JAMES HOGG, FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, AND ROMANTIC ANACHRONISM

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A

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Abstract

This thesis explores the problematic nature of the term “Romanticism” as traditionally dictated by national and temporal constraints. Most scholars and literary institutions (i.e., anthologies) define Romanticism as a solely European phenomenon of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This definition, intentionally or not, serves an elitist function in assuming that only Europeans of a specific era were capable of producing texts with Romantic qualities. Further, even authors who fall into this temporal and nationalistic category are often excluded due to their social class. This thesis seeks to extend the boundaries of Romanticism through examining two authors who, despite some recent efforts at re-appropriation, had previously been excluded by Romanticism: Scotland’s James Hogg (1770-1835) and Russia’s Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881). Specifically, this thesis explores a defining Romantic aesthetic trait – the Romantic Anachronism – as it operates in both authors’ uncannily similar masterworks, Hogg’s *The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner* (1824), and Dostoevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov* (1880). By placing emphasis on aesthetic rather than temporal and national constraints, Romanticism may be redefined towards an inclusivity that bolsters the relevance of Romanticism for current and future scholars operating in an increasingly globalized and rapidly diversifying world.
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Introduction: The Problem with Romanticism

Two stories, two countries, two continents, two devils, two sinner-intellectuals, two authors stuck on the outskirts of a hegemonic conception of Romanticism: originally titled “The Life of a Great Sinner,” *The Brothers Karamazov* by Fyodor Dostoevsky and James Hogg’s *The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner* (henceforth referred to *TBK* and *CJS* respectively) share more in common than their ambivalent Romantic protagonists. Both novels were, at some point in the past, excluded from the category of Romanticism due to arguably arbitrary temporal and nationalistic constraints. Although Hogg has since, to some degree, been re-appropriated as a “Romantic” by scholars, he is still largely excluded from anthologies and rarely taught in university-level Romanticism surveys. Similarly, though Dostoevsky has achieved worldwide notoriety and today can hardly be considered a victim of scholarly neglect or unfair treatment, recent scholars of Romanticism rarely consider him in their studies despite covering topics that would lend themselves to or benefit from discussion of Dostoevsky’s novel.

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1 The endnotes of Alan Richardson’s “British Romanticism as a Cognitive Category” include a statistical analysis of the number of times various Romantic authors occur across the major Romantic anthologies. James Hogg does not occur often enough to even merit mention, despite his prominent relation to Romantic authors. Recent editions of *English Romantic Writers* (Perkins), the Longman Anthology (Damrosch et al.), Broadview Anthology (Black) and Norton Anthology (Greenblatt et al.) similarly exclude Hogg. In the Longman Anthology, for example, the only mention in the entire text is titular: in Wordsworth’s “Extempore Effusion on the Death of James Hogg.” Though *Romantic Period Writings* (Haywood et al.) includes Hogg, it is only in passing reference in relation to other Romantic authors. *Romanticism: An Anthology* (Wu) includes Hogg, but features only one obscure poem of his: “The Witch of Fyfe.” Clearly, despite his 21st century popularity as a novelist, Hogg is still a predominantly excluded author by canon-formers.

2 For example, Dostoevsky self-consciously refers to “The Romantic” and “Romanticism” several times throughout *TBK*; especially in relation to antiquated English authors such as Shakespeare.
Both authors, excluded from Romanticism as it has been traditionally defined, share more in common than traditional period and national demarcations of Romanticism would suppose. These overlooked Romantic commonalities, I will argue, illustrate the need to redefine the category of “Romanticism” in more inclusive terms.

Although the commonalities between each work deserve examination, the focus of this thesis is upon the interactions between the Romantic hero protagonists (Robert Wringhim and Ivan Karamazov, respectively) and their Devil figure as a sufficient cause to categorize both works as Romantic. This comparison of Hogg and Dostoevsky under the unifying banner of Romanticism arose, oddly enough, from Ian Duncan’s 2010 introduction to CJS. Despite Hogg’s exclusion from polite society in his lifetime, Duncan describes CJS as a “world’s classic” that keeps company with the great nineteenth-century fables of the crisis of the modern self: tales of the doppelganger, by Hoffman, Poe, and Gogol, Dostoevsky, and Stevenson; the pact with the Devil, in Goethe’s Faust; the poor youth who commits murder in the belief that he transcends moral law, in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. Like much modern Scottish writing, Hogg’s masterpiece has more in common with works of German, Russian, or North American fiction than with anything produced in England. (viii)

Each of these authors – Hoffman Poe, Gogol, Stevenson, and Goethe – has been studied in relation Hogg, aside from Dostoevsky. While Duncan notes the common themes in

(11). The Romantic subject matter of TBK – and especially his Romantic protagonist, Ivan – will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Dostoevsky and Hogg, at this time there has yet to be any scholarly work done comparing Hogg and Dostoevsky. Due to their apparent romantic commonalities, this lack of comparison is a loss to both Hogg and Dostoevsky scholars. Given that it is unlikely that Dostoevsky ever read Hogg, the uncanny commonalities between the works – specifically the relationship between Wringhim and his devil, Gil-Martin, and Ivan and his Devil, Smerdyakov – show that tropes or motifs which have been critically defined as operating in a Romantic aesthetic point to something basic to the human response to certain recurrent social or economic circumstances, rather than a national trope. Such a commonality between two authors separated by such vast time, space, and cultural constraints illustrates the global potential for Romanticism – often considered an archaic critical category – to remain alive and relevant as a critical and aesthetic category; that is, through redefining Romanticism more inclusively, it turns into a living aesthetic mode of writing rather than a fading historical category.

The term Romanticism has been problematic and nebulous since its very inception; thus, delineating what texts and preoccupations constitute the category is difficult. As of 2013, *The Oxford English Dictionary* defines the “Romantic” in reference to literature and art as “characteristic of a movement or style during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe marked by an emphasis on feeling, individuality, and passion rather than classical form and order, and typically preferring grandeur, picturesqueness, or naturalness to finish and proportion” (OED “romantic” def. 1). Similarly, the most recent edition of the Norton Anthology (Romantic Period) emphasizes temporal and national constraints, contextualizing the Romantic mode as
dependent upon the French and Industrial Revolutions (Greenblatt et al., 6). Both the
*OED* and *Norton Anthology* make the aesthetic or stylistic traits of Romanticism
secondary to national and temporal factors, thus upholding, intentionally or not, an
assumption that Romantic aesthetic qualities are strictly limited to the geographies and
chronologies traditionally associated with the term. Although problematic enough itself,
this assumption carries an even more unsettling corollary: that (predominantly white and
male) Western Europeans between 1780 and 1837 were the only authors capable of
producing ideas and texts in the Romantic mode. In other words, the time- and place-
centered definition of Romanticism tacitly affirms the myths of Western exceptionalism
and cultural superiority.

Some scholars may contend that the *OED* and other popular sources are by no
means indicative of the current critical concept of Romanticism. Yet, while perhaps not
on the cutting edge of scholarship, the influence of the definitions proposed by the editors
of the *OED*, the *Norton Anthology*, and other canon-forming institutions – such as public
universities and popular literary magazines – cannot be ignored. After all, such
gatekeepers of accepted knowledge are often the first encounter undergraduates, graduate
students, and the general public have with the category of Romanticism. John Guillory
confirms the power of these canon-forming institutions when he labels college students
the “marginal elite” – or minority voices, secondary to the major elite of professors and
institutions – who help form the literary canon (145, 162). The few specialist voices
offering more innovative views of Romanticism as a category have been in effect
drowned out by the “marginal elites” who have internalized the traditional concept of Romanticism disseminated by educational institutions.

Substantiating the important influence of such institutions on understandings of Romanticism, Alan Richardson, in “British Romanticism as a Cognitive Category” (1997), studied the repeated occurrence of several Romantic authors across popular Romanticism anthologies and noticed that the same five authors – “Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, and Keats” – appear repeatedly (notably in overrepresentation in relation to their popularity in their own era). By contrast, most of the other writers included “are held to belong to the category (or canon) in good part by virtue of their proximity to the prototypical examples” (2). Among the excluded authors are Maria Edgeworth, Thomas Carlyle, Robert Burns, Alexander Pushkin, and James Macpherson; surprisingly, even Sir Walter Scott appears very scarcely in relation to the major five Romantic authors. Richardson substantiates the claim made throughout this thesis that hegemonic institutions, whether they consciously or subconsciously exclude texts, have an effect, or else presuppose, a definition of Romanticism that confirms not only the superiority of Europe over Russia and the “East,” but also, as will be clear later from my discussion of Hogg, reinforces the national and cultural superiority of England over Scotland.

On account of the ideology accompanying traditional definitions of Romanticism premised on temporal and national constraints, I propose a new, more inclusive definition that, at the very least, accommodates authors such as Hogg and Dostoevsky that were and sometimes continue to be excluded under the existing definition. My task of redefinition
takes its cue from Jerome McGann’s claim that “not every artistic production in the Romantic period is a Romantic one… the Romantic age is so called not because all its works are Romantic, but rather because the ideologies of Romanticism exerted an increasingly dominant influence during that time” (19). McGann posits that Romanticism can be conceived in ways beyond the temporal and national; and though McGann would reject my contention that a concept of Romanticism can be founded on some distinctly Romantic quality, “essence,” or “spirit”—the entire concept of “essence” being, for McGann, an aspect of the Romantic ideology—such essentialism can be justified pragmatically, which is to say, be justified for its providing a more inclusive concept of Romanticism than otherwise possible. Indeed, such a definition may prove more inclusive than McGann’s own insofar as he, though shifting the focus from texts to ideologies, preserves the temporal and national bias, basing his study largely on the philosophies of two major traditional Romantics (Coleridge and Hegel), and the writings of the same five authors identified by Richardson as dominating Romanticism anthologies (40). The quality or essence that offers a sufficient cause for labeling a work Romantic is what I will term “Romantic anachronism,” a uniquely Romantic orientation to time and space. Before I say more about this method of categorization, I will first illustrate the relevance of re-defining Romanticism through a brief survey of the troubled semantic history of the term. From there I will argue why Romantic scholars – and scholars of Hogg and Dostoevsky – would benefit from a revisionist study of Hogg and Dostoevsky as “Romantics.”
In 1924, Arthur O. Lovejoy outlined the study of Romanticism’s greatest problem: its definition, or lack thereof. According to Lovejoy, “the word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing” (232). In 1949, Rene Wellek built upon and challenged Lovejoy’s need for various distinctions of Romanticism, arguing that there is more in common between the various Romanticisms than there is difference, and that they all can be united under the term of Romanticism. He argues for the use of three criteria to define Romanticism: “imagination for the view of poetry, nature for the view of the world, and symbol and myth for poetic style” (147). Yet, even still, Wellek only considers Romanticism a Western European phenomenon, again imposing national constraints upon the term. Indeed, Wellek stresses that the unity of European Romantic works acts as a defining characteristic of Romanticism, directly excluding the possibility of alternative global Romanticisms (147). And, although the 1980s and 1990s saw a resurgence of discussion regarding Romanticism as a critical category, scholars came no closer to agreeing on a defining “spirit” or characteristic of Romanticism. For the most part, these scholars renewed Lovejoy’s position. In 1991, Frances Ferguson argues Wellek’s definition is overly broad and seconds Lovejoy’s use of distinctions as “the need for these distinctions, moreover, is particularly pressing . . . because it will produce greater specificity (472). In 1996, Aidan Day, in answer to the question whether there “can be said any sort of coherence” in terms of Romantic works, simply accepts and quotes Lovejoy’s conception of Romanticisms (5, 184-5). Rather than offering up a new, universal characteristic of Romanticism, recent critics fall back on Lovejoy’s nearly one hundred year old definition.
This is not to suggest that scholars have refused to seize upon certain qualities or characteristics claimed to be Romantic. Several scholars have attempted to pinpoint a particular unifying trait of Romanticism: Mario Praz singled out Romantic Agony (1956), Yvonne Marie Carothers posited Enthusiasm (1977), Anne Mellor singled out Romantic irony (1980), Peter Thorslev offered Freedom and Destiny (1984), Jerome McGann in 1983 and Markman Ellis in 1996 designated Sensibility, and Andrew Stauffer specified Romantic rage as a defining characteristic of Romanticism (2005). However, despite their merits, each of these unifying characteristics has its limits: Wordsworth hardly exhibits the rage described by Stauffer, and many post-modern works would arguably fit Mellor’s concept of Romantic irony. Moreover, many of the figures who get short shrift in recent anthologies – Thomas Love Peacock, Robert Merry, Leigh Hunt, Walter Savage Landor, and Mary Robinson, to name a few – hardly reflect any of these supposed preoccupations with enthusiasm, destiny, irony, or rage supposedly defining the Romantic movement. None of these designations is entirely satisfactory because each one excludes a portion of authors or works with otherwise distinguishing Romantic traits, but do not fulfill the limiting critical lens of the scholar.

While much recent scholarship is undecided on the underpinnings of the Romantic designation, some scholars are moving away from the traditional constraints towards a more inclusive view of Romanticism. For example, Larry H. Peer argues that “Romanticism is linguistically, geographically, and disciplinarily multi-territorial, in spite of those teaching in our schools, and producing some of our scholarship, who even use the term ‘Romanticism’ in a narrowed down way” (8). Peter J. Kitson also acknowledges
that the Romantic period and Romanticism are often erroneously conflated, “the period [coming] to be defined by the term ‘Romantic,’ which relates more to a kind of writing in both style and subject, than to a defined historical period . . . ‘Romantic’ and ‘Romanticism’ are critical constructions” (185). In other words, “Romanticism” and “the Romantic” are critical designations separable from the Romantic period. Scholars often erroneously assume that all art produced between 1785 and 1832 is aesthetically Romantic based purely on its chronology. In reality, many works published in the Romantic period did not fulfill the Romantic aesthetic. “The Romantic” as a stylistic designation may be attributed to any work – of any time period or nation – exhibiting Romantic stylistic traits.

Taking this aesthetic conception of Romanticism to its logical end, Nicholas Tapp argues for “romanticism [as] a general and inclusive term” present in locations, including China, that are typically believed to fall outside the bounds of Romanticism. Authors such as Ezekiel Mphahlele even identify an African Romanticism (Mphahlele 4). Consistent with this more capacious imagining of Romanticism, Tapp redefines Romanticism on an aesthetic basis, as

a movement or sentiment which involves the sense of inwardness, an aspiration to the sublime, a restive dissatisfaction with normalcy and the mundane, an interest in the spiritual and aesthetic, a searching out of the extraordinary perhaps, a rage against conventional norms and sometimes a recklessness, a heedlessness of the self and its body. And we mean, not an isolated sentiment or historical example, nor the capacity for any one of
these things, but a movement, a school, a way of thought, a model of being, a community of spirit. (2)

The evolution of understandings of the terms “Romantic” and “Romanticism” exhibited by Tapp and Kitson illustrate that scholars are moving towards more inclusive ways of defining Romanticism based around style, subject, or aesthetic qualities, not temporal and national constraints. However, both authors continue to frame the need for expansion within the old temporal constraints. Despite their traditional temporal framework, many scholars reject their national claims as too radical. The present body of such radical criticism is small enough to be ignored or silenced by major Romantic scholars who support traditional understandings of Romanticism.

While critical conceptions of “irony” and “nostalgia” perhaps come closest to identifying a sufficient cause to label a work Romanticism, I offer a term broad enough to encompass diverse global as well as temporal (to include the pre-Romantic, traditional Romantic Period, contemporary Romantic, and recognize the potential for Romantic works) aesthetic manifestations of Romanticism while still maintaining a narrow enough scope unique to the category. In order to focus on the aesthetic rather than temporal or national constraints placed upon the term, I offer “Romantic anachronism” as a distinctly romantic trope. By “Romantic anachronism,” I mean something similar to Romantic nostalgia, sehnsucht, or “existential homelessness,” but also something distinct on account of its paradoxical qualities, qualities linking it to the teleological dialectic and self-awareness – or irony – that scholars such as McGann and Thorslev detect at the center of Romanticism. In this essay, anachronism extends to include a general national,
temporal, and social out-of-placeness embodied in the angst or inner torment experienced by the Romantic hero, inner turmoil manifested through inconsistencies or the holding of paradoxical behaviors and beliefs. For example, a character might both believe and not believe in God or the Devil, or profess guilt while also maintaining innocence, as is the case for both Ivan Karamazov and Robert Wringhim. Often, such characters – and their authors – rebel against categorization by hegemonic authorities such as critics (in the case of Dostoevsky and Hogg), courts (in the case of Ivan), or predominant morality (in the case of Robert Wringhim) through what can be interpreted as equally genuine mockery and sincerity. Rebellion in this sense can be boiled down to Romantic authors and characters both reaffirming and rejecting hegemonic beliefs; in essence, realizing both thesis and anti-thesis of the non-Romantic. In this way, the presence of paradox (two logically incompatible truths existing simultaneously) and anachronism (the tension caused by two time periods or temporal designators coexisting, such as the past in the present) may act as a sufficient theoretical cause to label a work Romantic. Romantic anachronism serves in both novels as a means of resistance – a way of rebelling against the limitations of literary authority.

Defining Romanticism more inclusively in this way is necessary for two major reasons: first, because current definitions marginalize otherwise exemplary Romantic figures, and second, because a temporally and nationally liberated definition would open Romanticism up to previously neglected scholarship intersections. I operate under the fundamental assumption that including such diverse samplings under a unifying literary category such as Romanticism enriches critical understandings of the categories, and of
the works themselves by emphasizing aesthetic and theoretical attributes rather than shallow concerns such as an author’s national or temporal identity; things which the author has no control over rather than the skill and stylistic components of their work. I hope to illustrate how, through both authors’ resistance to marginalization by their respective critics, the unlikely and diverse pairing of James Hogg’s *The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner* and Fyodor Dostoevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov* can provide a radically inclusive redefinition of Romanticism. Further, nothing is lost through their inclusion: rather, that such inclusion has the potential to make Romanticism a relevant and living study for scholars, critics, and admirers of literature. That is, practically speaking, that in an academic world where more and more students and scholars hail from traditionally “Non-Romantic” nationalities such as Chinese, Mexican, and Nigerian, the study of a globally applicable Romantic aesthetic is more likely to remain alive and relevant than one restricted to a particular national or temporal demographic of authors. If Romanticism is paradoxically reduced and expanded into a basic human experience, it becomes critically accessible to a wider group of scholars; as with any study, more exciting discoveries can be made when a topic is explored by many diverse perspectives.

**AN UNLIKELY ROMANTIC PAIRING**

Close analysis of specific passages from *CJS* and *TBK* help make the case for a more inclusive definition of Romanticism founded on the quality I term Romantic anachronism. The Romanticism of *CJS* and *TBK* emerges foremost through their ironic
re-appropriation of the criticism aimed at both authors by contemporaries. While CJS complicates and redefines the British-specific Romanticism offered by Hogg’s main critic, William Wordsworth, in order to fashion a Scottish Romanticism, TBK at once resists, accepts and complicates the critic Vissarion Belinsky’s categorization of Dostoevsky as a Romantic. I will argue that Hogg and Dostoevsky’s anachronistic heroes in CJS and TBK, Robert Wringhim and Ivan Karamzov, are symbolically fungible with Hogg and Dostoevsky respectively.

Largely popular during his time, Hogg was otherwise forgotten in critical discourse until the 1970s. While scholars place James Hogg under the banner of Romanticism, few anthologies contain more than a passing reference to him. This is all despite the fact that he was, to use Richardson’s definition of the Romantic, in close proximity to prototypical Romantic authors: a sometime informant and protégé of Sir Walter Scott, a friend of Thomas DeQuincey, and a self-postured enemy of William Wordsworth. Perhaps Hogg’s present exclusion follows from the ridicule Hogg received in reviews and his resulting social exclusion by the main literary gatekeeping institution of his time, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine. Sir Walter Scott and the Blackwood’s reviewers mocked Hogg, someone without title or formal education, as sort of a caricature of rustic Scottish depravity and thwarted him from achieving the recognition he desired. Hogg was ostracized due to what Scott described as Hogg’s lack of taste and “common tact” (Scott 140); and his unromantic Scots accent was likewise derided, with Wordsworth suggesting that Hogg’s writing had “no pretense to be called English” (Jackson 92).
In what may seem a strange juxtaposition to this shepherd writing in Scotland in the early 1800s, Fyodor Dostoevsky—the son of a doctor and member of the gentry writing in St. Petersburg, Russia—appears antithetical to the Romantic Movement with his realistic, gritty depictions of depravity, chronicled in such works as *Notes from the Underground* and *Crime and Punishment*. In terms of national and temporal context, Dostoevsky resides outside of Romanticism; and such exclusion, though perhaps not harmful to Dostoevsky’s fame, is detrimental to Romantic scholars because it limits the range of their study to a disturbingly elitist demographic of authors, and makes the aesthetic qualities of Romantic literature seem less important than its temporal and national constraints: this confuses “Romanticism” with “The Romantic Period.” If the aesthetic of Romanticism is limited to a select few white, male, nineteenth century British authors, then the term as a critical category is made a repressive and arbitrary term. To rephrase the problem of Romanticism as exclusive, what is to be gained from limiting the term? To exclude Dostoevsky degrades the aesthetic qualities of the term Romanticism such as nostalgia, transcendentalism, and emphasis on the subjectivity of the Romantic hero, confusing the term Romanticism, at best, with The Romantic Period or, at worst, rendering the Romantic a too-narrow category defined strictly by national or chronological factors. However, *TBK*, and indeed Dostoevsky’s entire oeuvre, displays an inescapable obsession with Romanticism: Dostoevsky famously carried a copy of Sir Walter Scott’s *Waverley* (34), and in his letters recommended Sir Walter Scott as a necessary read (Letters 23, 254). Dostoevsky’s contemporaries associated him with
romanticism, a classification that Dostoevsky’s most cited modern biographer, Joseph Frank, also fully endorses\(^3\) (60).

Regardless of his fame, Dostoevsky deserves to be included under the Romanticism rubric because of the literary traits of his work, critical and self-identification. Despite Dostoevsky’s exclusion from Romanticism, his contemporaneous critics such as Belinsky derided Dostoevsky’s Western Romantic tendencies (Pevear 844). The point I am trying to make is that an author’s ultimate success has little to do with their categorization as Romantic, but both Dostoevsky and Hogg’s marginalization by their contemporaries, and subsequent redefinition of themselves and their work, results in the romantic aesthetic of paradox and displacement; that is, anachronism. Through \textit{CJS}, Hogg, the “Ettrick Shepherd,” whether intentionally or not, complicated the problematic Romanticization of shepherds, Scotland, and Scots by non-Scottish authors such as Wordsworth at the same time Wordsworth questioned Hogg’s legitimacy as an author. Dostoevsky likewise took offense to Belinsky’s calling him a Romantic, an intended insult, but later accepted the term and made it a major redeeming tenet of his troubled hero, Ivan. Though Romanticism as a critical category did not yet exist in Hogg’s time, both Hogg and Dostoevsky identify a concept of literary hegemony from which they are both included and excluded, and attempt to place themselves in their own

\(\textit{footnote 3}\) While critics often describe the Russian Romantic tradition as temporally and aesthetically distinct from Western European Romanticism, Frank notes that Dostoevsky’s particular Romantic bend is influenced by Scott, Pushkin, and Goethe, placing him in both the Eastern and Western Romantic literary traditions (34-7).
conception of the Romantic aesthetic. In fact, James Hogg, “The Ettrick Shepherd,” I will argue, was himself, in aesthetic terms, the perfect Romantic subject⁴.

These unlikely Romantic novels share many uncanny commonalities, principal of which is their use of the aforementioned Romantic anachronism. In both novels this anachronism takes a specific and nearly identical form: the use of the devil in their otherwise post-religious settings. Ian Duncan points out that Robert Wringhim is “a great, a transcendent sinner” among the likes of Romantic greats such as Don Giovanni and Milton’s Satan (Duncan 1). This idealization of the tragic sinner embodies the intersection between paradox and anachronism both in its glorification of a past hero in a present moment, a Christian mythological being in an otherwise realistic, Post-Christian world, and each protagonist’s obsession with the paradoxes of their respective religious beliefs. Essentially, both Wringhim and Ivan obsess over the status of Christianity in a post-Christian world and the problems that arise in the conflict between logic and faith.

Ivan and Robert embody this Romantic tendency towards anachronism, a tendency symbolized most directly by their conversations with the devil. Yet despite the evidence clearly identifying Hogg and Dostoevsky as Romantics, including their aesthetic preoccupations with nature, transcendence, and anachronistically reviving Christian mythologies in a secular world, these authors are excluded from Romanticism.

⁴ So perfect that, after his death, Wordsworth, though by no means a friend of Hogg’s, wrote the “Extempore Effusion Upon the Death of James Hogg” (1835), a poem so ostensibly representative of Romantic tendencies that it was included in Harold Bloom’s Till I End My Song: A Gathering of Last Poems (2010). It is also typically featured in standard selections of Wordsworth’s poetry.
The two chapters to follow will contest this exclusion along with the prevailing understanding of Romanticism that has thus far enabled that exclusion.
Chapter 1: James Hogg’s Characters as Definition-Resistant Romantic Subjects

_The fact that I_

_**am writing to you**_

_in English_

_already falsifies what I_

_wanted to tell you._

_My subject:_

_**how to explain to you that I**_

_don’t belong to English_

_though I belong nowhere else_ – Gustavo Perez Firmat

Although seemingly out of place in a chapter focused on Scottish and British Romanticisms, these lines from Firmat’s 1994 preface to his book of poetry entitled _Bilingual Blues_ captures the position of James Hogg’s 1824 novel, _Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner_ (CJS), in relation to the English influence on the category of Romanticism. An American-educated Cuban writer, Firmat exists at once as a popular mainstream literary figure, but is also forced to the fringes of society by his skin color, language and heritage. Even if he has been appropriated into mainstream literary prestige, he expresses here that he still feels out of place given his two different dialects and cultures are incompatible in many ways. Even the phrase “Cuban-American,” through hyphenation, highlights the national difference even as it includes.
Hogg operates under a similar view of the Scottish author’s relation to England. This concept of a misplaced, doubled national identity is often identified as a Romantic literary trope, especially in the works of both Hogg and Dostoevsky. In Hogg’s lifetime, Scotland was continuing to negotiate its cultural identity after the 1603 and 1707 Unions had subsumed Scotland into “Great Britain,” placing the fate of Scotland’s literary identity in the hands of predominantly English authors who, in many cases, dismissed Scottish writings as insufficiently Romantic because they were insufficiently British or English. Such critics valorized predominately English literary elements, including travel writing and elevated English language, as universal “Romantic” qualities, thereby tacitly excluding Scottish authors from membership within the evolving category of “Romanticism.” In the wake of such dismissals, Scottish authors such as Hogg set out to re-fashion a Scottish “Romantic” identity that the Union had largely obliterated. Like Firmat’s preface, Hogg recognizes that he does not “belong to English” and, by extension, Great Britain or England, though he belongs, perhaps, “nowhere else.” While Hogg may have at times felt he belonged in Scotland as a shepherd, he certainly aspired to matriculate into upper class Edinburgh and English literary culture. He found notoriety, but not respect, when he was lampooned by his cultured superiors in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine. In many ways, Hogg’s split personality as popular author in London, rustic caricature in others’ writing, and exclusion from upper class literary society mirrors that of his characters’ – Robert Wringhim, George Colwan, and Gil-Martin – split identities in his novel.
Douglas Mack, Katie Trumpener, Donald Wehrs and Ismael Velasco have characterized Hogg’s literature as challenging English imperial or colonial superiority, yet there has been surprisingly little exploration of the conflict between Wordsworth and Hogg as embodiments of distinct English and Scottish Romanticisms. Despite the term “Romanticism” as it is presently (and, as previously discussed, problematically) defined not being in wide circulation in literary discussions during Hogg’s time, many of the abstract ideas or qualities often identified presently as comprising “the Romantic” were iterated by now-canonical English authors William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, for example, in their 1800 collection, *Lyrical Ballads*. Through poems such as “The Solitary Reaper” (1807), “Songs of Shepherds and Rustical Roundelays” (1803), and “An Evening Walk, Addressed to a Young Lady” (1787), Wordsworth and Coleridge posited an aesthetic that valorized the “rustic” shepherd of Northern England and Scotland as a repository of authentic, uncorrupted human feeling and pre-modern values, an image also disseminated in Wordsworth’s “Poems Written During a Tour of Scotland” (1803). However, while Wordsworth claimed in his poetry to value Scotland, he repeatedly insulted Scottish writers, mocking Hogg in particular for his Scots language. In turn, Hogg used *CJS* to subvert Wordsworth’s Anglo-centric understanding of the “Romantic” that admitted the Scottish Romanticism only as an inferior category invented by the English to confirm through contrast the superiority of English Romanticism. In particular, Hogg counters the image of Scotland circulated in Wordsworth’s poetry, an image that, as Katherine Grenier notes, enabled English readers “to appropriate Scottish identity for their own needs” (8). Hogg parodies Wordsworth and his Anglicized
“Scottish Romanticism” through the characters Robert Wringhim, George Colwan, and the devil Gil-Martin, all of whom, in exhibiting both Scottish and English traits, blur the definition of “Scottish” in order to destabilize the English monopoly on Romantic “British” identity.

BATTLING AUTHORS, BATTLING ROMANTICISMS

According to Ian Duncan, CJS stages a battle between conflicting Romanticisms, between “Wringhim’s dark Romanticism and Colwan’s Wordsworthian, English, enlightened Romanticism” (Duncan “A Great Sinner” 4-5). I would like to both build upon Duncan’s conception of character-as-personified-Romanticism in this chapter and to suggest a different orientation for the Colwan-Wringhim relationship. And while it would be easier to simply invert Duncan’s identification of the characters as embodiments of Romanticism, in reality, rather than assigning Colwan or Wringhim as discrete Romantic categories, it is necessary for the sake of authenticity – and to keep in line with what I believe was Hogg’s intention – to complicate any attempts to definitely categorize either character. Instead, I seek to problematize them. Through both English travel writing conventions of the 1800s and Wringhim’s expressions of moral superiority towards Colwan, Hogg parodies Wordsworth’s use of the Scottish countryside as imaginative fodder. For Hogg, Wordsworth acts as a representative for English political and cultural hegemony through his descriptions of Scotland as well as his disdainful personal interactions with Hogg. His adoption of Wordsworthian technique is indicative of the larger relationship between Scotland and England, the division between the “elite”
(or hegemonic imperial power) and the “subaltern” (or colonized, native culture).
According to Douglas Mack, Hogg “contrived to find creative and ground-breaking ways
in which to allow the subaltern voice to be heard – and thus to question some of the
attitudes and assumptions that sustained the master-narrative of the British empire” (8).
Hogg’s primary means of achieving this goal is to expose and question the exclusionary
“English” aesthetic underpinnings of the concept of Romanticism. I will thus argue that
Hogg’s “dark Romanticism,” as Duncan calls it, is in fact a tenuous and permeable
“Scottish Romanticism.” Indeed, Hogg’s characters fulfill “traditional” Romantic
archetypes – i.e., those invented by such authors as Robert Burns, William Wordsworth,
and Samuel Taylor Coleridge – even as they complicate and undermine them, thus
muddling national and literary boundaries.

Such a muddling reflects the tenuous relationship between Scotland and England
preceding and during Hogg’s time. The relationship between Hogg and Wordsworth
embodies the larger clash between Scottish and English identities within the symbolic
entity of “Great Britain.” According to Richard Jackson, the tenuous relationship
between Hogg and Wordsworth began at a literary party in September 1814. There,
Wordsworth allegedly jested to Thomas De Quincey that Hogg was not a poet; and in an
1815 letter to R.P. Gillies, a friend of both Hogg and Sir Walter Scott, complained that
neither Scott nor Hogg “write a language which has any pretension to be called English”
(Jackson 92). As a poet himself, Wordsworth wrote in his “Preface to Lyrical Ballads”
that his mission was to “write in a language really used by men.” Wordsworth’s
description of Hogg’s use of the English language conflicts directly with his otherwise
revolutionary mission statement about writing poems. Whether Wordsworth feared being thrown into the same category as Hogg – a distasteful level of rustic – or, that he felt by pecking Hogg he would align himself with the literary powers that be, and thus avoid caricature himself in Blackwood’s, one cannot know. However, one thing is for certain: Wordsworth, wealthy and carefree (at least in terms of needing to work) in relation to Hogg, certainly had a power advantage both in terms of wealth and national heritage. While at face value such a power disparity may be justified as inescapable, in reality the ramifications in terms of representational literature are damaging to the Scottish subject. Regardless of contemporary reception, today Wordsworth is widely taught, read and canonized whereas Hogg is not. The misrepresentation and undermining of Hogg, intentionally or not, leads to a warped representation of the Scottish author and character, and has a destructive effect which extends past personal affront.

While seemingly trivial, Wordsworth’s criticism of Hogg has ramifications in a national context. Although Wordsworth disdained Scottish authors like Hogg and Scott, he found value in Scottish subjects as a vehicle for Romantic idealization, writing on Scottish themes on the occasion of his 1803 Scottish Tour. Yet this usage of Scotland came with distortion. Although concerned with natural world, Wordsworthian poetry—as both early reviewers and modern critics have pointed out—tends towards a solipsism in which the imagination consumes both nature and other people for the purposes of its

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5 For examples of Wordsworth’s representations of the Scottish subject, see Wordsworth’s “Rob Roy” (1807), “The Solitary Reaper” (1807), and, perhaps most revealing is his representation of Hogg in the “Extempore Effusion on the Death of James Hogg” (1835). In the last, despite the poem’s title, Hogg seems less the subject of the poem than the (mostly English) poets to whom Wordsworth repeatedly alludes.
own transcendence. Wordsworth’s failure to understand Scots-Gaelic becomes the condition for his imaginative work in the following lines from his poem, “The Solitary Reaper” (1803):

Will no one tell me what she sings?—
Perhaps the plaintive numbers flow
For old, unhappy, far-off things,
And battles long ago:

... I listen'd, motionless and still;
And, as I mounted up the hill,
The music in my heart I bore,
Long after it was heard no more.

As the last lines of the poem indicate, Wordsworth capitalizes on the figure as a sort of musical commodity through which to glean entertainment. He essentially uses the image and sound of this woman as a Scottish keepsake. Along these lines, according to Elizabeth Bohls, “Lack of access to what the reaper actually sings or feels is the necessary basis for the process of projection that defines her imaginative value to the poet” (188). The Scottish subject, reduced to a “figure in the landscape” or an undifferentiated element of nature, gains value only through his or her ability to produce pleasure for the reader or viewer. Donald Wehrs relates this observation to issues of nationalism: “Wordsworth’s incorporation of the archaic charms of Scottish poetry into his sensibilities [becomes] an instance of the egotistical sublime, an aesthetic
manifestation of the colonization England pursued toward Scotland after the 1707 act of Union” (Wehrs 8). Archaic and inscrutable, the primitive Highlander in Wordsworth’s poetry proves a “Romantic” figure to be consumed and, ultimately, dominated by English reading audiences.

This is the effect of colonial power dynamics as it plays out in literature. Wordsworth’s capitalizing on the Scottish identity is significant in that, on the one hand, he appropriates Scottish culture while, on the other hand, rejects the perspective of actual Scottish authors. This dissemination of an idealized, fantasy imagining of an entire group of people is destructive in that it removes the agency of the authors to self-define, and since this is the primary means by which non-Scottish readers would encounter Scottish life, and thus receive an inaccurate and reductive portrayal of the Scot. By undermining authors such as Hogg, and effectively negating their perspective, this limits the means by which readers – and particularly Romantic readers and scholars – receive information about Scottish culture and people. By promoting tourist writing and culture towards Scotland, Wordsworth effectively capitalized on the Scottish people – as he has done with nature – as a commodity existing solely for the benefit of the English tourist/author. This does not even take into account the effect such an inaccurate portrayal of Scottish life would have on contemporary and future Scottish authors, like Hogg. Though Wordsworth perhaps did not intend such a misrepresentation of the people whom he idealized, subconscious manifestations of colonial superiority are just as damaging, if not more so, than intentional ones. Because Wordsworth is often cited as a representational Romantic figure, and has even been dubbed by some scholars as the inventor of British
Romanticism, his creation of a sort of Romanticism which dehumanizes Scots is particularly dangerous in terms of its influence on public perception of Scots and Scotland. Indeed, the act of John Wilson and other Blackwoods authors of writing under Hogg’s name, and of John Wilson writing other pieces from the perspective of the shepherd though he was a wealthy gentleman, embody on a small scale the dangers of representing a person or peoples from an outside perspective while undermining those who have a first person perspective. At best, Wordsworth and Wilson misrepresented Hogg and Scotland. At worst, they repressed the voices of Hogg and other authors and dehumanized an entire demographic.

Hogg’s writings resist hegemonic literary appropriation of Scottish culture along with his simultaneous rejection of Scottish authors. In many ways Hogg conflates Wordsworth with other writers Hogg saw as criticizing or belittling him or his work. For example, wealthy Scottish author and Blackwood’s contributor John Wilson wrote purposefully poorly-written articles and published them under Hogg’s name, and also created the caricature of Hogg in the *Noctes Ambrosiana*, which reduced Hogg into a crude, oversexualized and bestialized shepherd. However, what Hogg found most problematic was this wealthy socialite’s attempts to write in the perspective of the Scottish Shepherd (Hasler xviii). Douglas Mack argues that Hogg may have written his 1823 *Three Perils of Woman* – a novel about love, jealousy, and leasing (i.e., lying) in three separate novella-like sections set in three different time periods – in order to “question what he sees as the false and unreal picture of subaltern Scottish life offered in [John] Wilson’s writings” (Mack 23). Similarly, selected scenes from *CJS* call into question and renegotiate
Wordsworth’s Romantic, reductive, and, in many ways, dehumanizing, depictions of Scottish subjects. For example, Hogg’s use of the Romantic trope of the locus amoenus, here embodied as a potentially transcendent moment for Colwan, resists reductive treatment of its human subject:

As he approached the swire at the head of the dell, – that little delightful verge from which in one moment the eastern limits and shores of Lothian arise on the view, – as he approached it, I say, and a little space from the height, he beheld, to his astonishment, a bright halo in the cloud of haze, that rose in a semi-circle over his head like a pale rainbow. He was struck motionless at the view of the lovely vision. (33; emphases mine)

In this passage, Colwan escapes the malignant shadow of his brother to a beautiful natural scene near a ruined chapel on Arthur’s Seat. The proximity of the chapel (32) to the natural scene on the dell is reminiscent of Wordsworth’s Romantic conception of nature as a potential locus of spiritual transcendence. Duncan confirms the Wordsworthian attributes of this scene: “Colwan’s expedition evokes a major Romantic topos, one especially associated with Wordsworth . . . the mountaintop communion of a ‘wanderer above the clouds’ with sublime nature” (Duncan “A Great Sinner” 1). Yet Hogg’s evocation differs in one key way from the typical Romantic sublime: the locus of agency. In Wordsworth’s poetry, the narrator and the protagonist are one, Hogg’s Wordsworthian episode opens a gap between the character who experiences the scene
and the narrator who describes it. In a poem such as “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud” (1807), for example, Wordsworth’s poet-speaker has the agency to “wander,” “float,” and view the daffodils:

I WANDERED lonely as a cloud
That floats on high o'er vales and hills,
When all at once I saw a crowd,
A host, of golden daffodils;
...
For oft when on my couch I lie
In vacant or in pensive mood,
They flash upon that inward eye
Which is the bliss of solitude;
And then my heart with pleasure fills
And dances with the daffodils.

In this as in many of Wordsworth’s poems, the subjectivity of the poet is the focal point of the poem: the “meaning” of nature is created through being processed by the poet’s “inward eye.” By contrast, the scene on Arthur’s seat assigns agency not to a human speaker or character, but to nature. Colwan here is struck by the vision; he does not strike out in search of it. Colwan is a “guest” in the house of Nature, careful to venerate the natural world around him as evidenced by his delicate treatment of the spider web, the “fairy web, composed of little spheres. . . shining in lovely millions” that Colwan was “afraid of defacing.” While Hogg mimics Wordsworth’s conception of nature as a
transcendent force, he shifts the focus from the colonizing subjectivity of the poet’s mind – where the nature images are used as a mechanism to make the poet feel retrospective “bliss” – to the veneration of nature without turning it into a mechanism to serve the poet/character in nature. This veneration complicates a Wordsworthian romantic aesthetic to embody a distinctly Hoggian Romanticism, in that nature is not something to be dominated, but something to be respected.

Wringhim’s shadowing of Colwan at Arthur’s Seat replays in unexpected ways the relation between Wordsworth and Hogg in relation to Scotland and the natural world. As Colwan enters the mini-Eden that is Arthur’s Seat, readers of Hogg’s novel know that Colwan is not approaching the scene as fodder for poetic consumption as Wordsworth would. Rather, he retreats to nature to escape the human mind. It is clear that the author—who may be Hogg or the mysterious Editor of CJS—is manufacturing the scene, rather than Colwan, based on the narrator’s interjection of “I say” in the description of “the bright halo in the cloud of haze.” Colwan is made whole, even holy, by this halo:

‘Here . . . I can converse with nature without disturbance, and without being intruded on by any appalling or obnoxious visitor.’ The idea of his brother’s dark and malevolent looks coming at that moment across his mind, he turned his eyes instinctively to the right, to the point where that unwelcome guest was wont to make his appearance. Gracious Heaven! What an apparition was there presented to his view! He saw, delineated in the
cloud, the shoulders, arms, and features of a human being of the most dreadful aspect. The face was the face of his brother, but dilated to twenty times the natural size. Its dark eyes gleamed on him through the mist, while every furrow of its hideous brow frowned deep as the ravines on the brow of the hill. (34; emphases mine)

In contrast with the “wholeness” of Colwan as described in the first passage, this second passage describes his brother Wringhim in fragmented parts, disturbing Colwan and ruining his Edenic episode. The fragmenting force of the foreign perspective is reminiscent spectres of the destructive, dehumanizing Romanticism conceived by Hogg’s detractors, including Wordsworth and Wilson, overshadowing Hogg’s writing. To read such fragmentation as functioning symbolically for the fragmentation of the Scottish identity, while perhaps not what Hogg intended, serves as an interesting method of analysis to explore how personal and national issues manifest themselves in the work of marginalized authors. This scene is particularly interesting in that, if read as potentially a literary manifestation of Hogg’s psyche, it illustrates the tension between Wordsworth’s depiction of the romantic, idealized Scottish Romantic subject and his critical remarks towards Hogg. Colwan here seems a natural Scottish character, where Wringhim seems a fragmenting force of foreign influence. Here, mimicking the social tension between Wordsworth and Hogg, personal and national affronts are conflated in Hogg’s writing. This is evidenced by Wringhim’s antagonistic behavior towards Colwan, his capitalizing
on the Scottish landscape to destroy Colwan in a manner similar to how Hogg may have conceived Wordsworth’s writing about the Scottish subject.

Though through this assertion of Hogg’s symbolic embodiment of his feelings of personal, literary and national rejection through the psychological splitting of his characters in *CJS* I risk being accused of intentional fallacy, such an analysis proves useful in terms of analyzing his characters – and particularly Gil-Martin – as Romantic anachronisms. The out-of-time and out-of-place-ness of his characters syncs too closely to Hogg’s personal, literary, and national alienation to be coincidence. While Colwan comes across as the morally “good” character of the novel, and Gil-Martin as certainly evil, Wringhim – like Ivan Karamazov will later be explained – is the anti-hero protagonist of the story. Prior to discussing Gil-Martin as a romantic anachronism, first his victim, Robert Wringhim, must be examined for the ways in which he complicates the image of the Romantic Scottish hero. He proclaims of himself: “I was born an outcast in the world,” a statement which acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy throughout Wringhim’s narrative.

Although Wringhim may at first appear, as an ultra-Calvinist Scot, an unlikely Wordsworthian avatar, he in fact carries associations inviting such a symbolic usage. Although Calvinism is the religion of Scotland, not England, Wringhim’s antinomianism—which is to say, the theological doctrine that faith and God’s grace frees a Christian from all of man’s and God’s laws—was not the same Calvinism popularly practiced in Scotland (Baldridge 386, Gribben 6). In fact, according to the 1646 *Westminster Confession of Faith*, Calvinism upheld the necessity of the moral law,
especially for the Elect, while Wringhim believes that the Elect are freed from such laws; as he states how he is a “justified person, adopted among the number of God’s children – my name written in the Lamb’s book of life, and that no bypast transgression, nor any future act of my own, or of other men, could be instrumental in altering the decree,” and, essentially, that his redemption is “sealed and secure” despite any evils he may ever commit (88). Hogg then is not critiquing Scottish Calvinism through this unattractive character, but Wringhim’s own particularly destructive ideology. Baldridge argues that the antinomianism critiqued by Hogg may be a metaphor representing “the extreme and belligerently partisan nature of the new model magazines…like Blackwoods;” Baldridge also acknowledges that it would be too simplistic “to paint Hogg as a man primarily responding through his fiction to a personal injury” (4). However Hogg’s critique of Wordsworth should not be reduced to a purely personal attack. Through his novel Hogg critiques not just Wordsworth, but also the sort of reductive, “fanatic” writing which, to Hogg, Wordsworth and other non-Scots writing about Scots may represent.

Wordsworth’s use of Scotland as a resource from which to mine “imaginative value” in order to achieve spiritual transcendence mimics the way in which Wringhim—representative of an alien religion forcing itself on the Scottish people—physically and rhetorically imposes his foreign beliefs onto his victims, for the sake of his own mistaken understanding of spiritual transcendence. Even Colwan’s frequenting of brothels and drinking, similar to those of the elder Colwan, paint a more admirable Scottish Romantic type, like Hogg, in a more likeable, Burnsian, latitudinarian character imagined by the less-than-genteel Hogg. Given Hogg’s adoration of Burns, it is unsurprising that his
“good” characters share Burnsian traits such as drinking, carousing, and wit. Embracing a Burnsian romantic aesthetic, Hogg rejects the Romantic Scot presented by Wordsworth, Wilson, and his own critics, choosing instead a realistic aesthetic of a mixed, impure, and all-around more relatable human character.

ROMANTIC BODIES

Though he rejects others’ idealization of the Romantic Scot, he does not obliquely reject the romantic aesthetic of idealization. Rather, he presents his own conception of idealized Scottish romantic characters, making them hyper-romantic before complicating them through fragmentation. In presenting readers with the two corpses of the two brothers, Hogg’s novel positions readers to compare the way the two are presented. As a more relatable character, Colwan, and by extension his corpse, embodies the hope of the future for the Scottish hero, and is thus described in wholesome terms: he is both the hope for his family and the “hope of his race” (43). Colwan’s father is so bereft at the loss of his son, and any now impossible future progeny, that he mourns over the corpse hyperbolically until he literally dies of grief after kissing the corpse’s “wound, lips and cold brow alternatively” (42). The imagery here is that of extreme Romanticism—the loss of a past possibility that can no longer be. This heavily romanticized image of the corpse contrasts violently with the more gruesome and less wholesome depiction of Wringhim’s corpse hundreds of pages later:

One of the lads gripped the face of the corpse with his finger and thumb, and the cheeks felt quite soft and fleshy, but the dimples remained and did
not spring out again. He had fine yellow hair, about nine inches long; but not a hair of it they could pull out till they cut part of it off with a knife. They also cut off some portions of his clothes, which were all quite fresh, and distributed them among their acquaintances, sending a portion to me, among the rest, to keep as natural curiosities. Several gentlemen have in a manner forced me to give them fragments of these enchanted garments: I have, however, retained a small portion for you, which I send along with this, being a piece of his plaid, and another of his waistcoat breast, which you see are still as fresh as that day they were laid in the grave. (181-2; emphases mine)

Hogg’s descriptions of the two brothers’ corpses move away from unity (in Colwan’s corpse) to fragmentation (in Wringhim’s corpse). Colwan’s corpse is mourned in such a hyper-romanticized way as to remove the body from individual status to that of an abstract archetype; George ceases to be just George Colwan and becomes the ideal “hope of his race.” This sentence idealizes the individual to a sublime individual representing the abstract concept of the entire nation. Contrast this with how Wringhim is dissected into “part, portions, fragments, and pieces” to be distributed among Scots and Englishmen alike. It seems important that the piece of clothing that was sent was of the ‘plaid,’ a distinctive garb which identifies the owner as Scottish. But this garb is also painted as inauthentic in how well preserved and out of place it is, further complicating any attempts to assign Wringhim a discrete Scottish or English identity. For example, Wringhim is never clearly identified as Colwan’s brother – it is hinted that he is a
bastard child of the reverend Wringhim, but Hogg leaves this ambiguous. This differs from the way that Wordsworth, over his lifetime, formulated a discrete Scottish archetype through his poetic interpretations of Scotland.

Hogg’s critique of the tourist modus operandi in CJS is, of course, focused on the objectifying examination of what we presume to be Wringhim’s corpse. The English Editor’s description of the corpse differs greatly from Hogg’s description; not only is the corpse in a location removed from the location in which Hogg described, but it is also greatly decayed, its hair is black, and instead of wearing the expected garb of a Border bonnet the corpse was wearing a dubiously undecayed “Highland bonnet...such as is sometimes still seen in the west of Scotland,” a description which also happened to match the bonnet which Hogg was wearing a few pages before (186). Given the state of decay of the rest of the corpse and its clothing and how, in his published letter, Hogg says he took the bonnet which was “sent to Edinburgh,” these inconsistencies between the descriptions of the corpse seem to illustrate that Hogg – or someone else – was tampering with the corpse and decorating it with historically inaccurate clothing and kitsch after it was buried to make it seem more authentic in its Scottishness. Whereas Hogg the character’s description lasts all of a paragraph, the Editor’s description spans three pages in length. Such extensive text space dedicated to the presumably English editor’s words rather than Hogg’s perspective plays into the inversion and subversion of the traditionally conceived Romantic Scottish identity. This subversion is performed through the evident disparity between what is important to the fictitious Editor, and what is important to Hogg the author.
Hogg’s and the Editor’s descriptions of the corpse illustrate the destabilization of authentic Scots and call into question the Wordsworthian conception of the Scottish subject. Hogg’s and the Editor’s descriptions of the corpse are consistent only in the details about the fragmentation and dissection of the corpse. On the surface level, if we accept that Wringhim is representative of an inescapable Wordsworthian spectre, then it seems Hogg is punishing Wordsworth by torturing his corpse. But, in the context of a corpse representing some sort of authentic Scottish history, the corpse takes on a new symbolism in addition to its Wordsworthian attributes. Unlike the description of George Colwan’s corpse, which is romanticized, mourned, and worshipped, here Wringhim’s body is dissected into its constituent parts in order to be proliferated, critiqued, and even fetishized throughout the unionized UK as a relic of Scotland. The corpse is at once authentic Scotland and inauthentic Scotland as conceived Scottish by its English tourist dissectors. It is also the corpus of Scottish literature and literary culture which has been disseminated throughout the UK and the world and dissected on its merits by Scots and non-Scots alike. The trappings of Wringhim’s corpse ring as metaphor for the trappings of Hogg’s language and writings and for Hogg himself—the “heaven-blessed Ettick Shepherd”—was a natural curiosity in terms of his ability to write without a proper education and his rustic background. By mimicking Wordsworth, Hogg attempts to escape the limiting author *nom de plume* of the Ettrick Shepherd by writing like an English nobleman. By relating the dissection and destruction of his (and other dismissed Scottish literati) literary corpus to the corpse of a character with Wordsworthian attributes, he attempts to portray the illogical inequity between them.
REAPPROPRIATING A SCOTTISH ROMANTICISM

In the face of these reductive English representations of the Scottish subject, including those by Wordsworth, it is unsurprising that Hogg would, literally and literally, mimic and play devil’s advocate against Wordsworthian Romanticism and its imagining of the Scottish Romantic subject. After all, given Hogg’s “frequent utilisation of mimicry and ventriloquism in his writing,” he had talent and penchant for mimicry (Coyer 54). Hogg had already mastered mimicry of Wordsworth and other Romantic greats in his 1816 Anthology, *The Poetic Mirror*. For example, in one of many of his Wordsworth-mocking poems – written and published almost simultaneously with *CJS* – entitled “Examination of the School of Southside, By Mr. W.W.” (1824), Hogg mocked the predictable form of Wordsworth’s poetry, parodying: “man must first begin / With trivial things, and move up by degrees, / And only reach to the sublimest last” (Groves 187). The novel form enabled Hogg to mimic other authors in a more subtle form. Perfectly mirroring form and content, Hogg’s *CJS* is a pastiche of various Scottish and English Romantic topoi, where doubling acts. For example, Gil-Martin mimics all the other characters in the novel and usurps their authority for his own. Another example is how the characters even mimic Hogg himself when, at the end of the novel, he interjects himself as a character. On a macro level, Hogg performs the ultimate form of mimicry in that he adopts the language of his English (and learned Scottish) oppressors to express subversively the woes of the subaltern. Mimicry becomes the tool through which Hogg asserts agency.
This assertion of agency through mimicry is perhaps most evident in the creation of the pseudo-author of the story, the Editor. This character relates the series of events to us prior to Wringhim’s narrative by digging up the corpse of Wringhim and publishes for us, supposedly without alteration, the memoirs he finds buried with the corpse. The Editor himself is certainly not Scottish, as he is able to “make nothing” of the character Hogg’s Scots and surrounds himself with translators like “Mr. L____W” who “speaks excellent strong Scots” in order to aid him in his anthropologic journey to exhume and examine the corpse (184-7). This use of the Editor is humorous and ironic in that he writes in English and Scots, but is unable to understand Scots. He is also a complete dupe, credulous of the tales of the conflicting accounts of the corpse told to him by Hogg and his Scots tour guides. The Editor accepts the kitsch presented to him by the Scotsmen as genuine despite the inconsistencies between the Scots’ stories. By mimicking and making into a dupe the very sort of English intellectual who was wont to not only criticize characters who speak Scots, but Hogg himself, Hogg simultaneously challenges the assumptions of power behind these individuals and also asserts himself as having the last laugh.

Indeed, in terms of the Romantic aesthetic, Hogg mimics the inventions of Romantic literary tropes by other authors in order to differentiate his own conceptions of the Romantic. In additional to his talent of mimicry, Hogg had a penchant for challenging or presenting himself as an antithesis of other writers. For example, in the face of Scott’s depiction of the Scottish historical, Romantic, literary subject, “[Hogg’s] The Brownie of Bodsbeck is written to rebut Scott’s Old Morality” (Trumpener 218). Of course, Hogg had
a heavily documented, antagonistic personal history with Wordsworth which, even if not for Wordsworth’s diminutive view of Scots in general, would have been justification enough to spur Hogg to literary retribution. Hogg had already set a precedent for this sort of antagonistic mimicry in some of his poems in which he aimed to “ridicule and out-Wordsworth Wordsworth as a poet” (Jackson 92). More than ridicule, such parody may be Hogg’s attempt to rescue the true Scottish identity from extinction; from being reduced, as Wordsworth, Scott, and English tourists who had fashioned it; into a pretty relic lost to time – a truly Romantic antique.

This Romantic antique is embodied in Hogg’s devil, a post-Miltonian character that does not quite fit his time or cultural context. Given Gil-Martin’s ability to take on the form of both brothers, his fluency in multiple languages, and his multi-cultural origins, it is apt that he is the most fantastic⁶, and therefore, at least aesthetically, Romantic element of the novel. Gil-Martin is not only Scottish as evidenced by his presence in Scotland, his name, and relation to Scottish folk stories, but is apparently an amalgam of cultures, which is evidenced by Wringhim noticing Gil-Martin reading a Bible “in a language of which I was wholly ignorant” (94). As Robin MachLachlan argues, Gil-Martin is English and “clearly akin to Milton’s Satan” and yet, paradoxically, is also “the Czar Peter of Russia,” wears a turban, and is similar at points to “Mephistopoheles, Melmoth, and the villain in Der Freischutz” (13). Meanwhile, Gil-

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⁶ While the term “fantastic” might come across as overly ambiguous in terms of an aesthetic romantic quality, by fantastic here I mean the character as evidence of the Romantic Anachronism; that is, something or being extensively out of place; something that can only be manifested in literature and not in reality; something sprung from the mind of the writer to create an aesthetic of another time, place, or literary work.
Martin is able to take on the physical attributes of Colwan and Wringhim, and other characters within the novel. So the Scottish characters Wringhim and Colwan are already ambiguated Scottish subjects, but the Scottish subject is further muddled in Gil-Martin, who is complicated into various other cultural representations spanning from English (Miltonic) to German (Mephistopholes) to Middle Eastern (Turban) to Russian (Czar). This sort of multifaceted character obviously has precedent in Milton’s Satan who is able to take on the forms of various animals, but is made more complex in his ability to assimilate cultures which do not even practice Christianity. By making the foreign Satan not simply the Other, but multiple Others including the Scottish self, Hogg eludes the clearly Good and Evil dichotomies set up by his Romantic contemporaries such as Wordsworth. Indeed, Hogg calls into question the reductive treatment of the Scottish subject as a necessary trait of the Romantic aesthetic. Through complicating his otherwise incredibly Romantic characters, Hogg makes a case for reimagining a more capacious conception of the Romantic as a literary category.

In addition to having a multicultural devil, Hogg’s use of Scots dialect within his novel written primarily in English dialect makes his novel all the more multifarious. Although operating within the Scottish tradition of appropriating the Scots dialect in a Burnsian manner, Hogg uses Scots to place himself within the novel. First, the reader is presented with the character Hogg’s ‘authentic’ letter which is written in perfect erudite English: “For my part, fond as I am of blue bonnets, and broad ones in particular, I declare I durst not have worn that one” (182). This is followed by and juxtaposed violently by the character Hogg’s Scots spoken when the Editor asks for Hogg’s help to
find and dig up Wringhim’s corpse: “Od bless ye, lad! I ha either matters to mind. I hae a’ thae paulies to sell, an’ a’ yon Highland stotts down on the green every ane; an’ then I hae ten scores o’ yowes to buy after, an’ if I canna first sell my ain stock, I canna buy nae ither body’s. I hae mair ado than I can manage the day, foreby ganging to houk up hunder-year-auld banes” (183). This inconsistency so closely placed together illustrates the bilingual abilities of Hogg and thus challenges the English and Scottish erudites who mocked and pigeonholed him as the swinish Ettrick shepherd. In this way, Hogg takes the concept of polyphony a step further than traditional Burnsian or Scott literary technique in that dialect does not only differ between characters, but within characters as well. Thus, dialect is used to create a new Scottish identity that is neither completely Scottish nor English, but an amalgam of the two.

Hogg creates such a complicated amalgam in order to avoid limiting categorization of a diverse range of complex Scottish characters into a single, reductive Scottish type. Such reduction of a complex culture into a single – and, in the case of Wordsworth’s poetry tourist writings, and John Wilson’s caricature of Hogg, marketable – national identity, as Hogg has learned, results in the at least partial, if not complete, destruction of its subject and justification for colonialism. To quote from Leith Davis, Ian Duncan, and Janet Sorenson in Scotland and the Borders of Romanticism, “Scotland’s fate is to have become a Romantic object or commodity: glamorous scenery visited by the Wordsworths, Turner, Queen Victoria, steamtrain parties of tourists; a series of kitsch, fake, more or less reactionary “inventions of tradition” (1-2). Through his writing, Hogg defies such limiting images of Scotland – and, by proxy, limiting contemporary
definitions of Romanticism – by mocking colonial convention and creating multidimensional characters. In terms of language, Hogg uses various styles of both Scots and English within his novel. Hogg’s polyphonic use of dialect and character mimicry would have perhaps appeared unorthodox alongside Wordsworth’s poetry, written, Wordsworth claimed in the Preface of Lyrical Ballads, about “incidents and situations from common life . . . in a selection of language really used by men” (2). While Wordsworth’s “language really used by men” may have been revolutionarily plain for English readers, it excludes any sort of dialect or regional speech, whether Scots or northern English, and thus disqualifies the Scots from being men.

Meanwhile, Hogg achieves what Wordsworth set out to do by writing in a panoply of voices, perspectives, and dialects, and thereby provides a more capacious conception of British Romanticism. Removing the limiting perspective of the hegemonic writer enables the aesthetic ideals of Romanticism to rise to the top: such as the emphasis on the countryside as a locus amoenus, the Devil as a double of the self, and the existence of the fantastic alongside reality. Hogg, the incomprehensible Scots-speaking Shepherd who appears in the final pages of CJS, is also Hogg the author, able to write and understand multiple dialects, cultural and literary styles, including literary embodiments of the devil. By creating a human devil that is both foreign and national, and by ambiguating the divisions between text and reality, Scotland and England, authenticity and kitsch, Hogg defines himself and the Scottish literary subject as something like the unstable, heteroglossic, multidimensional characters found in fiction today. He shrugs off the yoke of Wordsworthian Romanticism and uses it in ways Wordsworth would not
have approved in order to create a new, aesthetically-centered identity freed from class, dialect, and nationalistic constraints that does not, as the quotation from Firmat with which I opened states, “belong to English,” but belongs to Hogg and his readers.
Chapter 2: Dostoevsky’s “Paradoxalist”: Romantic Anachronism and Ivan Karamazov

“Although [Dostoevsky] is all his characters, one in particular was given the type of understanding that is closest to his own: Ivan Karamazov” – Czeslaw Milosz (Milosz’s ABC’s 101)

“Our brother Dmitri says of you: Ivan is a grave. I say: Ivan is a riddle”

(The Brothers Karamazov 254).

Paradoxical descriptions of Ivan Fyodorovich Karamazov abound in TBK. While his brothers cannot decide whether Ivan, the enigmatic middle son, is a “grave,” a “riddle,” or a “sphinx” (621), he is labeled by his friends a “paradoxalist” (91), by the narrator a “practical” and intellectually superior expositor of “natural science” (33-4) and, by the devil, a “romantic” (683)⁷. After proclaiming the title “romantic” an insult, Ivan later accepts his title of “grave” in relation to old, romantic graves in Europe (255), and similarly agrees with the devil’s claim, affirming, “Yes, I’m a ‘romantic,’ he [i.e., the devil] noticed it… though it’s a slander” (683). Such self-identification makes Ivan at first seem a Romantic figure. Yet, despite this self-identification as a Romantic figure, he regards this title as defamatory, and regularly claims throughout the novel that logic, skepticism, and empiricism constitute the only truth. As a complement to his self-declared “Euclidean” mindset, he believes in God and Devil only insomuch as man

⁷ While many aspects of TBK fit into the aesthetic definition of Romanticism, Ivan – and particularly his relationship with his devil – represents the strongest argument as to why TBK should be considered Romantic. Thus, given time and space constraints, this chapter will focus primarily on the sections of TBK in which Ivan and his devil interact; later to be defined as a manifestation of Romantic Anachronism.
created them in his image for practical reasons (260-5). If Ivan is a Romantic figure, he also embodies many non-Romantic qualities, to say nothing of his own apparent wariness of the Romantic title.

Indeed, Ivan can even be labeled a Romantic hero. He embodies the Romantic through his paradoxical nature, where he simultaneously challenges Romantic categorization even as he fulfills the aesthetic. As a testament to his paradoxical nature, scholars are divided in their attempts to decipher the riddle that is Ivan Karamazov. Helen Muchnic hails him as “an actor in the realm of ideas” and “Dostoevsky’s version of the artist” (146), Vladimir Kantor calls him “the novel’s manifest and sole vehicle of evil” (85), and Rochelle Ross describes Ivan as a “disillusioned romantic who, instead of retiring into a world of dreams, is left to despair and slow decay in a spiritually empty and physically revolting life” (40). These critical attempts to define Ivan, much like the efforts of the characters within the novel, fail to grasp the essence of Ivan—that he embodies a paradoxical resistance to definition, a paradox that mixes the Romantic qualities of anachronism, idealization of nature and innocence, and interaction with the supernatural with the non-Romantic qualities of enlightenment-era empiricism and atheism. Ivan’s strange panoply of philosophical beliefs fashion him a human anachronism of sorts: a character with no particular identifying nationalistic or temporal home. It is this sort of anachronism, in the form of resisting categorization, through which Ivan embodies the Romantic.

Similar to James Hogg’s problematizing of the Scottish Romantic hero through Robert Wringhim, Ivan’s resistance to categorization mirrors portions of Dostoevsky’s
biography. Specifically, Dostoevsky’s attempts to challenge categorization through *TBK* are leveled toward a popular atheist, Russian socialist literary critic and one-time lauder of Dostoevsky’s work, Vissarion Belinsky (sometimes also transliterated as Bielinsky) (1811-1848). While he comes across as a Romantic, due to the time in which he lived and to his philosophy which valued the individual over the community, Belinsky believed in a single objective truth and held works of fantasy and aestheticism in disdain. Whereas Belinsky valued literature as a means to remedy social disparity, Dostoevsky “rejected an art determined by social rather than aesthetic concerns and he could see that, were Belinsky’s views pushed to their logical conclusion, the aesthetic result would be merely ‘newspaper facts’” (Lantz 38). Consistent with his socialist leanings, Belinsky lauded Dostoevsky’s early novel highlighting the suffering of the lower class, *Poor Folk* (1845).

Yet almost immediately after praising Dostoevsky’s *Poor Folk* in a critical piece in 1846, in an extreme change of heart, Belinsky wrote that Dostoevsky’s work was “terrible stuff,” “a calamity,” that readers “can’t stand him at all,” and that he “tremble[s] at the thought that I shall have to read this novel [Poor Folk] once more. We’ve been well taken in by our ‘gifted’ Dostoevsky” (Letters 269).

While any author might react to a critic’s abrupt swing from idolization to condemnation as a “calamity,” Dostoevsky was particularly sensitive, reacting to Belinsky’s criticism by completely avoiding Belinsky and his entire circle. In an eventual meeting with another critic in Belinsky’s circle, Dostoevsky purportedly “lost control of himself” and threatened that he would “tread them all into the mud in time” (Letters 269). This threat came to fruition repeatedly in Dostoevsky’s work, where he both implicitly
and explicitly attacks Belinsky or his ideas. Dostoevsky’s damaged-ego-based abhorrence of Belinsky continued long after Belinsky’s death. Perhaps Dostoevsky’s feelings towards Belinsky are best described in his 1871 letter to Nikolay Nikolayevich Strachov, in which he writes, “I condemn Bielinsky less as a personality than as a most repulsive, stupid and humiliating phenomenon of Russian life” (Letters 219). Dostoevsky continued to undermine Belinsky, both in his personal letters and in his novels, for the duration of his life.

**ROMANTIC ANACHRONISM**

Before moving to discuss how Ivan at once embodies and resists traditional definitions of The Romantic, first we must revisit a point imperative to my argument: romanticism necessitates anachronism. That is, in its most fundamental state, Romanticism is built upon a yearning for a previous – or future – time in the present moment, which may be embodied through an archaic figure or object in the present. Unlike nostalgia, which is restricted to a feeling or disembodied thought, romantic anachronism gives a physical form to nostalgia within the narrative “now,” either by placing a character in a location or time period in which he obviously does not fit or by having a character simultaneously exhibit characteristics of both the present and the past. Stephen Cheeke describes nostalgia as a powerful sense of “having been there,” dependent on “being there” and “being in-between” (161). Ivan’s position is certainly that of anachronism; of not being there but constantly “being in-between.” Ivan’s identity as a “paradoxalist” is largely owing to his anachronism. Ivan’s anachronism is embodied
not only in his paradoxical combination of outmoded Enlightenment rationalism with transcendental Romantic quotes of Pushkin’s “sticky little leaves,” a line he constantly quotes from Pushkin’s “Still Winds May Blow,” which harkens to the deification of nature as ideal. Ivan’s anachronism is also evidenced in his physical interaction with the devil in a modern, post-Christian world. Just as Hogg’s CJS challenged critical attempts to exclude him from Romanticism due to class, so Dostoevsky challenges critics’ attempts to categorize him in terms of nationalistic constraints.

Ivan embodies Dostoevsky’s own feelings about this brand of out-of-time-and-place anachronism. Dostoevsky himself, as Belinsky and other critics noted, was Western in his literary styles and ideas. Dostoevsky’s love for the Romantics—and for Scott in particular—was such that he was reputed to carry a copy of Waverley with him at all times, like a Bible. Dostoevsky also insisted to friends and family that Scott and Goethe were necessary reads in order to have a decent morality (Frank 34). While considering himself Russian to his very core, Dostoevsky borrowed heavily from Western literary tradition, especially the Romantics, including Hoffman, Schiller, Scott, and Goethe (Frank 60). For such Westernization, Dostoevsky received heavy criticism from Bielinsky for seeming out of place in a rapidly socialist and nationalist Russia. Ivan shares his author’s cultural displacement: he does not fit into the town which he visits because he is too intellectual in a European sense. The narrator of TBK mentions Ivan’s arrival at his father’s town as prompting certain “uneasiness,” and tells us that Ivan’s coming was so “strange” and out of place that his coming prompted the locals to ask, “What does he want here?” (35). Ivan does not belong in the text any more than he
belongs anywhere else; he wishes to commit suicide because the only place he belongs is in the grave.

As an avid reader of Scott, and of other Western Romantic authors, Dostoevsky was certainly familiar with the Romantic subgenre of graveyard poetry. Perhaps relevant to Ivan’s and Dostoevsky’s anachronism, a traditional motif of the Western Romantic poets was an obsessive musing upon ruins and graves. Indeed, such musings upon graveyards has been identified as a defining characteristic of Romanticism (J. Murray 722). Although the Graveyard Poets had started the grave trend in the prior generation, the Romantic period produced the highest percentage of graveyard poems, many of which took the form of epitaphs (Bernhardt-Kabisch 114). Along with Burns (whom Bernhardt-Kabisch refers to as the “most prolific epitaphist”), Wordsworth, Gray, Coleridge, Byron, Lamb, and Scott are all numbered to be among both the most prolific Romantic graveyard poets (Bernhardt-Kabisch 114). By linking Ivan to the graveyard poets, Dostoevsky leads the reader to view Ivan as a romantic character of a particularly Western style, which emphasizes his anachronism but also subverts the vogue of Russian-nationalist-socialist literature which Bielinsky propagated.

Dostoevsky relies upon such aesthetic subjects as graves and Europe in order to define Ivan as a romantic figure. Dmitri labels Ivan a “grave,” which provides an immediate symbolic association with Romanticism, specifically the Graveyard Poets, for Western Romantic readers (254). Soon after Dmitri associates Ivan with graves, Ivan conflates his association with graves into a very Romantic, illogical yearning for the past,
along with a yearning to travel. He illustrates how he feels out of both time and place when he tells his brother:

I want to go to Europe, Alyosha, I’ll go straight from here. Of course I know that I will only be going to a graveyard, but to the most, the most precious graveyard, that’s the thing! The precious dead lie there, each stone over them speaks of such ardent past life, of such passionate faith in their deeds, their truth, their struggle, and their science, that I—this I know beforehand—will fall to the ground and kiss those stones and weep over them—being wholeheartedly convinced, at the same time, that it has all long been a graveyard and nothing more. (255)

In this reference to the graves in Europe, Ivan acts as sort of über-Romantic, excessive in his evaluation of the graveyard as “precious.” Yet most revealing about this passage, and about Ivan’s paradoxical essence, is the passage’s constant dialectical tension between ideas. First the graveyard is defined solely by its scientific, empirical status—”only” a graveyard. Yet Ivan immediately romanticizes it as “the most, the most precious graveyard” full of “precious dead” (255). He values the precious dead based, paradoxically, for their “passionate faith” as well as their “truth” and “scientific” value. His own imaginings of how he will behave in the graveyard are identifiably romantic in nature: kissing the graves and weeping over them. By the end of the passage he has come full circle, “being wholeheartedly convinced, at the same time, that it has all along been a graveyard and nothing more” (255). In this single passage, Ivan cycles repeatedly between realism and romanticism. Ivan resists pure realism and pure romanticism, and
instead manages to hold both paradoxical ideals—logic and beauty—in his mind at the same time.

Given the aforementioned hegemonically defined temporal constraints imposed on Romanticism (eighteenth or nineteenth century) and realism (later nineteenth century through Flaubert, Eliot, Tolstoy, etc), Ivan’s ability to hold both paradoxical aesthetics in his mind at the same time makes Ivan the most ideal romantic candidate in the way I am seeking to define Romanticism; as Wordsworth and Coleridge evoke an anachronistic romantic aesthetic by holding an ideal past or future in the present moment of a poem, so, too, does Ivan evoke this aesthetic through holding two dichotomous ideals “wholeheartedly… at the same time” (255). This ability to hold two oppositional beliefs at the same time is, ironically, highly irrational. It is this aesthetic, driven by the author and character’s marginal state between two paradoxical ideals, which defines the Romantic Anachronism.

**DOSTOEVSKY AS ROMANTIC AUTHOR?**

Ivan’s failure to conform to a realist, nationalist, socialist Russian ideal mirrors the critical reception of Dostoevsky. If contemporaries refused James Hogg the title of Romantic during his lifetime for not fitting the term’s idealized notions of title, gentlemanly behavior, and proper use of the English language, Fyodor Dostoevsky suffered a similar fate for opposite reasons: his critics derided him as being too Romantic, and thereby attempted to exclude him from being counted among the literary greats. Though now Dostoevsky is commonly accepted as a literary genius, during his time he was marginalized by his critics. To be Romantic in Dostoevsky’s Russia was to be
associated with the Western literary tradition, a damning association in a nationalistic, Tsarist Russia. Western tradition at the time—that is, anything culturally associated with Europe, such as language, politics, or literature—was viewed as dangerous and destructive. For example, Dostoevsky’s contemporary Tolstoy criticized as corruptive the very European style of Pushkin’s Romanticism which Dostoevsky praised, and argued that his literature “undermine[d] Russian values” (Levitt 100). In line with such symbolic manifestations of Western literature as corruptive, Dostoevsky’s purportedly characters such as Smerdyakov and Ivan’s devil speak French and behave in a stereotypically Western fashion, as when they use European-Enlightenment-style philosophy to explain God away as a human-made, practical tool. This characterization is also seen in Smerdyakov’s dream of running away to America, a dream which so infects Ivan that he encourages Dmitri to escape to America and start a new life with Grushenka rather than serve prison time in Siberia (584, 625). By having Ivan quote Pushkin, Dostoevsky mocks critical attempts (by contemporaries such as Tolstoy and Belinsky) to portray Pushkin’s Western Romantic tendencies as corruptive; for Ivan, those tendencies represent the good in his character. Yet, consistent with his character, Dostoevsky, paradoxically, both affirms and undermines his critics’ criticism.

Just as Dostoevsky rejects Tolstoy and Belinsky’s critique of European Romanticism’s influence on Pushkin, he capitalizes on the manner in which they have associated Westernism with evil in order to use his critics’ anti-Western symbolism against them. Through Smerdyakov, Dostoevsky mocks socialist Russians who would do away with Christianity, and through the devil, Dostoevsky directly mocks and
undermines Belinsky by directly inserting his name into the text several times. One example of such occurs when Kolya describes his lack of belief in Christianity in a stereotypically socialist way, essentially mimicking the demonic characters Smerdyakov and Rakitin:

“I am not against Christ. He was a very humane person, and if he was living in our time, he would go straight to join the revolution, and perhaps would play a conspicuous part… It’s even certain he would.”

“But where, where did you get all that? What kind of fool have you been dealing with?” Alyosha exclaimed.

“For God’s sake, the truth can’t be hidden! Of course, I often talk with Mr. Rakitin about a certain matter, but… Old Belinsky used to say the same thing, they say.” (584)

In this passage, Alyosha acts as a stand-in for Dostoevsky, while Rakitin parrots and thus stands in for Belinsky’s ideas. Alyosha, the monk initiate and moral compass of the novel, is the most truthful and “good” character throughout the novel, thus acting as a prime means by which Dostoevsky can express his opinions without fear of reprisal. Alyosha’s description of Belinsky as a “fool” is consistent with Dostoevsky’s 1871 description of Belinsky as “stupid.” Through such interactions, Dostoevsky all but explicitly states his opinion of Belinsky and his ideas. In a similar vein, Dostoevsky reveals Ivan as a stand-in for himself when he has the devil deride Ivan as romantic soon after appearing to him in the garb of an out-of-fashion gentleman:
Indeed, you’re angry with me that I have not appeared to you in some sort of red glow, ‘in thunder and lightning,’ with scorched wings, but have presented myself in such a modest form. You’re insulted, first, in your aesthetic feelings, and, second, in your pride: how could such a banal devil come to such a great man? No, you’ve still got that romantic little streak in you, so derided by Belinsky. (677)

As indicated by these various aggressive addresses, both direct and indirect, to his critics, Dostoevsky parallels Hogg not only in his reception, but also in his response to that reception. Dostoevsky again uses Ivan as a stand-in for himself and his views on Belinsky’s criticism of aestheticism, and simultaneously mocks Belinsky’s disdain for Christianity by having the Devil appear as a banal character rather than a fantastic demon. This image of the banal devil, coupled with Rakitin-as-Belinsky’s argument that if Christ were to exist today it would be just as another man taking part in the socialist revolution, represented an idea which appalled Dostoevsky (Lantz 39). Just as Hogg undermined his critics through CJS, so Dostoevsky undermined his critics through TBK, both by embodying socialist Russians in such demonic characters as Rakitin and Smerdyakov, and by having his unequivocally “good” character Alyosha directly call Belinsky a fool. Specifically, both Hogg and Dostoevsky subvert their critics and the cultural hegemony which engendered their power by critiquing them through character representations in their literature. These authors’ relation to the romantics, and the way in which they interacted with romantic aesthetics in their works, operate to redefine romanticism more inclusively.
In this vein of resisting categorization by critics through anachronism, both the characters and devils in *CJS* and *TBK* share uncanny Romantic similarities, which fortify them against hegemonic definitions of romanticism that would exclude them based on geographic and temporal location. Ivan, like Robert Wringhim, is the titular “Sinner,” the archetypal romantic protagonist named in *TBK*’s original working title, “The Life Story of the Great Sinner” (Letters 187). As an isolated sinner-intellectual who rejects society’s values, Ivan fulfills the traditional definition of the Romantic Hero archetype: he is a hero “placed outside the structure of civilization” that “society has impoverished itself by rejecting”; he represents the “triumph of the individual over the restraints of theological and social conventions” with his traits of wanderlust, melancholy, misanthropy, alienation, and isolation (Wilson 247, Bishop 3, 92). The Romantic often feels a profound sense of regret over his actions (Garber 321), and Ivan is constantly fettered with guilt for his father’s death at Dmitri’s hand, to the point of admitting to the crime in the court room (716). Yet such a traditional Romantic Hero definition is entrenched in the same national and temporal constraints which the Romantic Anachronism as it has been defined herein works against.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned definition of the Romantic hero as freed from national and temporal constraints, Dostoevsky’s novel is certainly romantic. Specifically, it is more inclusive of Dostoevsky’s conception of the Romantic as incorporating not only Wordsworth and nineteenth century English literati, but also Shakespeare’s Ophelia and Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus (24, 160, 677). Through such archetypes, Dostoevsky defines his own characters, relying on a series of literary
allusions to provide the romantic aesthetic. Dostoevsky’s conception of the Romantic is more about the aesthetics of anachronism—the past in the present, specifically the embodiment of archaic literary behavior—than an aesthetic specific to nineteenth century British literature. Ivan embodies this romantic aesthetic through his anachronistic obsession with theology in a post-religious world; he holds conversations with the Devil and writes the poem “The Grand Inquisitor” and essays on ecclesiastical courts In his deep concern for the suffering of children (for him they are embodiments of ideal innocence, as they were for William Blake), and his use of nature as a symbol of transcendence (he constantly quotes of a line from the Russian Romantic poet Alexander Pushkin’s “Chill Winds Still Blow”) Ivan embodies a caricature of Romanticism. That is, by founding the character of Ivan upon romantic predecessors, Dostoevsky pushes the romantic nature of Ivan to the extreme in order to juxtapose him against his Belinskian devil. While in these aspects Ivan’s portrayal is that of a Romantic ideal, on the other hand, he undermines his own Romantic energy through his constant rejection of his own romantic idealism and his Enlightenment-like insistence on logic as the sole system by which to gauge reality. These two polar extremes—what might be called an opposition between Logic and Beauty—make Ivan (and, arguably, Dostoevsky) what I am calling the Romantic Anachronist.

**THE ROMANTIC ANACHRONIST**

Based on the ways in which Ivan at once embodies and challenges standard definitions of romanticism, and the ways in which his author, Fyodor Dostoevsky, does the same, both
characters fit my definition of the Romantic Anachronist: a person who fits the aesthetic definitions of Romanticism, but not the temporal, geographic, or class constraints imposed by the conventional scholarly definitions of romanticism. The Romantic Anachronist occupies a space which, at any given time, can be interpreted as Romantic or realist. This entity is usually subaltern, in that this entity is outside of the literary or social authoritative body and subject to criticism from it. In being thus excluded, however, marginalized authors realize the romantic aesthetic of individualism more fully than those who determine and embody the romantic norm. Both Ivan and Dostoevsky occupy this indeterminate space. At times they cross the border into one or the other: Romanticism or Realism, Russian or Western literary tradition, Logic or Beauty, but they paradoxically maintain footing in their place of origin. That is, at any given time, Ivan or Dostoevsky can accept external categorization even as they resist it. They can exaggerate qualities of Romantic aesthetic, while at the same time undermining it through injections of realism and metadiscourse about the term Romantic itself, as exemplified by Ivan’s conversations with the devil about Belinsky’s criticism of the Romantic aesthetic. The benefit of the Romantic Anachronist as a definition is that it allows for hegemonic definitions of romanticism to stand untainted by supposedly impure examples of romanticism—such as the unfortunate 21st century understanding of romantic as something necessarily related to love or sex —while still acknowledging the aesthetic operating within otherwise un-romantic texts.

However, even this definition of Romanticism as being out of time and place is problematic, as it assumes that Dostoevsky and Ivan are less valid as Romantics than
their non-anachronistic counterparts. The exclusion of a character or author on the basis of chronology or the geographic location of their writing conflicts with the definition of romanticism; Romanticism, as a signifier, is itself a paradox. Anachronism and paradox are similar in that where a paradox juxtaposes two logically incompatible truths, anachronism consists of two logically incompatible times existing simultaneously.

In this way, Romanticism is by nature anachronistic; the Romantic fundamentally says “no” to the present moment in favor of an ideal time, while the author is stuck in the present moment and is unable to actually exist in the very time or place he or she idealizes. Examples include Wordsworth’s “Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood” (Poems, in Two Volumes 1807) and Coleridge’s “Frost at Midnight” (Lyrical Ballads 1798), both poems which depend upon a sort of mental feat of time travel by holding an idealized past moment in a present time. In Wordsworth’s Ode, the speaker is an older man who reflects upon his idealized memory of experiencing nature as a child. In Coleridge’s poem, the speaker looks upon his son and remembers his childhood and imagines a future for his child based on his own memories. These poems, canonically accepted as ideal Romantic productions by two of the six Romantic authors defined by Richardson, uphold anachronism as a major motif of the Romantic Movement.

Despite such Romantic poems’ preoccupation with the past, however, romantic idealization depends upon relativity to the present. In other words, in order to value one time as ideal, one must exist in a present that is different enough from the past to provide juxtaposition. This sort of juxtaposing of past or future with the present moment is an anachronistic paradox unique to the romantic aesthetic. Ivan embodies this paradox of the
past-in-present as a secular figure conversing with the devil, a figure more at home in a mystical Christian past. Dostoevsky creates the dichotomous possibility that this character is both a real devil and a fever-induced hallucination of the devil. This very ambivalence embodies the problematic nature of the Romantic Anachronist. Time and Place pull the Romantic into opposite directions, threatening to rend him in two. He belongs nowhere, and in his lack of belonging he embodies the very individual, subjective, rebellious nature of the Romantic hero. He is a human paradox: a being out of time and place, a representative of the conflict between an extinct ideology (Christianity) and the contemporary understandings of existence which have dismissed and usurped it.

In other words, to resist discrete categorization, rebel against the status quo, and embrace an existential homelessness through realizing two or more oppositional ideals is to define oneself as Romantic\(^8\). Ivan Karamazov, then, is Dostoevsky’s response, puzzle, and challenge to critics who attempt to categorize the author, character, and character-as-author. Ivan himself is a prolific author in that—much like Robert Wringhim—he writes articles on “controverted points of theology.” Like Dostoevsky, Ivan’s writing is so paradoxical that he simultaneously convinces the clergy and the atheists that he is on their side (34), and has Alyosha questioning whether Ivan is a complete atheist or a more...

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\(^8\) If one or more Romantic tropes / sufficient causes are met: for example, allusion to previous Romantic works or authors, transcendentalism, mortals in conversation with the devil, a focus on the sublime, existence of idealized shepherds or other nature/mythological idealization. We aesthetically know that Superman comics are not Romantic just as we know that Wordsworth’s poetry is Romantic. Though if there was an argument that Superman was romantic based on particular aesthetic functions—such as the idealization of a human being into a superhuman, a national hero and a grandiose simplification of the battle between good and evil—then what is to be lost in the examination of the Romantic characteristics of a non-Romantic work? This thesis sets to prove that Ivan Karamazov of TBK is a romantic hero of sorts and the text itself is a Romantic text; whether it is accepted as such is left to future scholars of Romantic aesthetics.
devout Christian than himself (287). By resisting categorization as Christian or atheist, spiritualist or scientist, Ivan symbolically acts as a fungible counterpart to Dostoevsky the author, a character who is at once categorically romantic and uncategorizeable, a being who synthesizes diametrically opposed conceptions of the Romantic. This is apt, given the paradoxical nature of the Romantic as anachronistic. Ivan, by dwelling on the edges of logic and beauty, character and author, realism and Romanticism, is unavoidably Romantic.

DIABOLICAL DIALECTIC

This Romantic ability to hold a paradoxical image or ideal in a time or place it does not belong manifests itself most strongly through Ivan’s conversations with his devil near the end of TBK. Ivan, like Robert Wringhim, can be labeled as Romantic, not because he has conversations with the devil, but because he has such conversations in a post-religious world. In the Scotland of Hogg’s time, religion had become a political rather than a spiritual mechanism, and TBK takes place in a Russia in which atheism is in vogue and socialism on the rise among intellectuals. Yet whereas Wringhim’s devil is more consistent with a Faustian or Miltonic Satan of mythical or magical proportions, Ivan’s devil is a self-proclaimed “banal” and “realist” devil (666), who labels himself the opposite of Faust’s Mephistopheles (677). TBK takes the half-mythical, half-double devil from CJS and evolves it into something more psychological in nature; the angels and devils in TBK are actual people rather than larger-than-life deities. Conversations with such human angels and demons illustrate how “The Brothers Karamazov constitutes an
attempt to reveal, transform, and extend the novel's own genre possibilities by engaging
with, and borrowing from, the rich generic heritage of Christian legend” (Holland 64).
Such engagement with Christian legend through demonic dialogue, typically associated
with *Paradise Lost* and the Faust legends, is used in more recent works like *CJS* and *TBK*
to interact with romanticism in a tenuous way. For Ivan, these conversations are
complicated in that they occur on the edges of Romanticism and realism; it is unclear to
the reader whether Ivan is hallucinating or truly in conversation with the devil. The
conflict between reality and hallucination matters in relation to Ivan’s status as a
Romantic Anachronist; At times, he indulges a romantic belief in the reality of the devil,
while at other times he adopts a scientific/medical stance, explaining away the devil as a
symptom of insanity, which undermines the image of the devil as romantic. Since Ivan
teeters on the edge of both sanity and Christian belief, and since the reader can believe at
any given time that Ivan is both mentally ill and subject to demonic visitation, Ivan
embraces simultaneously romantic and contemporary, scientific and religious ideas about
his devil.

Doubt, as an abstract concept driven by competing truths, manifests itself multiple
times in the chapters surrounding Ivan, as if it is an infectious disease: the phrases “the
devil,” “the devil take me” and “devil knows” are repeated hyperbolically by almost
every character throughout the chapters directly leading up to Ivan’s chapter (615, 623,
630, 636, 637, 651, 660…. and so forth). Ivan’s doubt takes the form of the delusion that
he, rather than Smerdyakov, is responsible for the death of Fyodor Karamazov by having
infected Smerdyakov with his ideas that “Everything is permitted,” including patricide
(629). For Dmitri, doubt takes the form of his ability to hold two incompatible beliefs; he ascribes blame for the killing of Fyodor Dostoevsky to the devil and Smerdyakov simultaneously. Dmitri “even managed to insult Ivan Fyodorovich in this first meeting, telling him abruptly that he was not to be suspected or questioned by those who themselves assert that ‘everything is permitted’” (633). A sense of doubt follows Ivan especially in relation to Smerdyakov, as Ivan fluctuates in his doubting whether Smerdyakov has Munchausen’s syndrome, as the latter forces himself to have seizures and manages to fool Dr. Herzentube and Dr. Varvinsky (633). While the medical authorities assure the characters in the text that Smerdyakov’s illness is legitimate and cannot be artificially induced, Smerdyakov himself admits that he forced himself to have the seizures in order to enable him to murder Fyodor Karamazov. Throughout the text, doubt surrounds Ivan in an infectious cloud. Such doubt refuses to be simplified by resolution. By resisting resolution, TBK pushes the reader’s mind to accept that both truths—that Smerdyakov forced himself to have a seizure, and that the seizure was legitimate—are equally true. The text undermines authoritative bodies such as judges, juries, and doctors, who force a single truth to be the Truth, as their assumptions are always proven false or mocked by the characters.

This movement of contagious doubt, which undermines any attempts at authority, manifests itself in its purest form in Ivan’s devil. Whereas the devil in CJS attaches himself almost exclusively to Robert Wringhim, Ivan’s devil is more contagious. This transformation of devil-as-myth into devil-as-disease emerges not only in the fact that direct dialogue with the devil is destructive towards Ivan and that Ivan’s devil may stem
from medical causes but also in the way the dialogue spreads like a disease to Lisa, Dmitri, and Ratkin. Ivan had originally said that “Everything is permitted,” but soon Rakitin adapts this phrase, saying, “Everything is permitted to the intelligent man” (618). Lisa begins to dream of devils and becomes obsessed with the torture of children, just like Ivan (615). Dmitri, in the next section, also obsesses about the suffering of children and quotes Pushkin (620), adopting a habit that has been Ivan’s trademark throughout the novel. Ivan introduces doubt into the hearts of everyone. His philosophies are a contagious devil; this disease and appearance of the devil is perhaps best described, as Dmitri describes it, as doubt turned to despair:

“Alyosha, my cherub, all these philosophies are killing me, devil take them! Brother Ivan…”

“What about brother Ivan?” Alyosha tried to interrupt, but Mitya did not hear.

“You see, before I didn’t have any of these doubts…” (621)

In this section of dialogue between Dmitri and Alyosha in Ivan’s section of TBK, the narrator follows Alyosha on a trail of breadcrumbs leading to Ivan. In order to understand the metaphysical significance of these conversations, one must understand that, in the world of TBK, angels and demons are not separate from humanity, but embodied in characters. So, unlike the mythical figures of the angel and devil in CJS, for the most part the characters are ascribed angelic or demonic roles. Alyosha is an angel; he is constantly described, as he is here, through the pet name “cherub” by Dmitri and other characters within the novel. Ivan’s philosophies are described as Satanic; throughout the text, when
someone says “Devil take…,” the colloquialism takes on a philosophical significance. These philosophies cause so much doubt and despair because they pit Christian mythology (past) and science (present) against each other in an extreme conflation of paradox and anachronism. As a result, fantastical Christian figures are made mundane, and otherwise seemingly insignificant colloquialisms take on mythical magnitude. So Ivan’s philosophies, which would otherwise only exist in the realm of ideas and have little effect on reality, are, quite literally, dragging people down to hell. Similarly, the proximity of “Brother Ivan” to the word “devil” illustrates the contagiousness of Ivan’s ideas.

Dostoevsky uses the proximity effect of Ivan’s ideas to other characters’ ideas to portray Ivan’s philosophies as a sort of demonic pandemic. Ivan’s contagious ideas continue to spread to Smerdyakov, who acts as a demonic precedent to Ivan’s conversations with the possibly hallucinatory devil. Ivan’s conversations with Smerdyakov always happen in private, with no one else to hear them, giving them a similar questionable existence. When Smerdyakov admits to Ivan that he was the one who killed Ivan’s father, Fyodor, he spits Ivan’s own philosophies back at him as justification for committing the crime: “It was true what you taught me, sir, because you told me a lot about that then: because if there’s no infinite God, then there’s no virtue either, and no need of it at all” (661). This harkens back to Ivan’s damning mantra that, without God, “everything is permitted” (91, 104, 290, 291, 618, 622, 653, and so on). This mantra continues to instill doubt into Ivan; even though he knows Smerdyakov committed the crime, he believes in his heart that he is at fault. The constant repetition of
this phrase by other characters, including Ivan’s potentially hallucinatory devil, illustrates the hell which rages in Ivan’s mind.

Dostoevsky insists, not subtly, that Hell is real both in the mythical sense and as a place within the mind: Ivan’s tormented inner thoughts again hold up the anachronistic paradox of a mythic or archaic hell existing in the modern human mind. Ivan “gnashes his teeth” multiple times in the text when he is talking about or thinking about the Devil (645, 667), an allusion to the Bible’s seven repetitions of the torments of Hell in the New Testament (Matthew 13:42, Luke 13:28). This reference to Hell illustrates that Ivan is in a metaphorical Hell throughout the novel, one in which he has placed himself.

This psychological imagining of angels, demons, and hell is consistent with Dostoevsky’s private correspondences about Ivan’s hallucinations about the devil. As Ivan at times believes in his devil and at times does not, Dostoevsky was similarly inconsistent as to whether his treatments of the devil generated from a medical or spiritual cause. Dostoevsky, in his December 19, 1880 letter to his friend Doctor Blagonravov, clearly states that Ivan is suffering from hallucinations stemming from medical causes. He says mockingly of his critics, perhaps with Belinsky in particular in mind, that “the gentlemen here, in their simplicity, imagine that the public will cry out with one voice: ‘What? Dostoevsky has begun to write about the Devil now, has he? How obsolete and borne he is!’ But I believe that they will find themselves mistaken” (Letters 259). In this letter, Dostoevsky goes on to say that he is glad that the doctor concurs that Ivan’s hallucinations are consistent with modern medicine’s understanding of mental illness. Yet, at the same time, Dostoevsky confesses in the same breath that he has “faith
in God” (Letters 258). Although Dostoevsky identifies his hero, Ivan, as suffering from a physical sickness, he does not disqualify the possibility that Ivan is also talking to the Devil.

In Ivan’s conversations with the devil, he himself refuses to acknowledge the devil as a real being, but insists that he is a figment of his own fevered brain. In this response to his devil, Ivan practices the narrow-minded, absolutist philosophy of Truth that Dostoevsky so despises: the very sort of thinking that must be transcended in order to redefine romanticism as discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Like Belinsky, entrenched in his belief that there is only one truth, Ivan refuses to accept the possibility that he is both mentally ill and in conversation with the devil. Rather, he simply discredits the devil as a hallucination. In order to validate such an argument, he makes the claim that the devil never repeats anything new to Ivan, but merely feeds Ivan back things he has already previously thought. However, this devil challenges the Truth that he is purely a creation of Ivan’s psyche in two ways: first, the devil is able to provide a new thought which Ivan had previously not considered:

“…Once incarnate, I accept the consequences. Satan sum et nihil humanum a me alienum puto.”

“How’s that? Satan sum et nihil humanum… not too bad for the devil!”

“I’m glad I finally pleased you.”

“And you didn’t get that from me,” Ivan suddenly stopped as if in amazement, “that never entered my head – how strange…” (668)
The devil and Ivan create a back-and-forth philosophical dialectic about whether the devil is real or a hallucination. The devil gives Ivan clues as to his ontological status, and Ivan literally plays devil’s advocate, in that for every conclusion he makes about the devil’s status, he immediately repudiates it with a counterclaim. This dialectic continues, with the devil saying such self-contradictory and clever things such as “Le diable n’existe point.” The devil even quotes a Pushkin poem (675). All of this serves to completely undermine any determination Ivan—or the reader—attempts to make about the devil’s existence. The effect on the reader is that they believe two radically opposed truths as fact.

Yet one piece of evidence is difficult to doubt: the devil tells Ivan that Smerdyakov killed himself, and Ivan knows it before Alyosha comes rushing to give him the news. Ivan, before talking to Alyosha in earnest, calls him a “pure cherub,” “dove,” and a “seraphim” (681). Dostoevsky makes it clear that Ivan has gone from talking to a (figurative?) devil to talking to an (figurative?) Angel:

“I knew he had hanged himself.”

“From whom?”

“I don’t know from whom. But I knew. Did I know? Yes, he told me. He was just telling me.”

“…how could he have talked of Smerdyakov’s death with you before I came, if no one even knew of it yet, and there was no time for anyone to find out?” (680-5).
Alyosha, even while recognizing Ivan is sick, simultaneously, paradoxically, accepts the devil as a real threat. He prays for Ivan fervently multiple times after Ivan succumbs to sleep, and says, “God will win!” in reference to Ivan’s tormented, self-debating heart. Clearly, Ivan embodies Dostoevsky’s conception of the Romantic hero of the text, the underdog, because he embodies the ability to accept paradox. Dostoevsky’s previously discussed disdain for Belinsky’s belief in a single objective truth at the expense of aesthetics shows the value Dostoevsky placed on the importance of being able to hold more than one version of the truth in one’s mind. Dostoevsky’s derision of the reductive idea of a single, objective truth manifests itself in the court’s failed attempts to discover the objective truth of who murdered Fyodor Karamazov.

Ivan’s courtroom scene, in which he pleads guilty to the murder of his father, illustrates that the devil is both real and hallucinatory, highlighting the romantic contradictory nature of Ivan’s existence, while simultaneously placing *TBK* in the romantic subgenre of the Confession Novel. Ivan’s testimony to the courtroom mirrors his private confessions to other characters, including the devil, throughout the novel. Though to the courtroom his guilt-admitting testimony seems like meaningless blabber triggered by mental disease, the courtroom receives Ivan’s testimony out of context. Because we, as readers bear witness to Ivan’s conversations with the devil, we know that

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9 To briefly define the Confession Novel genre, it is a (real or fictitious) autobiographical genre in which the narrator details his or her hidden secrets to the reader, usually with spiritual overtones. Credit for this genre’s creation is often attributed to St. Augustine’s *Confessions*, but the genre became, based on frequency of occurrence in popular literary magazines and published works, immensely popular in the Romantic period through such works as Thomas De Quincey’s *Confessions of an Opium-Eater* (1822), Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Confessions* (1789), and of course *CJS* (1824).
Ivan speaks the truth. Even the authorities on insanity—the very doctor figures on whom Dostoevsky relied to illustrate the medical validity of Ivan’s hallucinations—contradict the idea of Ivan as insane. The marshal responsible for allowing Ivan to testify states that “the witness had been well all along, that the doctor who examined him an hour ago when he felt slightly ill, but that before entering the courtroom he had spoken coherently, so that it was impossible to foresee anything; that he himself, on the contrary, had demanded and absolutely wanted to testify” (718). Yet, just pages later, another doctor is summoned who states that Ivan is indeed mentally unstable, suffering from brain fever, and that Ivan visited him two days before to confess that he “saw visions while awake, met various persons in the street who were already dead, and that Satan visited him every evening” (723). This doctor’s testimony convinces the public and the courtroom that Ivan is insane and thus his testimony is false, yet the reader, privy to the whole story, knows otherwise. Such undermining of perceived truth of the characters versus knowledge of the reader challenges the authority of the doctor and courtroom, both as elements of the story and as abstract constructions of traditional authority.

This mysterious unnamed doctor disappears in the next sentence, never to appear again. The symptoms described by the doctor, while perhaps medically indicative of mental disorder, are uncannily similar to how one would go about diagnosing Romanticism. Canonical romantic authors such as Wordsworth depended upon these sorts of inspirational visions to write their poetry, as emphasized by Wordsworth’s poem “The Inner Vision” (1798), in which, as in many of his poems, (e.g. “Daffodils” (1804) and “The Solitary Reaper” (1803)) a vision flashes “upon the inward eye” to provide a
transcendental moment. Further, meeting “various persons in the street who were already dead” is another common romantic subject, with authors such as Wordsworth and Coleridge imagining meeting famous dead people such as Rob Roy (as described in “Rob Roy’s Grave” [1803]) or Robert Burns (“At the Grave of Burns” [1803]). Finally, such visitations with Satan are common to romantic and pre-romantic characters, including as Doctor Faustus and Robert Wringhim, and many of Nathaniel Hawthorne and Washington Irving’s characters. Ivan’s symptoms as described by the doctor at the court room are not restricted to a single diagnosis; rather, it is possible, or even probable, that Ivan suffers from both disease in the medical sense and dis-ease in the romantic sense.

Father Zossima’s judgment of Ivan diagnoses him in a Christian romantic context rather than the medical context of the doctor: “Here the devil is struggling with God, and the battlefield is the human heart” (132). Zossima, the moral compass and sage of the novel, whose authority certainly carries more weight than that of the unnamed doctors who diagnose Ivan as medically ill, serves to elucidate the purpose of Ivan as a battlefield; while it may seem that the battlefield is implicitly religious in nature, such a dialectical struggle also invokes battles between past and present, romanticism and realism. Zossima’s answer—or “moral of the story,” is consistent with Ivan’s existence. Alyosha, who closely resembles the eponymous main character of The Idiot (1869), fails to understand a central message of TBK: that God will not “win” in a way that perpetuates the dichotomous, archaic conception of Good and Evil, but that there is beauty in the very tension between God and the Devil. That God and the Devil can exist simultaneously in a world that is post-religious illustrates the very sort of paradoxical
beauty which breeds salvation for characters like Ivan. “That’s just where beauty lies”—in paradox (132).

The Devil embodies the paradoxical qualities of the romantic in much the same way that Ivan embodies Dostoevsky’s Romantic self. Besides his questionable status as either real or hallucination, advocating paradox as both torment and beauty, Dostoevsky’s devil resists categorization. This devil shares uncanny similarities with the devil presented in *CJS*, especially his rhetorical skills and tendency to self-undermine. This is unsurprising, given Dostoevsky’s Romantic influence, as “it took Romanticism to provide Russian culture with a model of the devil that ascribed to him a grandeur, a profound philosophical significance ambiguity, and a rich complexity to which the malicious imps of folk and Orthodox tradition could never aspire” (Leatherbarrow 16).

Such a devil, based on the “rich complexity” of a Western devil, inherently undermines Belinsky’s belief that literature must be nationalistic. Rather than using a devil easily recognizable and understandable to a Russian audience, Dostoevsky makes his devil more ambiguous in his complexity. As noted, the devil’s ambiguity extends beyond his status as hallucination or not; the devil’s ambiguity lies as much in his moral ambiguity as in his physical ambiguity. Is this devil necessarily evil? This devil causes Ivan to finally (perhaps) achieve faith in God which he previously could not; he muses that if the Devil exists, God must as well. The Devil’s very mythical and irrational existence is at once terrifying, beautiful and mundane. For Ivan, the ugliness of the devil paradoxically opens up infinite possibilities for beauty.

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10 Russian readers would be familiar with such manifestations of the devil, such as the one that appears in Nikolai Gogol’s “Christmas Eve” (originally published in 1832).
By embodying anachronism as a primary feature of the Romantic mode, Ivan acts as a stand-in for Dostoevsky in the novel – a human paradox who resists categorization by critics. Using the Romantic mode as a means to challenge critics’ derisions of his writing and what he saw as a fallacious mechanism by which they judged a writer based on an assumption of objective truth which invalidates all other possible truths (Belinsky’s original praise of Dostoevsky as a genius, and his later assertion that his work was “terrible stuff” and a “calamity”), Dostoevsky subverts Belinsky’s attempts to define him, his characters, and his work. *TBK* exists outside of the traditional parameters of Romanticism as defined by hegemonic gatekeepers, but some scholars and characters insist, and Dostoevsky himself, all insist on Ivan Karamazov as a romantic character. As Dostoevsky resists discrete categorization as Romantic in Belinsky’s derisive use of the term, but embraces self-categorization as Romantic in a Pushkinian and Scottian sense, perhaps he can set the stage for other novels to self-identify as Romantic, thus opening up the canon for future works and dissolving often destructive external categorization. Paradox, in a romantic sense, is beauty. For Ivan—and for Dostoevsky—"Beauty will save the world" (*The Idiot*).
Conclusion

Through *CJS* and *TBK*, Hogg and Dostoevsky challenge their respective critics’ Romantic categorizations and offer more inclusive and diverse examples of Romanticism. As Lovejoy introduced the idea of having not a single overarching Romanticism, but various diverse Romanticisms, so too do these marginalized authors offer constantly changing – and often contradictory – approaches to the Romantic. Both Hogg and Dostoevsky offer multiple and often self-and-critic-contradictory approaches to Romanticism, never settling on one clear, definite national aesthetic. Such alterations allow Romanticism to adopt a more egalitarian approach. The problem with all of the texts Lovejoy cites in his argument about Romanticism is that they are all from authors traditionally considered within the canon of Romantic literature – all from the hegemonic or elite strata of their respective societies. The redefinition of Romanticism, if it is to occur, must do so by including—and perhaps focusing upon—the Romantic literature produced by those on the borders of Romanticism, recognizing the inherent paradoxes of the term. Nowhere are the limits of Romanticism more clearly outlined than by the outliers of the hegemonic sample. On the limits, the un-Romantic variables can be identified and removed from the Romantic equation, isolating the definitively Romantic attributes based upon their adherence to a Romantic aesthetic rather than the authority presented through the author’s wealth, time, geographic location, social status, or cultural currency.

Given the present lack of a clear definition of Romanticism, the similarities between Hogg and Dostoevsky’s works, the apt manner in which both authors observed
the intricacies of Romanticism—attempting to place themselves within Romanticism while simultaneously critiquing it—and the manner in which they redefine or reappropriate what they see as the problematic exclusivity of the Romantic works of the time, Romanticism as a literary definition must be revolutionized in a way that focuses on its overarching spirit, and the inherent paradox of ambiguity in such a concept as overarching spirit, rather than on shallow temporal and national constraints. Although I do not offer a completely new definition for Romanticism that will subsume all qualifying Romantic literatures, I do propose Romantic Anachronism as sufficient cause to define some literary texts as Romantic. Separating the Romantic aesthetic from the Romantic period opens the canon to many texts which have previously been excluded from Romanticism, and frees the definition from the constraints of time and space. Thus freed, the term can be used in a way that illuminates rather than ambiguates the texts which it includes.

The Romantic Anachronism emphasizes the paradoxical nature of the romantic mode; that it is not, in fact, a clear term which can be defined, but rather a muddled upheaval of multiple—often oppositional—national, religious, personal, temporal and hierarchical ideals. The distinctive attribute of this Romantic mode is that it is able to hold all of these competing ideals equally and simultaneously. Romantic Anachronism encompasses previous romantic categories of the irony, self-consciousness, self-awareness, nostalgia, sensibility, fate and self-determination, sensibility, rage, and enthusiasm. The Romantic Anachronist, then, is the character embodiment of the romantic mode; a being caught in the exchange of paradoxical ideals. This aesthetic
allows for a Romanticism not limited to the Romantic period; it frees the term from national and temporal constraints, opening up and therefore enriching the canon with a diverse range of authors writing in the romantic mode.

It is my hope that, though this anachronism-focused definition, Korean/African/Australian/displaced authors 200 years from now can write works and say to themselves, or have critics and readers say of them, yes, this author clearly operates in the Romantic mode based on aesthetic merit; such an understanding may help illuminate both the author’s text and Romantic texts that came before it through Romanticism’s complex richness of paradox and similarity. Self-consciously Romantic works that weave in and out of traditional conceptions of Romanticism – such as CJS and TBK – offer an interesting examination of Romanticism compared to work – such as William Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads – that defines and fulfills traditional, more parochial understandings of Romanticism.
Works Cited


