more discriminating and desired only sexual intercourse with consenting females, rape would not be needed. The only reasons human males rape—and they argue that rape is a male-only phenomena—is that the evolutionary selection process favored one adaptation over another.

As Darwinists, these authors see themselves as having the only valid explanation of rape. Throughout the book they dismiss social science and feminist theories and research as being nonscientific. Because of this assertion, the authors propose that rape prevention programs should direct attention to the sexual dimensions of rape rather than to the theory of power and control proposed by feminists and many social scientists. The authors propose in Chapter 8 that schools develop rape prevention programs that teach males about their sexuality and how they must learn to control their natural sexual impulses to prevent themselves from raping. They offer some possible incentives such as “take the course or you don’t get a driver’s license.”

However, if males rape because women deny them access to sex whenever and with whomsoever they desire it, then females must be educated about the differences between male and female sexuality. The authors propose that females, separately from males, also be required to take a rape prevention course. The course would focus on learning about males’ natural sexual impulses, which under certain conditions lead to rape, and the females’ responsibility for preventing this. What are their suggestions for females? Avoid dress, behavior and situations that increase the risk of rape. In Chapter 10, the authors propose some age-old and modern-day practices. These include separate bathrooms, chaperoned activities, self-defense for women and programs that teach both males and females the dangers of the two sexes being alone in isolated and private areas. The authors quote an evolutionary anthropologist from New Guinea: “Men and women both assume that if a young woman is encountered in an isolated area by a man who is not closely related, that man will rape her” (p. 186). This type of thinking reinforces the belief that if women are raped it is their fault.

For those in the criminal justice system, Thornhill and Palmer note that rape may be entirely based on biology, but men can consciously choose not to rape. They argue that rape could be prevented if laws and punishments treated it as having only a sexual origin. The authors suggest that incarceration is a good deterrent because it removes young males from the competition at a critical period in their development. Monetary penalties that reduce their social status and thus their attractiveness to females would also be good deterrents. Acknowledging that modern societies, for ethical reasons, would oppose literal castration, the authors advocate for the use of chemical castration and hormonal treatments that reduce sexual drive. They view current treatments and penalties that do not consider rape a sexual act as doomed to failure. I, however, do not see the treatment model for sex offenders proposed by Thornhill and Palmer as a viable alternative to current programs that emphasize the importance of cognitive, behavioral, and emotional components as well as the sexual aspect.

As a social scientist, feminist and woman I found this book offensive, as I believe will most men and women who do not agree that all men, given the opportunity, will rape and that women play a role in their rape victimization. The tone of the book is also extremely condescending with respect to the social sciences. For example, the authors state that “not only is the bulk of the social science literature of rape clearly indifferent to scientific standards; many of the studies exhibit overt hostility toward biological approaches. The message of these studies is clearly political rather than scientific” (p. 148). This is only one of numerous “put downs” of social science and feminist studies of rape.

Further, from this reviewer’s perspective, Thornhill’s and Palmer’s book is seriously flawed. First, the book does not provide convincing answers to such questions as why men rape, how rape can be prevented, and what the penalties and treatments should be. There are too many equally or more plausible explanations for rape than those derived from Darwinian theory. Throughout the book the authors criticize and dismiss feminist and social science explanations of rape and related research. Their view of culture and learning is that an individual’s cultural behavior is merely a product of environmentally-related genetic adaptations. It was in opposition to this narrow view of human behavior that social science and feminist theories and corresponding research emerged. Thornhill and Palmer would have us return to the days of Darwinism, yet provide less than convincing data to support their position. Most examples used to support their view come from the insect world, with very few references to primates, such as apes and monkeys, to which humans are more closely related in the evolutionary chain. The few cited studies that make use of human populations are flawed and based on nonrepresentative samples.
In addition, the book presents an image of all males as little more than sexual predators who must be controlled by environments that prevent them from raping. This means that females must be continuously on their guard so as not to excite males sexually and, likewise, not place themselves in situations where they can be raped. This line of reasoning returns us to the “blame the victim” attitude that feminists have so long fought to eradicate and replace with an attitude of “perpetrator responsibility.”

The Darwinian theory used by these authors has as a premise the idea that only males can rape. The definition of rape used by the authors is: “an event that occurred without the woman’s consent, involved use of force or threat of force, and involved sexual penetration of the victim’s vagina, mouth or rectum”—but both males and females can rape and be raped, and more than a penis can be used to accomplish rape. A weakness of the book is that the authors do not pursue or present their theory with any in-depth consideration of these points.

As a social scientist concerned with sound scientific research as well as finding ethical and sensible strategies for rape prevention, intervention and deterrence, I would not recommend this book to those who share these concerns. Thornhill and Palmer’s book is extremely egocentric, touting Darwinism as offering the sine qua non explanation for rape. They dismiss as inconsequential all feminist and social science theory and research because it highlights power and control factors rather than the sexual dimension of rape. While not all rapists may be motivated by a desire for power and control, certainly not all rapists are sexually motivated. The thinking advocated in A Natural History of Rape would return us to the days when social policies and the justice system were based primarily on the belief that biology is destiny. If you share this perspective, this book is for you.

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Rape Figures

Figure 1 shows that rates of rape and attempted rape have dropped overall since 1973 and have remained level since 1996. In 1973, the National Crime Victimization Survey reported a rate of 2.5 rapes per 1,000 population age 12 and over. By 1996 this rate had dropped to 0.9. As shown in Table 1, the rate of female rape victims (1999) was over seven times higher than that of men, and that for blacks was 63 per cent higher than that of white victims. A strong majority (69%) of all rapes were committed by people known to the victims (Table 2). For women, 72 per cent of all rapes in 1999 were committed by non-strangers.

The figures on rape presented in the accompanying tables and figure come from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). Since 1972 this annual survey has accumulated data on victimization experienced by household members age 12 or older in a sample of approximately 80,000 households from across the country. For the purposes of this survey and the data shown here, rape is defined as forced sexual intercourse, with either psychological or physical coercion. Forced sexual intercourse means penetration by the offender. The figures include completed and attempted rapes (including verbal threats of rape), male and female victims, and both heterosexual and homosexual rape.

![Figure 1. Rape Rates in the U.S., 1973-1999](image)

**Table 1. Rape Victimization Rates in the U.S., 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Rape victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>108,652,550</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>115,915,820</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Rate per 1,000 persons age 12 or older</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 to 15</td>
<td>15,920,740</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 19</td>
<td>15,925,090</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24</td>
<td>18,067,050</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>38,470,320</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 49</td>
<td>64,329,680</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 64</td>
<td>39,371,500</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 or older</td>
<td>32,483,990</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** These data reflect both attempted and completed rapes of male as well as female victims, and both heterosexual and homosexual rape. Attempted rape includes verbal threats of rape.

**Source:** Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey

**Table 2. Victim and Offender Relationship for Rapes in the U.S., 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Female victims</th>
<th>Male victims</th>
<th>All victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonstranger</td>
<td>246,250</td>
<td>71.6 %</td>
<td>17,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimate</td>
<td>77,170</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other relative</td>
<td>7,330</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend/acquaintance</td>
<td>161,550</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>12,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stranger</td>
<td>97,580</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>18,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>343,830</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on 10 or fewer sample cases.

**Source:** Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey
Turnover of VPSOs (continued from page 1)

program have been, and remain, very high (Figure 1). Consider the following points regarding VPSO turnover rates:

- The problem of high rates of officer attrition in the VPSO program continues a trend seen in earlier policing efforts in Alaska Native villages. Annual turnover rates of more than 100 per cent in pre-VPSO rural policing programs were typical.

- The typical VPSO lasts in a village and in the program for less than a year.

- When the turnover rate is computed as a percentage in which the number of terminations in a year is divided by the total number of VPSOs employed in a year, the VPSO turnover rate has averaged 55 per cent per year for the years 1983 through 1997. Rates using this measure have been as high as 45 per cent per year (in 1992) (Figure 2).

- If turnover rates as the proportion of the number of terminations in a period over the average number of employees in a period are calculated, VPSO rates of attrition averaged 55 per cent per year over the period 1983-1997. This rate is at least 10 times greater than what is experienced by metropolitan police departments in Alaska and the U.S.

For a number of reasons, the high VPSO turnover rates are problematic. First, it costs an estimated $6,200 to hire, train, and equip each new VPSO. In addition, the time between when one VPSO quits and another takes his or her place is more than four months (138 days)—a period during which the village is without local VPSO service. Moreover, new VPSOs will, on average, serve in a village for an additional five months before completing the training academy.

Survey

The survey of current and former VPSOs focused upon four topic areas thought to be associated with officer turnover. First of all, the officers were questioned about their pay and cost of living expenses. Both subjective and objective measures appear to indicate that VPSOs are underpaid.

- Five out of six VPSOs felt that they are not paid very well, while more than nine out of ten had the opinion that VPSOs earn much less than the job is worth.

- The majority (60%) of VPSOs reported doing something to supplement their incomes. More than 20 per cent of the officers reported using food stamps while in the program, and 48 per cent of the officers reported working an extra job while employed as a VPSO.

- VPSO housing is expensive; nearly two-thirds (63%) of the VPSOs reported paying more than one-third of their salaries toward housing. Only a slim majority (51%) of VPSOs were satisfied with the quality of their housing.

Questions were also included in the survey to consider the stresses and dangerous situations VPSOs face in their job.

- In terms of the organizational sources of stress, most of the officers surveyed were clear about the VPSO role and the limits of their authority, but most also reported receiving conflicting direction from their management authorities.

- A slim majority of VPSOs reported experiencing at least some physiological effects of stress because of their job.

- Many VPSOs feel that they have been placed in danger on the job. Most (80%) reported that they were lucky to not have been injured in some calls for service; a similar proportion (72%) said that they feared for their own life and safety while dealing with dangerous situations.

- More than one-third (37%) of the VPSOs surveyed reported being injured while making an arrest. Nearly two-thirds (63%) of those hurt while making an arrest required medical attention for their injuries.

- Roughly two-out-of-five (39%) VPSOs said that at least once in their career they had responded to a call for service in which gunshots were fired.

Alaska VPSO Program: Some Facts

The Village Public Safety Officer program began formally in 1981, filling 52 positions throughout the state. In August 2000, there were 71 VPSOs serving 70 villages. An additional 53 villages have authorized VPSO positions which are vacant.

VPSOs participate in an initial nine-week training course conducted at the Public Safety Academy in Sitka. The course covers five areas: law enforcement, fire fighting, search and rescue, water safety, and emergency medical services. In addition to this initial training the officers receive yearly refresher courses conducted on a regional basis.

The program was designed to facilitate local control over public safety services, but management authority actually resides with three entities: the village itself, the regional nonprofit Native corporation and the Alaska State Troopers. Each entity has specific responsibilities with regard to the program. The program receives all of its financial support from the state, and all program costs are contained in a single line item in the Alaska State Troopers’ budget. The FY01 budget for the VPSO program is approximately $7.5 million. A portion of this covers the cost of the troopers’ oversight administration of the program, and the remainder goes to the regional non-profits for the day-to-day operational costs of the program.

In addition to providing training and some equipment, the Alaska State Troopers serve as field supervisors of the VPSOs. Each VPSO is assigned an “Oversight Trooper”—a commissioned Alaska State Trooper who provides technical assistance, guidance and training from a centralized location which may be several hundred miles away from the village. The program calls for regular oversight visits by the assigned trooper to provide on-the-job training. In complex situations, including all felony cases, the VPSO stays in communication with the trooper, taking action to control the situation until the trooper can get to the site. VPSOs do not carry firearms on duty. Currently there are 36 Oversight Troopers.

Although the field supervision is provided by the Alaska State Troopers, the VPSOs are actually employees of the regional nonprofit Native corporations—they are paid through the corporation. Each nonprofit has a VPSO Coordinator who administers the program for the corporation. The position is responsible for payroll management, insurance and retirement plans, maintenance of personnel records and the expenditure of grant funds.

Village control over VPSOs stems from two sources. First, villages have the choice of participating in the program; in other words, a village cannot have an officer imposed upon it. The other source of village control is the power to select and terminate officers. Villages exercise ultimate discretion over who serves as a VPSO, although hiring and firing are generally conducted in consultation with the non-profits and the Alaska State Troopers. The villages provide office space, telephone service, a holding cell and any equipment not provided by the Alaska State Troopers.
Almost all (89%) VPSOs surveyed believed that the villages they served expected 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week service, and most (68%) said that the job made it difficult to take part in subsistence activities or to spend time alone with their families.

An additional set of questions was included in the survey to gauge the VPSOs’ perceptions of their training and the organizational support they received throughout their tenure.

- Although a third of the VPSOs reported dissatisfaction with their training, a majority (59%) of officers felt that they were well trained while slightly more (69%) believed that the VPSO academy prepared them for the job at hand.
- While nearly all (93%) VPSOs reported talking to their Oversight Troopers on the telephone at least once a month, a slim majority (55%) reported seeing the Oversight Troopers in their village only in the case of emergency or investigation.
- Although a majority (63%) of VPSOs were satisfied with their office space, a similar proportion (62%) felt that they lacked the equipment necessary for them to do their jobs properly.
- Most VPSOs felt that they were supported by the village they served (59%) and that people in the village expressed their appreciation for the job the officer was doing (60%).

The final set of questions included in the survey examined the experiences of the nearly two-thirds (63%) of VPSOs who are of Alaska Native heritage.

- Most Alaska Native VPSOs served in their home village (75%) or a village where they were related to other residents (93%).
- Serving in these locations often forced the Alaska Native VPSOs to enforce the law against relatives. Nearly four out of five (79%) said that they had arrested a relative. Half as many (39%) reported making an arrest of an immediate family member.
- Somewhat surprisingly, a majority (57%) of the Alaska Native VPSOs surveyed felt that they had not been pressured to be lenient toward their relatives.
- Only a slim majority (52%) of Alaska Native VPSOs felt that it was difficult to enforce the law against relatives.
- Slightly less than half (46%) of all VPSOs felt that they were treated like outcasts.
- Two out of five (42%) Alaska Native VPSOs reported being treated as if they were somehow less Native because they were VPSOs.

**Analysis**

Principal components analysis was used to reduce the large number of variables made available by the survey into a smaller number of theoretically compelling factors and scales that could then be reasonably compared using multivariate analytical techniques. Treated as though they were factors that put officers at risk of leaving the VPSO program, these factors and scales were used in three different proportional hazards regression models to investigate their effects when other factors and scales were held constant. As an analytical tool used in demographic and actuarial research, proportional hazards regression analysis was appropriate for estimating the likelihood of VPSOs quitting and/or being fired from the program in any given month given the officers’ scores on the factors and scales isolated in the principal components analysis.

What proportional hazards regression does, in essence, is examine the relationships between each of the individual causal variables (e.g., dissatisfaction with training) and the effect variable (VPSO turnover) while holding constant the values of other causal variables (e.g., marital status, age, dissatisfaction with pay, etc.). In other words, it allows us to determine what the impact of each individual causal variable is upon turnover when the values of the other individual causal variables are held equal.

Three different proportional hazards regression models of VPSO turnover were estimated to determine the probabilities of officers leaving the program. One model considered the likelihood of attrition among all VPSOs, while the other two looked at the likelihood of turnover among Alaska Native and non-Native VPSOs, respectively.

Across all three models (i.e., for all VPSOs, for Alaska Native VPSOs, and for non-Native VPSOs) a number of factors were found to be closely associated with VPSO turnover. In any given month:

- Officers who were dissatisfied with their training, were, when all else is held equal, more likely to leave the program.

Please see Turnover of VPSOs, page 6

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**Figure 2. Yearly VPSO Turnover Rates, 1983 to 1997**

Computed as a percentage of the mean number of positions at mid-month and as a percentage of the total number employed during the year.

Yearly turnover rates have decreased over recent years. From 1983 to 1990, turnover rates were relatively high with values ranging from 30% to 40%. In 1991, the turnover rate dropped to 20%, and has remained relatively stable at around 20% since then. This decrease in turnover may be attributed to factors such as improved training and support within the program, or changes in the program itself. 

### Analysis
- **1983**: Turnover rate was the highest at 40%
- **1984**: Turnover rate slightly decreased to 35%
- **1985-1990**: Turnover rates remained stable around 25-30%
- **1991**: Turnover rate dropped to 20%
- **1992-1997**: Turnover rates remained stable at around 20%

**Notes**
- Data represents the average number of positions at mid-month for each year.
- Turnover rates are calculated as a percentage of the total number of positions employed during the year.

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**Alaska Justice Forum**

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Turnover of VPSOs
(continued from page 5)

- VPSOs who were unmarried while in the program were more likely to leave the program.
- Officers who did not work an extra job while serving as VPSOs were actually at a greater risk of leaving the program.

Other factors were associated with VPSO turnover in only some of the models. In any given month:
- Among all VPSOs and among Alaska Native VPSOs, those who reported using food stamps as a means of financial assistance had a much greater chance of leaving the program.
- Among all VPSOs, being of Alaska Native heritage decreased the chance that an officer would turnover.
- Among all VPSOs, serving in a village where other police such as Village Police Officers or Tribal Police are stationed reduced the probability that an officer would leave the program.

The proportional hazards regression model for the Alaska Native subgroup generated a few results that differed from those found for the model of all VPSOs as a whole. During any given month:
- Alaska Native VPSOs who served somewhere other than their home village were more likely to turnover.
- Alaska Native VPSOs who scored highly on a psychological scale measuring directiveness (included in the survey to gauge the extent to which officers were able to do their job without being ‘bossy’) had an increased chance of quitting, or being fired from, the VPSO program.
- Alaska Native VPSOs who did not report feeling endangered on the job were at a higher risk of leaving the program.

Aside from the effects of dissatisfaction with training, being unmarried, and not working an extra job while in the program, the only other significant effect found by the proportional hazards regression model for the non-Native subgroup was that the younger a VPSO was when hired, the greater the chance of him or her leaving the program during any given month.

With the factors considered above held constant, other measures considered appeared to have negligible effect upon VPSO turnover:
- Lack of contact with, or being too far away from, an Oversight Trooper did not appear to make VPSOs any more or less likely to leave the program.
- Dissatisfaction with their equipment did not appear to have an effect upon the chances that a VPSO would turnover.
- Most of the factors associated with officer stress—role ambiguity, role conflict, adverse health effects, difficulties with the demands of VPSO duty, receiving injuries in the line of duty—appeared to have little effect upon the likelihood of an officer leav-
ing the program.

- The perceived mistreatment of VPSOs by the villages they served, either through a lack of village support or through village treatment of the officer as an outcast, also appeared to have no discernible effect upon officer attrition.

- Because of overwhelming agreement among the officers that VPSOs are not paid very well and that they deserve much more salary than they currently receive, the subjective indicators regarding VPSO pay and expenses did not help to predict which officers would stay with the program and which would terminate their employment.

- Among all VPSOs in general, and specifically among Alaska Native VPSOs, the pressures and difficulties of policing relatives did not appear to be associated with the likelihood of an officer leaving the program.

Conclusions

As explanations, no single perspective on VPSO turnover was any more convincing than any other. VPSO turnover does not appear to be associated only with relative lack of pay, with the stresses the job brings, or with the issues surrounding the officers’ Alaska Native heritage. Instead, variables from each of these perspectives helps to discern between the VPSOs that stay with the program versus those more likely to leave the program. Given that no single viewpoint was any more compelling than another, a different theoretical perspective on VPSO turnover, one which focuses upon the reasons officers have for remaining with the program and the connections they have to others in the villages they serve, should be put forth. This perspective would take into account some of the more compelling findings from this study, including those showing that:

- Entrenchment within the Alaska Native culture makes officers more likely to remain a VPSO.
- The stabilizing force of marriage has a positive influence upon the probabilities of VPSOs staying in the program.
- Service to the officer’s home village increases the likelihood that he or she will continue to serve the program.
- And, although it actually is correlated with higher levels of reported stress, service in villages where other police (such as VPOs or Tribal Police) are stationed gives a VPSO someone else with whom to work and reduces the chance that he or she will leave the program.

Ultimately, it is perhaps more beneficial to search for those things that keep VPSOs attached to the occupation instead of looking at the things that drive them away. Despite all the reasons for leaving, many VPSOs do remain with the program for good reasons for a considerable amount of time.

Darryl Wood is an assistant professor with the Justice Center. This research project was supported by Grant No. 98-IJ-CX-0035 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The complete report, Turnover Among Alaska Village Public Safety Officers: An Examination of the Factors Associated with Attrition, is available at the Justice Center Web Site at http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/just/reports/9901vpso.html.

Search for Historical Records

Dr. Lawrence Trostle of the Justice Center is compiling historical materials on Alaska Native policing from 1867 through 1959. He is interested in looking at any material—diaries, letters, government records, missionary or other church records, newspaper accounts—which relate to the contribution of Alaska Natives to law enforcement or to the general provision of justice services in the period after the purchase of Alaska from Russia through the enactment of statehood. He is also interested in speaking with anyone who may have personal reminiscences to recount.

Trostle can be reached through the Justice Center at (907) 786-1816 or aflct@uaa.alaska.edu.
2001–2002 Judicial Fellows Program

The Judicial Fellows Commission is seeking applications for the 2001–2002 Judicial Fellows Program. The program, established in 1973 and patterned after the White House and Congressional Fellowships, seeks individuals from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds who are interested in the administration of justice and who show promise of making a contribution to the judiciary.

Up to four fellows will be chosen to spend a year, beginning in late August or early September 2001, in Washington, D.C. at the Supreme Court of the United States, the Federal Judicial Center, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, or the United States Sentencing Commission. Candidates must be familiar with the federal judicial system and have at least one postgraduate degree and two or more years of successful professional experience.

Information about the program is available from:
Vanessa M. Yarnall
Administrative Director
Judicial Fellows Program
Supreme Court of the United States
Room 5
Washington, DC 20543
(202) 479-3413
http://www.ussc.gov/jdfellow/jdfellow.htm
The application deadline is November 3, 2000.

Justice Center Project Highlights

The following is a list of some of the current Justice Center research and public education projects. The Justice Center Web Site presents further information and findings from many of these projects at http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/just/research/.

Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Project (ADAM) (JC 0001)—N.S. Schafer, Cassie Atwell
Judicial Candidates Evaluation Surveys (JC 9207, 0021)—Richard Curtis
Community Jails Statewide Research Consortium (JC 9902)—N.E. Schafer
Alaska Natives: Careers in Corrections (JC 9501.05)—John Riley
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Jail Monitoring Project (JC 0108)—N.E. Schafer, Cassie Atwell
Alaska Native Technical Assistance and Research Center (JC 9915)—Lisa Rieger, Darryl Wood, Michael Jennings
Emmonak Elders’ Group Juvenile Accountability Project (JC 0009)—N.E. Schafer
Evaluation of Kids Are People Too Electronic Monitoring Program (JC 0010)—N.E. Schafer
The Changing Legal Environment and ICWA in Alaska: A Regional Study (JC 0012, proposal pending)—Lisa Rieger
IRT/ITM: The Online Substation: Government Reform, Community Policing, and the Internet (JC 0102, proposal pending)—Matthew Giblin
Reducing the Victimization of Alaska Native Women: Examining Victim Target Networks as Solvability Factors in Apprehending Rapists (JC 0103, proposal pending)—Maurice Godwin
A Multivariate Investigative Approach to Classifying Rapists’ Behavior: Developments in Linking Rape Offenses in Anchorage, Alaska (JC 0101, 0104, proposals pending)—Maurice Godwin

 Langworthy Accepts 14-Month NIJ Appointment

Professor Robert Langworthy, Director of the Justice Center at the University of Alaska Anchorage, has accepted a fourteen-month appointment as Director of the Crime Control and Prevention Division in the National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the U.S. Department of Justice. The division administers national research grants in the areas of policing, crime prevention and crime mapping. During Langworthy’s absence, Professor Nancy Schafer is serving as Acting Director of the Justice Center.