Irish-American Nationalism: From the Kennedy Administration to the Clinton Administration
By Zack Boyd
History Thesis
5/7/2009
Abstract:

The Irish in America have always had a complex relationship with their government and with American society. Few groups have resisted cultural assimilation more fervently than the Irish, and arguably none have retained so strong a political link to the current affairs of their homeland. This interest has not always been constructive; Irish-American contributions to violent organizations in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which span over a hundred years, have led to characterizations by the British press and international opinion of Irish-Americans as radical interlopers in ‘The Troubles’ who worsen the conflict and encourage bloodshed. The image of Irish-Americans that has been painted by British tabloids, Unionist agitators and popular perceptions in the US and UK are frankly incorrect.

The new class of Irish-Americans that began their evolution and ascent with the election of the Kennedy finally matured into an active group of citizens ready to speak out for moderation and constitutional means to Irish unity in the late 1970s. This class represented the interest of the vast majority of Irish-Americans in their moderation, but were active in politics rather than reserving themselves to economic and career pursuits. Though occasionally taken with wistful visions of a romantic Irish history, these modern, educated citizens were not the rabid plotters of destruction they have been made out to be and deserve an accurate description of their politics and actions. The emergence of these well-informed moderates drowned out the influence of violent radicals, voiced concerns
for peace in Northern Ireland to the governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Ireland, and heavily contributed to the peace process.

The Irish in America have always had a complex relationship with their government and with American society. Few groups have resisted cultural assimilation more fervently than the Irish, and arguably none have retained so strong a political link to the current affairs of their homeland. This interest has not always been constructive. Through several different organizations, Irish-Americans have contributed funds to violent organizations in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Largely because of these activities, which span over a hundred years, Irish-Americans have been characterized by the British press and international opinion as radical interlopers in ‘The Troubles’ who worsen the conflict and encourage bloodshed. As Michael De Nie has noted, British popular opinion and such weeklies as Punch sought to make the Irish and Irish-Americans the ‘Other’, and by comparison, establish their own identity and ascribe superiority to British culture and character.¹ The Irish-Americans bore the brunt of British rationalization and were characterized by drunkenness, violence, a proclivity to intrude into affairs other than their own, and a simian nature embodied by the racist figure “Caliban the Celt”.²

Traditional characterizations of Irish-Americans in their new home do not stray far from this image, though the edges may have been smoothed for twentieth century political correctness. A study by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago (cited in an article by the Philadelphia Inquirer) found that modern association of its subjects with Irish-Americans is the image of a lower-middle-class
devoid of a real connection to his heritage and who, in general, is conservative, racist, sexist and alcoholic.iii That same study gathered data from Irish-Americans (as determined by their ethnic entry on the US Census) and found that the actual Irish-American is nothing like the image that popular memory paints of them. Irish-Americans, as the study states, are, “the most successful educational, occupation and economic gentile ethnic group in America…they have compared with other groups, largely retained their traditional cultural patterns and tend to be rather liberal in outlook. For example, Irish Catholics are second only to Jews in their support of feminist positions.iv” This study supports an image of Irish-Americans as average, suburban middle-class Americans largely indistinguishable economically or educationally from other European immigrant groups.

What does distinguish Irish-Americans from other European immigrants is their attachment to the country from which they originated. If Irish-Americans do not fit the traditional Anglo-American stereotype in terms of their economic, social and moral character, their actions may play into their reputation as meddlers. However, the impact and involvement of Irish-Americans in general, have been grossly exaggerated. While many Irish-Americans, even ‘respectable’ ones harbor romantic thoughts about Ireland and the Republican cause, this rarely translates to direct action to support terrorism. Rather, what success fundraising done in America for the IRA has had is the result of the efforts of a relatively small core of radical republicans and some others who were unaware or mislead as to how the funds were disbursed. Nevertheless, begrudging respect has been paid by Irish-Americans to the romantic notion of IRA ‘heroes’.v This paper,
while acknowledging the penchant of Irish-Americans as a group to romanticize the republican movement, unwittingly support the IRA, even if only with moral support, and generally fail to understand the consequences of their actions, were in truth, and in their actions, peaceful constitutional nationalists. If any stereotype must be established of the average Irish-American it would be more fitting to make him middle-class, suburban, liberal and supportive of the Northern Ireland peace process not an ignorant, bigoted, zealous supporter of the IRA.

Historiographical work in this area has been scarce at best, only a few historians have written on the subject of the Irish-Americans. Most of this writing is composed of sections in longer works on the Northern Ireland issue, usually dubbed ‘The American Connection’ or in a few singular articles that later developed into book chapters. Perhaps because the ‘conclusion’ of the Troubles is so recent (1998) there has been little time for historians to buffer themselves from the events, choosing to refrain from commenting on a series of events that are still in a hazy area between ‘current events’ and ‘history’. Nevertheless, a brave few have tackled the topic, though the lack of contentiousness in their writings suggests not enough effort has been accorded to the subject to create the kind of controversy, division and discussion that usually accompanies a well studied subject. John Dumbrell and Adrian Guelke are the leading scholars in this area. Dumbrell, an American, works primarily on the foreign policies of various US Presidents, including Carter, Clinton and Bush. He has contended that Irish-Americans involved in moderate lobbying efforts and agitation in the US, as well as Irish-American politicians such as Kennedy and Moynihan were contributors to the peace in Northern
Ireland. Dumbrell admits that there has been a vein of Romantic naiveté among Irish-Americans and that significant fundraising activities by the IRA have originated in the United States. However, he finds the traditional view of the Irish-Americans by the British government, press and public to be simplistic and not representative of the truly complex relationship of Irish-Americans with their ancestral homeland. 1977 is the year that Dumbrell trumpets as a turning point in Irish-America. In this year, President Carter made an announcement condemning the actions of the British government in Northern Ireland in terms of human rights abuses and violence. This, to Dumbrell, signaled a departure from the traditional US policy of non-intervention and the inclusion of Northern Ireland as a valid US foreign policy consideration. The efforts by the US that followed were relatively politically moderate in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict, and coupled with the efforts of other moderate Irish-American groups, drew a large crowd of Irish-American supporters that had so far been silent and inactive in Irish-American Nationalist life. The success of these endeavors in eventually contributing to the Northern Ireland peace process and the popular support they received demonstrates the moderate nature of the Irish-American community as a whole.

Adrian Guelke is another prominent voice in this conversation. Hailing from the United Kingdom, his criticism of the British government and praise of the peace efforts of President Clinton are no less vocal. Like Dumbrell, he disputes the myth of the naïve Irish-American, harboring ancient grudges against the English and willingly supporting terrorism en masse. Like Dumbrell, though he pays proper notice to the facts, that a sizable portion of IRA funding originated in the United States. He includes passages in
his work detailing the involvement of NORAID in the supplying of money and arms to the IRA and small but spirited minority of Irish-Americans who did support physical force nationalism and the use of violence in Northern Ireland. Guelke illustrates an interesting counterpoint to these facts, the broad support for Irish-American issues that was obtained when wider, more relatable perspectives were related to the Irish Question. When moderate Irish-American activists and non-Irish politicians began to speak about Northern Ireland in terms of human rights, civil rights and the myriad of non-sectarian considerations that could be applied to Northern Ireland and had been widely touted in other ethnic conflicts such as the Balkans, many moderate Irish-Americans were attracted to the issue and became involved. Even non-Irish became interested in an issue that could increasingly be considered in a modern context as a debate over rights, rather than the centuries long scrap over petty religious differences it had previously been portrayed as. Like Dumbrell, Guelke writes that the majority of Irish-Americans were actually of a more moderate persuasion than the image placed on them by popular perception and traditional attitudes. When the opportunity arose, the moderate impulses of the over twenty-two million Irish-Americans were tapped into, and the movement became much more formidable and reflective of the aggregate beliefs of Irish-Americans. This belief system was a far cry from that propagated by the British government, press and general public. In fact, it is not so much the historical establishment that men like Dumbrell and Guelke have had to contend with, but with popular perception and prejudice, possibly owing to the recentness of these events. In fact feelings about the issue are so strong that at one time Dr. Guelke’s life was in danger.
The attachment of the public and press, both domestically and abroad, to this view of Irish-Americans, has been studied at length by post-Colonial historians in the case of Ireland, but less extensively when specifically referring to Irish-Americans. When it comes to analysis of attitudes toward Irish-Americans, the best known study had been conducted by Michael de Nie. Specifically in his article “A Medley Mob of Irish-American Plotters and Irish Dupes': The British Press and Transatlantic Fenianism” Michael de Nie analyzes images from the British daily Punch and other similar publications, then compares and contrasts them to other British publications to construct an idea of how Irish-Americans have been perceived historically. Punch is a crude example of how Irish-Americans were perceived in the British press, while admonished, more respectable journals, such as The Times did not entirely separate themselves from the sentiment of racism and feelings of superiority against the Irish. To many Britons, educated and not, the Irish were a lesser breed and the Irish-Americans were their unruly cousins, returned to avenge some imagined slight and to cause trouble in an otherwise ‘peaceful’ land. The view of the Americans as the cause of the Irish Troubles is well documented in the cartoons of Punch. From the perspective of a post-Colonial historian, the British would appear to be labeling the Irish as the ‘Other’ and assigning them all the characteristics that are undesirable in their own society, thus defining themselves through comparison and placing themselves above both the Irish and Irish-Americans racially. Michael de Nie makes this very argument and supports conclusions of its popularity and prevalence in British society by citing the fact that circulation of dailies such as Punch, mostly crude racist rags, outstripped the circulation of more notable and educated newspapers, such as The Times. It is entirely plausible, given the extent of the
permeation of British culture that these ideas and prejudices had in the late nineteenth to the early-twentieth century, that they would continue to have some influence and following in the mid-to-later twentieth century, the subject of this paper. Given this historiographical work, there is a clear divergence between popular perceptions of Irish-Americans and their contribution to the situation in Northern Ireland, and academic contentions of scholars that the majority of Irish-Americans were in fact interested in applying the prevailing ideas of human and civil rights, non-violent and moderate.

Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, this is the image that best represents Irish-Americans, but these citizens were largely silent. Much more public was the voice of the few in the Irish-American community who supported physical force nationalism and the violence of the IRA. This fact is perhaps a large contributor to the perception of Irish-Americans as raving radical republicans and the bankrollers of the IRA. Near the end of the period in question (roughly 1960-2000) this was not the case. Many actions taken by Irish-American groups in support of the IRA were no longer tolerated by the silent majority of Irish-Americans. The louder praise came for the actions of President Clinton and such figures as Tip O’Neill, Patrick Moynihan, Hugh Carey and Edward Kennedy. These actions were legal pursuits of peace in Northern Ireland through reconciliation, not violent insurrection. Many who had followed the events of The Troubles were tired with incessant news of bombings, death and mayhem. The emergence of the voice of constitutional nationalism was not a transformation of opinion, but a rejection of the status quo and a realization that something could be done, that the radical, violent elements of the Irish-American opinion weren’t the only perspectives that needed to be heard. This development was the direct result of many different factors
affecting the Irish-American community and the American political scene as a whole.

When John F. Kennedy was elected President of the United States, it was an underrated coup for Irish-Americans. As related by Raymond James Raymond, “The election of John Kennedy as President in 1960 not only marked the belated fulfillment of the wartime generation’s political aspirations but also gave rise to an emotional Irish-American resurgence…The great American economic boom of the 1950s had brought increased social mobility and economic prosperity to dull the ethnic self-consciousness of Irish-America further.” A New York Times article from 1994, concerning the Irish inhabitants of the suburban Long Island is revealing of the development of suburban Irish-America and its eventual cultural renaissance:

“‘But when the Irish became successful,’ Mrs. Murphy (interviewee and Long Island historian) said, ‘they moved out of the “Irish ghettos’ and into the home-oriented isolation of the suburbs, where their political interest in Irish affairs diminished…The Irish here have been assimilated,’ she added. ‘They have struggled to become accountants and lawyers. But there has been a rediscovery and resurgence of pride in Irish culture in general in Long Island.’”

The people who, at one time were outsiders of American society, had occupied the highest hall of power in the United States with the election of Kennedy. The confidence gained in this election would have critical influence on the Irish-American psyche and on the way Irish-Americans organized their socio-political groups in the future. The traditional reluctance of Irish-Americans to enter the mainstream political arena in a style other than that of Tammany Hall began to abate. There was no one factor that contributed to this evolution, but Kennedy’s election can certainly be counted among them. Irish-Americans began to perceive that they had ‘arrived’ in American mainstream
society, they could participate in government without fear of attack or retribution and they could contribute to America as Americans.\textsuperscript{xii}

The economic success of many Irish-Americans was instrumental in their acceptance into the American mainstream and their willingness to participate in the American political process to achieve their Irish Nationalist goals. At the time of Kennedy’s election and with a momentum that carried on beyond those years, the American-born descendants of the original Irish immigrants to America (most during the time of the Great Famine in 1845) were becoming increasingly suburban and gentrified. Leaving the cities and adopting a suburban lifestyle in many ways brought them more into the center politically and increased the respect they received from other groups (most whom believed the Irish as a race were unable to attain material success because of their ‘brutish and violent nature’). Economic ascent and suburban demographic movements distanced the ‘new’ Irish-Americans from the radical politics of the past and having more to lose, sought a less risky way to express their nationalist sentiments, an avenue they found in lobbying, elections and mainstream American politics.

American politics during this period lent itself to the Irish cause, once Irish-Americans took up constitutional nationalism as an alternative to violence and terrorism. The issues at stake in Northern Ireland, when considered from a broader perspective, paralleled much of the political developments occurring in the United States at the time. Issues of civil rights in Northern Ireland for Catholics were similar to those for African-Americans in the United States.\textsuperscript{xiii} In this political context, Irish-American constitutional nationalist groups that gained mainstream and Irish-American support were advantageous
solutions for this dilemma of Irish-American identity. The ‘arrival’ of Irish-Americans as a viable member of the American establishment is both marked by and partially responsible for the increasing support, power and influence of Irish-American constitutional nationalist groups from the time of John F. Kennedy’s election though the Clinton Administration. Their emergence and development of strength represents a transformation in the Irish-American community from a lower-class urban group of outsiders, to a suburban middle and upper-class group of mainstream activists included in the American mainstream at every level.

Kennedy’s election is primarily significant for its historical affect on the Irish-American and indeed the Irish psyche and perception of its place in society. However, during this time, after the failure of the IRA’s border campaign, there was little activity on the “Irish front” and not much interest in Ireland on the part of Irish-Americans (substantially contributed to by Irish-American resentment of the Republic of Ireland’s neutrality during World War II). However, activity did resume in the late 1960s with emergence of a civil rights movement in Catholic community of Northern Ireland. NICRA (Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association) was formed to advocate for equality for Northern Ireland’s Catholics in the areas of employment, housing and civic rights. NICRA initiated non-violent civil rights marches and demonstrations to protest discrimination against Catholics. The demonstrations drew on the American examples of Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King Jr. But this was not to last. Civil rights marches were interpreted was threats to the Protestant ascendancy in the North and coupled with economic woes from declines in the linen and shipbuilding industries, Protestants were
looking for an ‘other’ to vilify.” Spurred on by the extreme Loyalist rants of Rev. Ian Paisley, Protestant youths formed the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) and attacked Catholics deemed to be steeped in republican plots. The UVF was not the only group to do so, the Apprentice Boys of Derry, associated with the Orange Lodge, announced their intentions to perform rival loyalist marches on the same routes and dates as NICRA, prompting the Northern Ireland government to ban civil rights marches. Some civil rights supporters refused to obey the ban and were attacked by RUC officers. These unwarranted attacks radicalized some sections of NICRA, particularly students, who formed the People’s Democracy when more moderate civil rights groups decided to put a moratorium on marches. On January 1st, 1969 civil rights marchers initiated a march from Belfast to Derry and were attacked by Protestant groups, which included many off-duty police. The scene erupted as Catholics from the nationalist area of Derry joined the fray and Northern Ireland descended into chaos. Eventually nearly all of urban Northern Ireland was a scene of violence as nationalist and loyalist groups regularly attacked each other at random. Eventually the British Army was brought in to stabilize the situation, but not before the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland and NICRA itself were lost in the fires of sectarian violence.

The entire debacle in Northern Ireland during this period and the American reaction to it is illustrative of the complexity of Irish-American opinion towards Northern Ireland. The initial peaceful civil rights movement and demonstrations was more popular among Irish-Americans than the American equivalent led by Martin Luther King Jr. (most likely due to the racial element in the United States). James Heaney founded the
Congress for Irish Freedom, to support NICRA from the United States. Among Irish-American organizations (which prior to the hostilities in Northern Ireland had a very small active membership) the Congress for Irish Freedom was relatively popular, especially in demographics where activism had not been especially prevalent historically, namely, in the middle-class. \footnote{viii} Many of this organization’s supporters had not voiced their opinions in the arena of Irish affairs previously and were now renewing their interest in their heritage and the politics of Ireland. The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland represents an early era of reawakening among Irish-Americans to the situation in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, American support for civil rights in Northern Ireland sharply subsided when that movement failed in the midst of violence, but the transference of its energies does illuminate another aspect of the Irish-American connection. Once violence took the stage in Northern Ireland, news images of attacks on peaceful protestors, police brutality and random acts of violence perpetrated by both sides flooded the airwaves of American television. The violence in Northern Ireland was very public and moving to many Americans, Irish-Americans not the least. In Northern Ireland, what was left of the IRA was woefully inadequate to defend the Catholic community against Protestant attacks. IRA was now popularly thought in Northern Ireland to stand for ‘\textbf{I Ran Away}’. In these fires the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army was born, to meet the threat of violence against the Catholic community and renew the campaign of to unite Ireland, left to gather dust since the end of the Border Campaign in 1962. Faced with the images of what they perceived as unwarranted violence toward non-violent protesters, many Irish-Americans were angered and felt that the actions taken by the
PIRA to arm and defend their community were justified.

During this conflict, the British Parliament at Westminster assumed direct rule of Northern Ireland and sent British Army troops to stabilize the region. To this effect, the government also instituted internment of prisoners (mostly Catholics) drawn without charge or trial from Belfast and other regions in internment camps. In response to internment and a variety of other factors stemming from the violence in Northern Ireland, the Irish Northern Aid Committee was formed, principally by Michael Flannery, who was also a founding member of the PIRA. Ostensibly, the goal of NORAID was to collect funds in the United States to be transmitted to a non-profit firm in Northern Ireland and distributed to the families of internment prisoners as economic aid. However, it has been asserted by many sources that money raised by NORAID usually went to fund arms purchases by the IRA, even within the United States. In fact, in 1984, a court ordered NORAID to list the IRA as its principal foreign agent (it was forced to register as an organization making transfer payments to foreign agents in 1971 under the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act). While it may not have been entirely clear where the money the average Irish-American contributed to NORAID ended up originally, and there were misleading statements made by NORAID to contributors, it is a telling example of the vulnerability of Irish-Americans to calls for support in time of crisis from radical republican groups. However, the fate of NORAID is also an excellent example of the strength of Irish-American moderates toward the end of the period in question and their pursuit of NORAID’s destruction. While NORAID is an extant organization, it no longer remits monies to Ireland, has condemned the use of violence and supports the Good
Friday Peace Accords:

The mission of Irish Northern Aid is to develop a broad coalition of supporters for Irish Unity through organizing and educating the public, our members, political leaders, and the media; to support the current Peace Process, including the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, which was endorsed by the vast majority of the Irish people; and to support a process of National reconciliation and equality for all the citizens of Ireland.

Later on in the time period under consideration, there was a concerted effort by the American and British governments, moderate Irish-American business leaders and politicians, and the American press, to reveal the link between NORAID and the IRA, as well as the violent, revolutionary and radical face of the organization. Especially given the stigma of terrorism during periods of intense and very public, incidences of terrorism, support for NORAID and the IRA waned as more and more attention was paid to the link between the two groups. Numerous statements by politicians, including President Clinton, were made condemning NORAID and pleading for peace in Northern Ireland. These pleas were heard and repeated by Irish-American businessmen, as illustrated by the ad taken out by a number of prominent Irish-American business leaders on December 27th, 1993, pleading for peace. Even British newspapers, long committed to the image of Irish-Americans as ignorant interlopers and Romantic supporters of terrorism, began to warm to moderate Irish-Americans. Some British journalists saw that in many cases moderate Irish-Americans had been duped by organizations like NORAID and that they were beginning to learn the complexity of the Ulster question:

“What is particularly encouraging about this group (Irish-American moderates), however, is that in recent years they have turned away
from NORAID. In response to the sustained efforts of the British and Irish governments as well as numerous private lecture tours by Irish academics, journalists and politicians, this ‘layer’ of Irish-Americans is slowly becoming aware of the complexity of the Ulster situation.xxiv

Mr. Raymond, the author of this article, continues on citing economic improvement and a realistic connection with Ireland the situation there as additional factors in the education of moderate Irish-Americans and their migration away from extremist groups. He calls the Irish-American supporters of NORAID and the IRA a body of opinion, “…although small, is extremely dangerous. These Irish-Americans (often composed of recent immigrants from Northern Ireland together with Irish-American Vietnam veterans) are not very different from Provisional IRA supporters in Ireland in the historical basis of their arguments and the depth of their feelings.xxv” Clearly, if a British columnist will admit that Irish-Americans are not, as a group, in favor of violence in Northern Ireland, though somewhat naïve, then the forces at work to convince Irish-Americans to renounce NORAID must have gained some credence. American journalists echoed the observation that public attacks on NORAID and the IRA were becoming effective in educating moderate Irish-Americans. On March 16th, 1984, Michael Getler of the Washington Post wrote that, “One sign that the IRA is getting less outside help has been an increase in attempted kidnappings and bank robberies in Ireland—sources of money for the terrorist….As one official said, ‘the major success of organizations such as the New York-based Irish Northern Aid committee is in creating the impression of widespread support for the IRA in the United States.xxvi’” As a result of the news articles presented and
numerous other publications, moderate Irish-Americans became increasingly knowledgeable about the conflict in Northern Ireland, the deceit of NORAID and concluded that a peaceful approach to the situation in Northern Ireland was the only foreseeable answer to the Irish question.

Arguably the most influential group of moderate Irish-Americans was a group of politicians known as The Four Horsemen. Composed of Senator Edward Kennedy, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Governor Hugh Carey and speaker ‘Tip’ O’Neill, this small cluster of Irish-Americans was instrumental in numerous developments in Irish-American opinion and agitation. The group gained most of its initial publicity with a joint statement from its members’ office condemning NORAID, the IRA and stating support for US involvement in Northern Ireland on a foreign policy level. This statement, made on St. Patrick’s Day 1977, along with the lobbying efforts of the group, was a heavy contributor to the statement made by President Carter in that same year, articulating his human rights-based policy interest in Northern Ireland. Lobbying, in fact was the main success of the Four Horsemen. As leaders and legislators themselves, they were adept at using the legal and government processes to their advantage in pursuit of their goals. In this way, they were representative of the new awakening of moderate Irish-America and the displacement of militant republicanism with moderate constitutional nationalism. As John Dumbrell points out, the efforts of the Four Horsemen were instrumental in the drop in funding for NORAID, through public appearances and educational campaigns. Teaming up with John Hume of the Irish SDLP (Social
Democrat Liberal Party) and the Dublin government, the Four Horsemen were more effective in their campaign against NORAID and the IRA than the London government because, "(they) were all perceived by Irish-Americans as in favor of a united Ireland, albeit by constitutional means." The Four Horsemen were by no means the first Irish-American group to advocate constitutional means to a united Ireland, but they were first group that could wield enough power domestically and abroad to influence both United States foreign policy and eventually, the Northern Ireland peace process itself. The Four Horsemen were effective in drawing support and pushing their agenda in Washington, but were also successful in bringing the Irish-American business community into the fray. While Irish-Americans had previously been quietly successful, feeling fortunate enough just to survive and push forward in the American economy (as the New York Times article on Long Island suggests) the Four Horsemen were able to attract enough attention to the cause of Northern Ireland to garner committed support from Irish-American business leaders. These leaders combined in a commensurate show of solidarity and commitment on December 27th, 1993, taking out a full-page ad in the New York Times, pleading for support for the Irish peace process. Signatories include CEOs and managers of huge multi-national corporations, lawyers, judges, doctors and leading members of the Irish-American community. These are people who obviously had a great deal to lose by risking their reputation publicly. Such was the strength of their commitment to process that the Four Horsemen introduced them to.
William J. Flynn is the model citizen of this class of Irish-American activists and leaders that RJ Raymond called ‘the second layer’, a professional class of well-educated and well-informed Irish-Americans advocating for a united Ireland through a non-violent, constitutional peace process. The primary business leader behind this force, William Flynn was also the CEO of Mutual America, one of the country’s biggest insurance companies. Flynn is one of a generation of Irish-Americans who grew in the midst of the counter-culture movement of the 1960s, civil rights and without heavily emotional or nostalgic feelings for Ireland or Irish history. Suburban raised and college educated, like many other signatories, when the Four Horsemen brought attention to Ireland they examined the situation and became well-informed on Irish issues, much in the way they learned about history and current issues school. This experience gave then a less visceral connection to Ireland and allowed them to be the proud nationalists that their heritage and the politics of Irish-American nationalism required, while remaining well-reasoned and moderate advocates of peace. It was this strain of moderate Irish-American nationalism that brought President Clinton into the fray of the Northern Ireland peace process and contributed the most influential work of the history of Irish-American.

This tidal wave began with the rise of the MacBride Principles. The MacBride Principles, a list of nine principles, modeled along the lines of American civil rights and anti-discrimination legislation, made it illegal for companies in Northern Ireland to discriminate against minorities, particularly Catholics. The MacBride Principles gained their name from Sean MacBride, a Nobel laureate, founding member of Amnesty International and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who composed the Principles. The
MacBride Principles represented a fusion of American-style civil rights legislation and Irish Nationalist defense of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. It is also further demonstration of the wide support that Irish Nationalism achieved when it disembarked from sectarian agitation and enlisted a secular, human-rights based agenda. The Irish National Caucus, originally formed as an offshoot of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (a Catholic fraternal society, comparable to the Catholic version of the Orange Lodge) concerned itself almost solely with the propagation and promotion of the MacBride Principles. Founded in 1974 by Father Sean McManus, the INC was originally influenced by NORAID and was thus fairly radical in its attitude toward violence. However, as its involvement in the MacBride Principles increased, campaigns against NORAID intensified and the violence of the Troubles deepened, the INC turned away from the radical politics of violence and concentrated with single-minded purpose on promoting the MacBride Principles. At this endeavor they had much success. Capitalizing on the rising awareness of suburban Irish-Americans, the INC was able to enlist men such as William J. Flynn to endorse their principles, as well as a number of US companies. These companies committed to making hiring decisions and human resource policies that complied with the MacBride Principles. The INC and others were successful in enlisting commitments from sixty-one of the sixty-nine publicly traded US companies doing business in Northern Ireland with more than ten employees, including companies such as Conoco, AT&T, GE, GM, IBM, McDonald’s, Allstate and Viacom.\textsuperscript{xxxi} In 1998, due to the influence of President Clinton, the US Congress codified a law that required all businesses in Northern Ireland that benefited from the International Fund for Ireland (a
fund contributed to by many countries to create incentives for parties in Northern Ireland to pursue peace and reconciliation) to adhere to the MacBride Principles. The economic pinch of these initiatives has been held up as an example of the influence and positive contribution of the Irish-American lobby on the Northern Ireland peace process.

The Presidency of William J. Clinton is the last chapter chronologically in this analysis of Irish-American nationalism and perhaps the most evocative in terms of the influence of Irish-American nationalist lobbyists. During his tenure, the Irish question was frequently and seriously considered. It is, after all, during Clinton’s administration that a majority of the peace talks occurred and in which the ‘final’ (thus far) peace accords were signed in Northern Ireland. The bold approach of Clinton’s foreign policy in regards to Ireland was motivated both by his personal enterprise at ameliorating ethnic strife and the influence of the moderate forces in the Irish-American community previously described. Even from the beginning of his campaign for President Clinton was influenced by the Irish-American lobby. The Four Horsemen created the group ‘Irish Americans for Clinton and Gore’ to raise funds for Clinton’s campaign. During his campaign Clinton issued a strong statement condemning the use of lethal force by British soldiers and police in Northern Ireland, upholding the MacBride Principles, and announcing his intent to send a peace envoy to Northern Ireland in pursuit of a peace brokerage. What at first seemed like lip service to his Irish-American supports and simply a rehashing of President Jimmy Carter’s 1977 statement, turned out to be a firm and candid commitment. In February of 1994 Clinton granted a 48-hour visa to Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, the first ever visit of Adams to the US. This gesture represented a
real effort by Clinton to bring all stakeholders of the situation in Northern Ireland to the table in a realistic attempt to negotiate a peace. This shocking decision jolted the position of the British government and forced them to reconsider their previous intransigence to negotiate with radical elements of the Irish republican movement (such as the IRA and Gerry Adams). Clinton also established a fund, contributed to by the US and other western countries, that would provide aid to Northern Ireland in the event of a peace settlement. The millions of dollars committed to the fund represented a significant economic incentive for peace in the impoverished counties of Northern Ireland, where outsourcing of manufacturing jobs and declines in traditionally vibrant textile and shipbuilding industries were weakening the resolve of northerners to hold onto an ancient and costly sectarian conflict. Clinton then encouraged a visit by business leaders Bruce Morrison and William Flynn as well as upper management of the AFL-CIO to Northern Ireland to promote peace talks and the adoption of the MacBride Principles. The group was greeted by a seven-day IRA ceasefire and in August 1994 a ceasefire agreement was reached which lasted until 1996, when the same men (assisted by US Special Envoy George Mitchell) helped negotiate another ceasefire, which lasted until the Good Friday Peace Accords in 1998. In December 1994 Clinton appointed George Mitchell as a Special Envoy/Adviser to Northern Ireland, charged with mediating peace negotiations, promoting the MacBride Principles and developing encouraging private investment both for the Irish Fund and in Northern Irish businesses that adhered to the MacBride Principles. It George Mitchell who labored for four years in Northern Ireland until the Good Friday Peace Accords were hammered out. Furthermore, he advised President
Clinton to allow Gerry Adams a second trip along with Joe Cahill (an IRA figure) to explain the IRA and Sinn Fein signing the peace accords to radical groups like NORAID who would not listen to moderates and Clinton. While many factors contributed to the 1998 Good Friday Peace Accords, the contribution of President Clinton and the United States is undeniable and the convictions of Clinton to involve the United States in Northern Ireland is a direct outgrowth of the lobbying efforts of the Irish-American community. Economic and social factors in the period leading up to Clinton’s presidency increased the participation of moderate Irish-Americans, who composed a majority of the Irish-American community, and they displaced the influence of the radical minority of Irish-Americans, allowing the moderate voice of the Irish-American community speak in favor of peace and constitutional progress toward a united Ireland.

It was this voice, the voice of moderate Irish-American nationalists, that had been overshadowed by the activities of a small minority who advocated a violence and radical militancy. The potential influence of this body, representing a majority of the estimated 44 million Irish-Americans was not fully realized until Clinton’s presidency and only revealed itself in several episodes. NICRA, support for the Four Horsemen, the MacBride Principles and the INC are instances in which the moderate beliefs of the majority of Irish-Americans were expressed. This moderate nature is tempered by a tendency toward simplification of the Irish question, naïveté, romanticism and an overly emotional view of Northern Ireland. This aspect of Irish-American character has played out in contributions to groups like NORAID, intense public interest and protests at times of high emotions (i.e. Bobby Sands/Hunger Strikes, Bloody Sunday, Civil Rights marches, and general
incidences of violence both by the IRA and the British). But this facet of the Irish-American community has proven to be decidedly superficial. During times when radical Irish-American activity was at a highpoint, the majority of Irish-Americans did not approve of contribution of funds to support terrorism, did not approve of violent means to the unification of Ireland. While they may have harbored a begrudging respect for what they saw as passion and sacrifice in the actions IRA gunmen, they would not have been satisfied by the scene that would have greeted them had they experienced the work of the groups they were purported to support. The truth is that many moderate Irish-Americans in the 1960s and 1970s took interest in Ireland only when some controversy appeared on televisions. The most active players in Irish-American nationalism at this time were undoubtedly small in number, radical in politics and overwhelmingly Irish-born. What changed its that the silent majority of Irish-Americans that were politically moderate and largely uninterested in Irish affairs during this time, became interested in an active way as the conflict drew on, groups were created that suited their views and distanced themselves from the IRA and NORAID, and they were able to visit Ireland and gain a more realistic picture of the situation from disseminated information. The new class of Irish-Americans that began their evolution and ascent with the election of the Kennedy finally matured into an active group of citizens ready to speak out for moderation and constitutional means to Irish unity in the late 1970s. This class represented the interest of the vast majority of Irish-Americans in their moderation, but were active in politics rather than reserving themselves to economic and career pursuits. The emergence of these well-informed moderates drowned out the influence of violent radicals like NORAID, voiced
concerns for peace in Northern Ireland to the governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Ireland, and heavily contributed to the peace process. The image of Irish-Americans that has been painted by British tabloids, Unionist agitators and popular perceptions in the US and UK are frankly incorrect. The vast majority of Irish-Americans, feeling economically strong and socially ‘arrived’ by the time of Kennedy, were confident in their moderate principles. Though occasionally taken with wistful visions of a romantic Irish history, these modern, educated citizens were not the rabid plotters of destruction they have been made out to be and deserve an accurate description of their politics and actions. John Burns put it best in his Financial Times article when he wrote:

“The earlier Irish migration sprang from suffering and fostered a romantic sense of Irish history which militant republicans have been able to translate into money for guns. While those first Irish immigrants clambered on to American shores as supplicant refugees, today’s festive Irish fans will find a community of Irish cousins who have themselves ‘arrived’ and are now finding their voice…It is not the type of community in which the IRA can take for granted support for its campaign of violence. Numbering about five times as many Irish men and women as live in Ireland, north and south, the community’s politics is informed by moderation. As Bill Flynn puts it: ‘I think the real power of 44m Irish Americans has been awakened. It’s available to anyone who wants to be a peacemaker.’”


In 1991, an attempt was made on the life of Dr. Guelke by a member of the unionist Ulster Defense Association, his life was spared when the would-be assassin’s gun jammed.

Refer to Appendix A.)

Raymond, RJ. “Irish-America and Northern Ireland; an end to Romanticism?” *The World Today*. March 1983


Hereafter referred to simply as the IRA, since the Official IRA, from whom they split sharply declined in membership and essentially ceased to exist.


A campaign of attacks by the IRA on the Royal Ulster Constabulary designed to instigate the fall of the Northern government in order to create a united Ireland. This campaign lasted from 1956-1962 and was deemed a total failure.

Hamill, Pete. To Live For Ireland.(2000, April) *Mother Jones*, 25, 2, pp 56-64

Hamill, Pete. To Live For Ireland.(2000, April) *Mother Jones*, 25, 2, pp 56-64


Hereafter referred to simply as the IRA, since the Official IRA, from whom they split sharply declined in membership and essentially ceased to exist.


Source: http://irishnorthernaid.com/directory.html

Refer to Appendix B.)


See Appendix B.)


See Appendix C.)

See Appendix D.)


Appendix:

A.) Images from *Punch*

B.) New
Irish Eyes are crying for peace

Now is the chance

Display Ad 10.--No Title

New York Times (1857-Current file); Dec 27, 1993; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2005)
pg: A11
Appendix C.)
THE MacBride PRINCIPLES – The List
initiated, proposed, and launched by
the Irish National Caucus in November 1984
(Amplifications issued by Sean MacBride in 1986 appear in plain text)

(1) Increasing the representation of individuals, from underrepresented religious
groups in the workforce, including managerial, supervisory, administrative,
clerical, and technical jobs.
A workforce that is severely unbalanced may indicate prima facie that full equality
of opportunity is not being afforded all segments of the community in Northern
Ireland. Each signatory to the MacBride Principles must make every reasonable
lawful effort to increase the representation of underrepresented religious groups at
all levels of its operations in Northern Ireland.

(2) Adequate security for the protection of minority employees at the workplace.
While total security can be guaranteed nowhere today in Northern Ireland, each
signatory to the MacBride Principles must make reasonable good faith efforts to
protect workers against intimidation and physical abuse at the workplace.
Signatories must also make reasonable good faith efforts to ensure that applicants
are not deterred from seeking employment because of fear for their personal safety
at the workplace.

(3) Banning provocative sectarian or political emblems from the workplace.
Each signatory to the MacBride Principles must make reasonable good faith
efforts to prevent the display of provocative sectarian emblems at their plants in
Northern Ireland.

(4) Providing that all job openings be advertised publicly and providing that
special recruitment efforts be made to attract applicants from underrepresented
religious groups.
Signatories to the MacBride Principles must exert special efforts to attract
employment applications from
the sectarian community that is substantially underrepresented in the workforce.
This should not be construed to imply a diminution of opportunity for other
applicants.

(5) Providing that layoff, recall and termination procedures do not favor a
particular religious group,
Each signatory to the MacBride Principles must make reasonable good faith
efforts to ensure that layoff, recall and termination procedures do not penalize
religious groups disproportionately. Layoff and termination practices that involve seniority solely can result in discrimination against a particular religious group if the bulk of employees with greatest seniority are disproportionately from another religious group.

(6) Abolishing job reservations, apprenticeships restrictions and differential employment criteria which discriminate on the basis of religion, Signatories to the MacBride Principles must make reasonable good faith efforts to abolish all differential employment criteria whose effect is discrimination on the basis of religion. For example, job reservations and apprenticeship regulations that favor relatives of current or former employees can, in practice, promote religious discrimination if the company's workforce has historically been disproportionately drawn from another religious group.

(7) Providing for the development of training programs that will prepare substantial numbers of minority employees for skilled jobs, including the expansion of existing programs and the creation of new programs to train, upgrade and improve the skills of minority employees, This does not imply that such programs should not be open to all members of the workforce equally.

(8) Establishing procedures to assess, identify and actively recruit minority employees with the potential for further advancement, This section does not imply that such procedures should not apply to all employee equally.

(9) Providing for the appointment of a senior management staff member to be responsible for the employment efforts of the entity and, within a reasonable period of time, the implementation of the principles described above. In addition to the above, each signatory to the MacBride Principles is required to report annually to an independent monitoring agency on its progress in the implementation of these Principles.

Source: http://www.irishnationalcaucus.org/
Appendix D.)

**U.S. COMPANIES AGREEING TO THE MACBRIDE PRINCIPLES AND DATES OF AGREEMENT**

(As of July 11, 2001)

These 61 US Companies have agreed in writing to “make all lawful efforts to implement the Fair Employment Practices embodied in the MacBride Principles in their Northern Ireland operations (some of these companies no longer operate in Northern Ireland or have been bought by another company).

Overall, there are 120 companies doing business in Northern Ireland. But only 69 publicly traded companies have more than 10 employees. (It is only publicly traded companies with over 10 employees that are obliged by British law to keep a statistical breakdown of the workforce by religion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. AES Corporation</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Allstate</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. AM International</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. American Home Products</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AT &amp; T</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Avery Dennison</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. AVX Corporation</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Bemis Corporation</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Cendant Corporation</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Chesapeake Corporation</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Conoco</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Dana Corporation</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Data General</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Donnelly (R.R.) &amp; Sons</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. DuPont</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Estee Lauder</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23. Fort James 1998
24. Fruit of the Loom 1991
25. GATX Corporation 1993
27. General Motors 1995
28. Honeywell 1990
30. Hyster (NACCO Industries) 1991
31. IBM 1992
32. Interface, Inc. 2001
33. Keyspan Energy 1997
34. McDonald's Corporation 1994
35. Marsh and McClennan 1994
36. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M Corp) 1996
37. Northern Telcom (BCE Corporation) 1993
38. NYNEX 1990
39. Oneida 1991
40. Petsmart 1999
41. Phillip Morris 1995
42. Pitney Bowes 1990
43. Procter & Gamble 1991
44. Reynolds Metals 1994
45. Sara Lee 1991
46. Shaw Industries 1996
47. Sonoco 1991
48. Sun Healthcare 1999
49. Teleflex 1991
50. Texaco 1991
51. Toys 'R' Us 1999
52. TRW, Inc. 2001
53. Tyco International 1994
54. Unisys 1993
55. United Technologies 2001
56. VF Corporation 1992
57. Viacom 1999
58. Warnaco 1995
59. Waste Management 1998
60. Westinghouse Electric 1995
61. Xerox Corporation 1996
Source: http://www.irishnationalcaucus.org/
Bibliography


1979.


Hamill, Pete. To Live For Ireland.(2000, April) *Mother Jones*, 25, 2, pp 56-64


Irish National Caucus. “MacBride Principles”.

http://irishnationalcaucus.org/pages/MacBride/macbride.htm

Irish National Caucus. “US Companies Agreeing to the MacBride Principles”.

http://www.irishnationalcaucus.org/pages/Articles2001/U.S.%20COMPANIES%20AGREEING%20TO%20THE%20MACBRIDE%20PRINCIPLES.htm


Raymond, RJ. “Irish-America and Northern Ireland; an end to Romanticism?” *The World Today*. March 1983


United States Department of Justice: Foreign Agents Registration Unit. (1984). Exhibit A of Irish Northern Aid Committee Registration Statement. Washington, DC:
