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Bush Justice and Development in Alaska:
Why Legal Process in Village Alaska Has Not Kept Up
with Changing Social Needs [original]

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Summary
This paper analyzes the evolution of the working legal process in the predominantly Alaska Native villages of rural Alaska after Alaska statehood. Replacement of territorial government by highly centralized state justice agencies led to a weakening in the working relationship between formal law and extralegal mechanisms such as the village council. This change coincided with development and other changes which demanded more formal legal presence in villages rather than less. The paper reviews the fate of various bush justice reform efforts made by state agencies and efforts by villages to respond to justice needs. The author suggests that the inadequacy of legal process in village Alaska is not due primarily to language problems or Native confusion about Western law; rather, the "bush justice problem" is caused by a lack of resources, a lack of legal planning for development, and the state governmental system's lack of accountability to its rural constituency. The author recommends experimentation at village level, better planning, and greater autonomy for villages.

Additional information
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BUSH JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT IN ALASKA:
WHY LEGAL PROCESS IN VILLAGE ALASKA HAS
NOT KEPT UP WITH CHANGING NEEDS

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Introduction

For more than ten years, as researcher and as attorney, I have studied what Alaskans term "bush justice," the delivery and implantation of state law and order services upon nearly twenty percent of Alaska's population who reside in more than one hundred isolated villages and towns. ¹

The legal services herein described are fundamental to the American legal culture. They include:

(1) police services - the expectation that some level of police protection and some level of reaction to crimes can and will occur on a daily basis and with regularity;

(2) judicial and dispute resolution services - an expectation that a forum will be available to deal with minor and major disputes and law violations by adults and by juveniles; and

(3) representational services - that trained advocates will interpret law for citizens and represent either community or individual interest when they are in conflict.

There is a further premise operative in American legal culture. It is the notion that the machinery of law is guided by community needs and expectations.

Community needs are expressed through a local law base. Community will is reflected then in the enforcement of laws desired by the community. Direct participation in each of the above named activities is a second way that community needs are met. Local people are not only law givers but implement the law given as players in the system. Finally, the American process
provides for participation by local citizens as jurists, as wit­nesses, complainants and observers.

There are evident tensions within any community. Although there is a tendency to speak of villages in Alaska as though each (or all) have a single personality there are tensions between individual interests and some illusive "community will," even there.

To address these evident tensions, checks and balances are developed in the American legal process. Thus, we depend not merely upon an erudite judge to discover the truth, but also upon a clash between competing interests within the legal system.

The notions that individual communities within larger societies are entitled to have a law process which is appropriate to their needs and to some extent guided by the political and social will of that community is not necessarily an attribute of all legal cultures in all countries. However, it is very much the sense of American law in the history of its development. Perhaps because American communities received only the law services which they choose to pay for and engraft, institutions of law and law jobs tended historically to be directly reflective of problems and solutions which needed a legal solution. Legal process shared the stage as a secondary player with other forms of social control. As communities from colonial times onward perceived that social control through familial and economic structure could no longer contain forms of deviant behavior, these forms of deviance were recast as legal deviance. Procedures were
implanted to address them which were legal rather than social.

Even then, the formal legal approach remained as a backdrop to social control for most members of small communities. Communities in the American West moved from non-legal social control to vigilante justice (termed here extra-legal) to formal justice in what was not in fact a sequence so much as a succession of overlapping waves. This interaction between social non-legal control, extra-legal social control and formal legal control is a complex relationship which few social scientists and most assuredly few legal professionals understand. In fact, as the Alaska case will demonstrate, few legal professionals desire to understand that elements of non-legal social control, extra-legal social control and formal legal process complement one another and compete for favor and dominance in the same place at the same time.

Extra-legal process does not disappear with the assertion of authority by official forms of law and order. It can and does reassert itself in communities where formal law is incapable of meeting broad-based community expectations.

These three components of the legal culture of village Alaska and of virtually any community large or small each serve its needs. The components interact and interrelate.

**Non-legal Social Control**

Non-legal social control has rules and sanctions which can be viewed as the etiquette of the setting. While etiquette is a term which suggests no more than the finishing touches of behav-
ior, it is used here to encapsulate those non-institutionalized rules and sanctions which separate members from strangers. Rule violation can drive members into exile; sanctions can drive members mad. 2

The etiquette of the setting (Black, 1976:36) derives its force from a desire of persons to belong to a group, and to retain the advantages of membership then and in the future.

This process of social control works very well upon persons engaged in longterm and dependent relationships. It works very poorly when strangers are involved, persons with no special stake in the community or concern for the community's perception of them. It works very poorly when the arbiters of etiquette are called into question or when once cohesive societies lose their cohesion (Conn and Hippler, 1973).

Extra-Legal Control

Within the category of extra-legal control and processes are both appendages and repackaged versions of formal law and appendages and repackagings of non-legal social control. Lines of identity and control flow in both directions.

The village council has been the historical vehicle for extra-legal activity in village Alaska (Conn and Hippler, 1975). Extra-legal process binds and draws upon both non-legal social control and legal authority but in fact has a separate identity. Extra-legal process institutionalizes in a demi-legal fashion, non-legal social control. It collects and focuses social pressure upon recalcitrant members and "educates" strangers (or
persons with very limited knowledge of or stake in village opinion). It often "legalizes" social pressure by means of threats or enforcement of fines or other legal sanctions (Conn and Hippler, 1974).

Extra-legal process also draws upon and controls formal legal process to the extent that it determines when formal intervention should occur. It is reinforced by formal legal process in an unofficial manner when it is granted the authority to accomplish a variety of sublegal tasks or to report formal law violations. This role has the effect of extending the reach of official law into places and circumstances where it cannot or will not reach on its own. What the extra-legal authority receives in exchange for this responsibility is a kind of derivative power which it can direct to other less clearly authorized tasks.

"Unless you listen to us with respect to this now-institutionalized non-legal rule violation, X" says extra-legal authority, Y, "We will report you and call into play intervention by formal authority for law violation, Z" (see Conn, 1976:217-24).

Extra-legal authority brokers social control and law and packages both into a new form. That form and its role is highly changeable because it is most dependent upon the forces and demands of non-legal social control and the forces and demands of state law givers. In Alaska these state law givers operate from towns which service clusters of villages.

Extra-legal authority is the dynamic force which "makes law
happen" in places where neither social control nor formal law can or will dominate the hearts, minds and lives of the people involved. It is most susceptible to changing needs, but it is also most fragile of the three named forces which make up legal culture in village Alaska.

Formal law has power beyond the comprehension of its own purveyors to drive extra-legal authority from its place in the center of legal culture. It can displace without replacing extra-legal institutions which have institutionalized rules which are not legal and which have proffered the desired approaches to problem solving and dispute resolution be they legal or extra-legal. Ironically, it can also weaken extra-legal authority by inaction when that same authority requests intervention. Formal law must not be either too strong or too weak in its association with extra-legal authority. It must allow extra-legal authority to guide it in this respect.

To assess the role of state law in meeting the changing needs of village Alaska one must understand a longterm and historic relationship between Eskimo or Indian social control, hybrid forms of village-based extra-legal authority, and town-based personnel who represent state legal process.

The legal process which addresses the needs of village Alaska and operates therein is usually poorly conceptualized by students of the subject. Yet without correct conceptualization one cannot understand why that process has faltered and failed even as more state resources have been introduced into the process.
How can more equal less?

The village of P, 40 miles from town, typifies this curious phenomenon. P has every resource presently available to rural communities by way of law and order. It has a resident part-time magistrate to handle misdemeanors. Its two cell lockup and police station houses the office of a state trooper constable, a Village Public Safety Officer (VPSO), and a village policeman. The former is an employee of the Department of Public Safety who handles criminal offenses of every kind in P and in neighboring villages of Q and R. Trooper constables are allowed to remain in rural locations permanently and are hired against somewhat reduced standards in order to attract rural persons who might not qualify as troopers or desire to rotate into the cities.

The VPSO is an unarmed multipurpose policeman, trained in emergency medical care and in firefighting, who handles lesser offenses and holds the scene for either town-based troopers or for the trooper constable. VPSO's are paid by the legislature through the Department of Public Safety and regionally-based non-profit Native corporations (see Sellin, 1981).

Town-based services include a trooper contingent, a superior court judge, a public defender, a soon-to-be-placed district attorney, and a legal services attorney. Correctional probation-parole services are provided from Nome. Youth services are provided in town.

P, along with about sixty other villages, has adopted a state local option law which prohibits importation or sale of alcoholic
Eight years before I surveyed the same village justice system. P had a magistrate then as now. The difference was that eight years ago she was hiding from her intoxicated husband. One of its local village police had burned down his own home during a drinking bout. The other was drunk during our visit.

The magistrate and police operated out of a modular court and lockup facility (a trailer) barged up the P river by the court system. The magistrate had stacks of unopened legal materials in her office.

In town, the trooper contingent was half of its present composition (two instead of four). The town had a magistrate, but no lawyers other than a legal services attorney. The town had an Alaska Native correctional aide for both juveniles and adults.

Today there is more law available to P if law is the accumulation of law givers or legal resources. The village policeman, the town-based youth services aide and the magistrate are Alaska Natives. However, the village policeman and magistrate are from other villages. Other figures are non-Natives and are from other places. Problems of "arresting one's brother," often voiced as the reason why hiring local residents has been difficult for justice agencies, had been obviated by hiring transient figures, both Native and non-Native.

P has a magistrate. One hundred and thirty-five other villages lack any state-appointed judicial officer. P has a VPSO.
At least eighty villages lack a VSPO and must hire and pay their own police. P has a trooper constable. Only a very few villages have trooper constables.

P has changed in other ways. Its population has nearly doubled in the eight years between field visits from 400 to 750 people. It has a high school in its village. It has television and a phone system, new in eight years. A bridge spans the P river. It has three flights from town daily instead of one.

Yet the village council has complaints about its legal situation. Small kids and young people drink and disobey curfew. The magistrate is never in her office. The town has no interest in these small matters. The VPSO and trooper constable make unnecessary arrests. They pick on people. They influence the magistrate to sentence residents to fines and jail terms out of proportion to the offense. The police don't listen to the council and question local ordinances.

The police are unhappy. The youth jeer at them. The town social worker and youth services aide tell the VPSO to leave the kids alone.

In August, 1983, a summertime population of young adults repealed the local option law. For three months arrests were constant, at least four times the number of arrests during the previous seven months of 1983. The council had to take to the streets when the village police quit working. Council members put 27 persons in two cells in a single night.
The village voted to ban importation again in November. But, complain the councilmen, people have learned to sneak liquor into the village.

"Why can't we search their baggage?" they ask (see Lonner and Duff, 1983).

A neighboring village repealed the local option law after three suicides in rapid succession. People have discovered that the law does not enforce itself and that there are severe limits on the way it can be enforced constitutionally.

There is a numbing sense of loss in P. Councilmen tell the author the same stories about the old council of the 1930s and 1940s that they related to him in 1976: The council once put a woman and a man who misbehaved outside without clothes. Children were switched with willow branches for acting out.

Is this nostalgia for Eskimo law ways? Is it nostalgia for a time when non-legal social control and council justice played a central role in dealing with legal needs? Or is it nostalgia for a legal system in which some element of authority remained in the village?

P's city council is not the village council of yesteryear. Its agenda is heavy with projects not unlike those of any small town in America.

It meets with its professional grantsman on important capital improvement projects; wooden sidewalks for the village, new washers and dryers, and transfer of school housing to the
The council members are a mix of young and old. All are aware that P floats in a sea of legal jargon and regulations.

When P's council considers applications for the jail attendant, the issue of an applicant's age arises. Can an applicant be under 19? Council members scurry to find the answer in the magistrate's set of statutes and in her administrative regs. Not finding it, they call the corrections officer in Nome to find out.

The fear of breaking the law and being sued is very real. That this sensitivity is so prevalent and so very high in places where the ability to bring or respond to a law suit is close to nonexistent is one of the ironies of bush justice today.

Those who view village initiatives to improve their legal system as attempts to challenge the state legal system or even to separate the village as a legal place from the system that envelops the village sadly misinterpret the village perspective. For village Alaska, the time when Eskimo peoples floated free of Western law is a distant moment in time as removed from village experience as it is from most community experience in the Western United States.

A working relationship between formal law, extra-legal authority and social control has persisted since the late 19th century (Conn, 1980). What is now different for village Alaska is the level of autonomy available to the extra-legal component
and, through it, to P. There has been a relationship between the three aspects of P's legal culture since the first teacher-missionaries appeared on the scene. What has changed is the shape of the legal process as well as P's capacity to guide that process to its determined needs.

The Structure of the Legal System

With the exception of the village policeman, each member of P's legal community has been hired and is subject to control by a different state or town-based bureaucracy. Each has a vertical relationship to persons outside of the village that guides the way each does his or her job. In fact, the state legal agents in P relate to town in the exact fashion that town-based professionals relate to Nome (the hub of the judicial district) and that Nome-based professionals relate to superiors in Anchorage and in Juneau.

P experiences law and order as it is served up by a coalition of vertically directed figures placed in P and subject to removal from P by town and city-based supervisors.

P experiences law but does not guide it. P is given the law which separately trained and separately assigned representatives of separately managed state bureaucratic units see fit to provide.

What P can obtain from state law is some after-the-fact reaction to P's most serious problems. If P complains to any single bureaucracy about its service, the chances are good that its agent in P will be removed to X, Y or Z or any of a hundred
plus villages who lack the resources of P and would very much desire them.

What P has received is a "trickle down" justice system of parajudges and parapolice, mere scraps of an American law system injected into an Eskimo village. P is a base for a collection of random legal offerings it does not guide or control.

Bush justice has become rural ghetto justice.

Development in a Village Context

Changes in Alaskan village life have occurred within the context of Alaska development during the past two decades. The replacement of territorial government with state government, the development of transportation and communication networks, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the construction of the TransAlaska Pipeline and consequent explosion of government spending have all left their marks on the village landscapes.

While division of these events into historical stages is difficult - most especially because regions of bush Alaska have historically felt change at different times and at different degrees when compared with each other or when clusters of villages are compared in a single region - two periods are notable for their influence when the combined forces of development and changing legal needs are considered.

First, the early 1960's when Alaska state law personnel replaced territorial law personnel in the towns which service village Alaska. They refused to reinforce prohibitions on Native
drinking by extra-legal village authority, the single most persistent role of white legal officialdom from the Russians to statehood (see Conn, 1980).

In a shift of legal position which caught many villages by surprise, the state refused to validate village council bans on the manufacture of hootch or to impose other limits on transportation of liquor from towns (Conn, 1982). The district attorneys and bush troopers were prepared as a de facto matter to reinforce enforcement of villages rules by transposing some of these violations into state law violations after several attempts by the council to act. The very limited allocation of police and prosecutorial services to rural Alaska sharply diminished the reliability of this approach and, consequently, the credibility of both state law and council justice in the eyes of many villagers.

This weakening in the working relationship between formal law and extra-legal mechanisms such as the village council was coincidental with developmental shifts that demanded more legal presence in the villages rather than less.

In Southwestern Alaska where the largest numbers of village Eskimos and Indians reside, Bethel emerged as a source of wages and liquor. In the midst of a population explosion, the region's young men and women migrated toward villages more proximate to Bethel.4

In a series of meetings, the Association of Village Council Presidents decried the opening of a liquor store and bars in Bethel. Councilmen equated the death of their young men in
alcohol-related accidents, shootings and suicides to war; they requested legal advice to contain Bethel's influence on their villages (Conn, 1982:25-27).\(^5\)

What they received were admonitions against illegal acts by their councils and advice that only Bethel citizens could deal directly with Bethel's liquor situation whatever the impact on surrounding satellite villages. Councilmen were told to write the governor and the Alcohol Beverage Control Board. As to their own local problems, they were advised to develop consensual approaches to problems which could not be dealt with by state law.

Without reliable support from town-based legal personnel, councils became more like police courts which meted out fines and even jail terms and less like brokering institutions which stressed compromise and counseling as a prelude to "calling in the law."

Village councils could not act as courts under state law. Only court appointed magistrates could undertake that task. The court system placed magistrates in about sixty villages in the late 1960s, employing War on Poverty funds, but were never pleased by the administrative and operational problems caused by designating parajudges to distant villages. After two magistrate study boards met to consider the subject in the early and mid-1970s, the court system retreated to the proposition that town-based judicial officers should handle village problems large and small once they were termed "legal." The size of the magistrate
system was not increased.

What placement of magistrates accomplished from the village perspective was to implant an agent of state law into the village. He or she had unquestioned authority to handle minor criminal matters and small civil claims. What she lacked was the capacity to buttress social control in the village with approaches familiar and acceptable to village people. Village councils had autonomy which magistrates lacked. Also, removed from their jurisdiction were children's problems and a range of extra-legal prohibitions on behavior.

Magistrates could displace but not easily replace the extra-legal brokering component of village culture (Conn and Hippler, 1973). As part-time court employees very low on the organizational totem pole, they were also in no position to initiate reforms.

The Structure of State Law and its Influence

The destabilization of village council justice occurred for reasons which would have continuing influence on the issue of legal planning to meet changing village needs, both in the 1960s and in the decade thereafter.

The legal process of Alaska was packaged constitutionally in separately administered, highly centralized departments and divisions. The court system, the Department of Public Safety, the Department of Law, the Division of Corrections (and later the Division of Youth Services) and the Public Defender Agency emerged as independently administered fiefdoms (Conn, 1981).
For most of these agencies, bush responsibilities were satisfied by placing departmental representatives in as few regional centers as possible and by drawing villages' problems into towns and cities.

Only the Department of Public Safety viewed the bush as its principal constituency as urban police departments made trooper work less essential in the state's population centers. But this enthusiasm for bush service on the part of the troopers did not result in placement of officers in all settlements as in Canada. The troopers, also, chose to follow the territorial model and place its detachments in towns.

Each component of the justice system had its own determined service boundaries. The court system continued to use the judicial districts inherited from riverboat days (with some slight variations). Decisions on professional placement and decisions on data gathering and record keeping were independently made. Records on village Alaska were intermingled with those of urban centers by all agencies.

To what extent had the state accepted its responsibility to offer services to Native villages in rural Alaska?

Though it can hardly be verified scientifically, there appears to have been an inherited state governmental attitude that the federal government would take care of Native problems, this despite the fact that Congress in 1958 extended territorial (later state law) over criminal and some civil offenses in Indian country within Alaska.6
In territorial days there had been some structural division between governance for whites and governance for non-whites in the territory. The special provision for schooling of Alaska Natives as Native Americans in Bureau of Indian Affairs village and boarding schools was a good example of this division. Hospital care for Natives through Alaska Native Service facilities was another.

Teaching and law and order had been introduced together by deputizing teachers who set about organizing early village councils (Strickland, ed., et al., 1982:764). Though both federal and state officials had apparently forgotten it by statehood, the Congress and Interior department had validated the village councils' authority to act as tribal governing bodies of Indian Reorganization Act communities in the 1930s. This potential tribal legal authority of villages to handle some of their own law and order matters was not argued again until nearly twenty-five years after statehood (Case, 1978).

Although villages near Bethel discovered in the early 1960s that a working relationship between formal law and village authority had broken down, many other rural areas did not see this as critical until later. Developmental events had impacts that differed from region to region and within regions.

A good example of the latter variation were coastal villages in the Bethel region that remained relatively immune to the social convulsions of town life, wage earning opportunities and bootleggers until the late 1970s (Conn, 1982:71-74). Even to the
mid-1970s, these villages demonstrated themselves statistically to be very free of alcohol-related accidents and crimes when compared with the villages near Bethel and with upriver Athabascan villages. Communication links both by phone and airplane were problematic. Church influence was strong. So strong was social control, both institutionalized and non-institutionalized, that recurrent offenders found it expedient to move away. Even in Bethel, villagers from this coastal cluster did not drink to excess or "let off steam."

However, by the end of the 1970s, telephone communication and air transportation had improved. A village high school kept the children at home. Letters to the Assistant District Attorney from the coastal villages reflected the change: complaints of drunken violence and youth in trouble with liquor and drugs predominated.

The 1970s

This decade was marked by the megaprojects which brought oil wealth to Alaska. No longer could the state plead poverty when the plight of village law and order was discussed.

Oil revenues flowed with pipeline oil. However, even earlier than that, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration promised to reward the state bureaucratic network with federal funds to develop and to supplement criminal law service in rural and in urban Alaska. This lead to the establishment of the Governor's Commission on the Administration of Justice and to the creation of its staff arm, the Criminal Justice Planning Agency.
Chief Justice George Boney took the helm of the Governor's Commission. He wrote and spoke of regional bush justice centers to train rural persons to take up law-related activities. Along with Vic Fischer of the Institute of Social and Economic Research he convened the first of what would become three conferences on bush justice in the decade.

In addition, each major developmental project spawned social and economic impact statements which addressed the way that village life would be affected by the project at hand.

All of these heady developments could not have been more promising for bush justice improvements through coordinated state planning. They provided:

1. A financial raison d'être for collaboration among state justice agencies.

2. Strong leadership from the court system to direct the Governor's Commission toward rural justice problems.

3. The first of three slates of bush justice recommendations, these drawn from non-Native expertise from Alaska and Canada (along with symbolic bush representation) as well as periodic social impact statements from state, federal and private experts on proposed construction projects.

4. A planning agency to plan.

Added to this was important new leverage on the part of the "Native community." While reapportionment decisions had begun to erode bush legislative representation, the emergence of Native corporations had provided the Native minority with new political
clout. Further, Native leadership who had lobbied Congress effectively could transfer that expertise to the halls of the state legislature.

What Did Occur

The first bush justice conference in 1970 acknowledged the importance of village councils to the administration of justice in remote Alaska (Alaska Judicial Council, Bush Justice Conference, 1970:2). It gave equal weight to the need for Native participation at all levels of the administration of justice. (Id:2).

Although few participants in this conference were Native people from rural Alaska, its agenda of recommendations spoke to many practical failings of the state system to address rural needs. It requested trials to be held in rural areas and increased travel by police and courts.

Yet this agenda for reform, as well as two other slates of recommendations which flowed from two other bush justice conferences, ultimately came to naught.

The reason was that would-be reformers, including University scholars and an Alaska Federation of Natives bush justice team, were essentially outsiders to both the bureaucratic decision-making process and to the state political process.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

Early in the decade a young part-time criminal justice planner named Butch Schwartz reported to the Commission that only
10.8 percent of Alaska's LEAA block grants and 11.1 percent of all LEAA funds directly benefited bush areas. Eighty percent of this amount went to construct five jails and to fund police training programs (Schwartz, 1973:4).

To understand this diversion of LEAA funds to urban and central bureaucratic needs, one needed only to examine the composition of the Governor's Commission. On the Commission sat agency heads or designees, the police chiefs of Alaska's largest cities, legislative representatives and a lone rural representative. That latter person was usually a bush magistrate or a person with no connection to any organization engaged in the legal or political process.

Chief Justice Boney died in a boating accident in May, 1972. From that time forward the Commission served as a conduit for funneling federal money into established state bureaucracies and to urban police departments. Smaller police departments and other non-line social service agencies were left to scramble for the leavings after the feast.

There was no centralized process for translating studies, even LEAA-funded studies, into plans of action. The position of the Criminal Justice Planning Agency and LEAA representatives in the Seattle region was that Indian matters should be dealt with and funded by the Indian desk of LEAA despite the fact that "Indian villages" in Alaska are, with one exception, non-reservation communities subject to state criminal law.

When the Criminal Justice Planning Agency finally did fund a
study to garner "hard data" on the rural situation in 1977, it discovered that the hard data did not exist. It questioned police and local officials for estimates of crime.

John Angell (1979) analyzed and later published (1981) this material from questionnaires designed to discover the state of bush justice in 55 villages selected because of the presence of some components of the Western system (such as a state magistrate). His report described the delays of as much as three days in service from town-based police and the near absence of knowledge of justice components other than the state troopers (see Appendix 1). It also depicted what may be the highest rate of reported crime in the United States (see Appendix 2).

The Angell report stressed that while small white communities were isolated for purposes of data collection in police statistics, village Alaska was included in a catchall category.

The State Legislative Approach

Bush Alaska was viewed constitutionally as the great unorganized borough subject to governance as a whole by the state legislature, acting as its borough assembly. ANCSA's division of Alaska into cultural sectors for purposes of the Act came to be employed as a de facto way to deal with rural Natives through their non-profit regional corporations. The court system (among others) fought off an attempt to realign its districts to this grid, arguing that it would place judges under too much local pressure.

The state legislature listened to state departments, cities
and towns in rural Alaska, but not to the villages. Early in the
decade drunken behavior was decriminalized. This change removed
from the arrest dockets Native persons who were often rounded up
en masse in Alaskan cities and towns (Friedman, 1970). The pro-
cess of collection of inebriates had already given way to a
"waiver" program that made court appearances unnecessary. Cities
and towns continued to collect numbers as high as half of the
resident Native population under protective custody provisions
(Conn and Boedeker, 1983). However, villages were in no position
to use this dragnet approach. The net effect for them was to
repeal drunk in public and drunk in private ordinances leaving no
replacement for villages.

Bush legislators during the first half of the decade focused
on issues relative to successful implementation of land claims
and on the bellwether issue of high schools for the villages. No
consideration was given, either by the state legislators or by the
state agencies who deal with youth and family services, to the
impact year-round of a youthful presence in small villages where
the high schools were constructed.11

Village high schools were introduced in the context of
regionally-based school districts. Village parents discovered
that power in these districts reposed in the towns which served
as regional centers, in the unionized faculty and in the school
administration.

Regionalization of services contracted by the state or
federal government through the non-profit Native corporations
(whose good work had aided in the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act) emerged as the practical working relationship between state agencies and the villages. Regional corporations became friendly conduits for state and federal funds for studies such as the 55 village study and for more recent programs such as the Village Public Safety Officer Program.

Whether villages were entirely satisfied with this arrangement was not as clear. In 1977 village council members went to Washington to soundly rebuke a plan to make non-profit regional corporations into "Indian tribes" for purposes of the federal trust relation. (United States Senate Select Committee, 1978; see also, Conn and Garber, 1981).

In this critique of formalization of the regional community at the federal level, they were joined by urban Native leaders who argued that the Land Claims Act's Native corporations, both village and regional, provided a structural basis for carrying out governmental responsibilities without the creation by Congress of a new tribal relationship (see testimony of Roy Huhndorf, Select Committee 1978:404-407).

Just as villages were reluctant to give over absolutely local governmental authority, so were Native leadership, schooled in the political process of land claims, unwilling to see power dissipated among many tiny villages. That strategy had been one unsuccessfully pursued by the state during the Congressional debate over the Claims Settlement Act (Berry, 1975).

For the state to deal with non-profit corporations or rural
school districts as conduits for state programs the reins of which remained in state hands was different from a unilateral conveyance of state power to regionally-based governmental structures. When this last approach occurred in the decade it demonstrated how jealously guarded was the concept of centralized state authority.

Development of the legal process on the North Slope Borough well illustrates the political and administrative tensions engendered by an official sharing of power with rural Alaska. After its stormy beginning (marked by oil opposition to the formation of a local taxing authority) the North Slope Borough requested and assumed boroughwide authority for police powers in the seven villages and one town in that 4,000 person Inupiat region (McBeath and Morehouse, 1980).

As originally conceived, the North Slope Borough Police were to be a tri-service (police, paramedic, and firemen) effort shepherded into existence by former state trooper and court personnel employed by the NANA Development Corporation as well as by the Department of Public Safety (see Moeller, 1978:16 and NANA Development Corporation, 1976).12

Rifts between the consultants, state troopers and North Slope Borough Government lead to the peremptory removal of the single trooper post on the region. Tensions between the Department of Law and the new police operation lead to a period when few cases were prosecuted by the Fairbanks office of the Department of Law. Two white campers were killed by a Native man whose earlier case
had been dismissed for lack of prosecution. News reports spoke of violence in Barrow and anti-white hostility. In fact, what had occurred was the breakdown in collaboration between justice agencies when a borough agency displaced a state agency.

Confronted with cases which were not prosecuted, the North Slope Borough undertook a massive campaign of proactive protective custody apprehensions. Five years would pass before the court system, Public Defender and Department of Law would begin to locate resident professionals in Barrow to give what became a massively overpoliced rural district some balance in its Western legal process.

Conceptualization of the Problem and Its Solution

Attempts over the decade to conceptualize the legal needs of rural villages against the backdrop of social change often lead even sympathetic observers to provide program planners and program implementers with excuses for their failures.

For example, writings during the period described the problem of bush justice as one of a culture clash between Native law ways and state law. It was believed that anthropologists could probe Native law ways and discern from that analysis those aspects of Native law ways which kept the legal system from functioning. The operative assumption was that law did not work in Native villages because the consumers of law were not prepared to appreciate it.¹³

Certainly there was some truth to the proposition that Western law remained a confusing mystery to villagers; yet that
confusion stemmed largely from the signals given off by state law representatives, especially the de facto arrangements given credence by town-based officials who were then transferred to another post leaving no institutional memory in their wake.

Village council process and village council records from the turn of the century reflected de facto working relationships induced by Western law officers as much as they reflected ingrained Eskimo or Athabascan attitudes toward conflict resolution.

State law administrators did not want to hear that the customary law system in the villages was formed by the bush law ways of Western law agents and not of Natives.

Moving from what was perceived to be a cultural adaptation problem of Eskimos and Indians, the justice agencies spoke of solving their clients' problems by offering bilingual explanations of their clients' rights or by educating students to the American law system. This same view that the bush justice problem stemmed from cultural misunderstandings had a second negative effect. There was strong resistance to either institutionalization of the de facto working relationship between formal law and extra-legal process or to suggestions that classic Western law jobs or procedures be adapted to the unusual bush environment.

Even though an urban legal process could not be introduced into any small village due to lack of funds and appropriately credentialed personnel (as well as to lack of agency interest or
commitment), plans which suggested that paraprofessionals or conciliation panels be authenticated as components of the system were uniformly rejected (see Marquez and Serdahely, 1977).

The Magistrate advisory panel of judges and lawyers recommended that the court system disassociate itself from alternatives to dispute adjustment in rural villages even as national figures urged an increase in options to going to court (Second Magistrate Advisory Committee, 1979:22).<sup>14</sup>

This paranoia demonstrated not only a lack of appreciation of the rural law process as it evolved historically but a lack of appreciation for American legal history and the persistent adaptive component to American legal machinery.

The Institutional Impetus for Reform

When suggestions for adaptation or reform of traditional law jobs or institutions were made, their central ingredients were often strongly colored by bureaucratic imperatives.

In 1980, the Department of Public Safety requested state funding for Village Public Safety Officers who would replace village police, persons trained periodically but paid through village and job training funds (Department of Public Safety, 1980). The troopers acknowledged that "Rural Alaska has the distinction of having the worst record for public safety of any of the 50 states" (Id:1).

Unlike former proposals for the training and hire of local police, the VPSO program was designed to assure village officers
that pay would be reasonable and reliable. Funds were solicited by the Department of Public Safety to be paid through the non-profit Native regional corporations to the personnel in the villages.

The Department cited the danger of death by fire in rural Alaska, "the greatest loss of life due to fire... in the entire Western World" (1980:2). The policing function of VPSO was to be coupled with training and work in fire fighting, search and rescue, and emergency medical treatment.

"This broadened job responsibility should enhance the perception of these Village Public Safety Officers by other village residents. No longer would he only be a policeman and be associated with just arresting people. Now he would be cast in a more favorable role, such as rendering medical assistance, organizing search and rescue efforts, developing fire protection program and similar efforts" (Id).

A similar working relationship between "demi-police" and "real police" had been proposed to the North Slope Borough. The North Slope Borough had opted for a trooper-style police operation of its own.15

The initial trooper proposal called for villages to decide whether VPSOs carried firearms, (Id:7). Later regulations required that VPSOs meet marksmanship standards of urban police officers. The end result of the VPSO program was to solidify the jurisdictional presence of the Alaska State Troopers in rural Alaska.
The VPSOs were viewed as components of an essentially informal or extra-legal government structure. The troopers, unlike other state agencies, had consistently recognized that village councils and problem boards which mediated disputes served a necessary function in absence of effective enforcement of local ordinances which dealt with minor problems. The same report called for strengthening of the ordinance structure and development of local mechanisms for dispute resolution (Id:9) as well as introduction of a state statute banning importation of alcohol into dry villages. However, the question remained whether the level of formal law enforcement was sufficient to deal with those problems not amenable to an informal or customary solution even where (as Angell had discovered) councils continued into the late 1970s to deal with legal matters in an extra-legal manner.

The Department of Public Safety's options were proscribed by its need to maintain a territorial jurisdiction and by its unionized personnel structure. Even as it admitted its own lack of success in bringing law and order to villages, it could develop no other solution than a police aide program for villages, a program which left individual police as unarmed "lone rangers" in small villages.

The Department's proposal for VPSOs acknowledged the continuing failure of law enforcement in the bush as well as trooper jurisdiction "in almost all rural areas. . ." (1980:1).

"From their bush outposts they attempt to respond immediately to emergencies as quickly as possible to felony cases, and rou-
tinely to misdemeanors but their efforts are often hampered by delayed notification, long response distance, the uncertainties of weather and transportation and limited manpower and budget" (Id:1).

The lack of follow-up to previous training efforts, "the high turnover in personnel caused by low salaries and the difficulties that face a village policeman who may have to arrest friends and relatives, have all combined to generally frustrate law enforcement at the village level. As a result, many problems in the villages remain unresolved."

"Not surprisingly, the extent, type and frequency of crime in rural Alaska is not known due to lack of a local reporting mechanism and a state records system that yields data only on a regional, rather than a community basis" (1980:2).

The trooper proposal did not seek to displace Department of Public Safety jurisdiction. As in the case of earlier LEAA programs, (Village Police Training Programs) the Department requested additional troopers to town locations in order that follow-up contacts be maintained with village police on a monthly basis.

Actual police work in state law offenses remained in trooper hands. VPSOs, it was said could accompany troopers and even take the place of a second trooper "thus easing the manpower problem being experienced by Troopers at bush outposts" (Id:6-7).

VPSOs were to meet their law enforcement functions, chiefly
enforcement of village ordinances with a "serviceable, distinctive uniform and parka, handcuffs and baton but without a handgun" (Id:7).

Institutional Perspectives as Planning Perspectives

The court system and the trooper organization have taken two dissimilar positions with respect to meeting the needs of village Alaska. However, similarities in their points of view are worth noting.

The court system began to place lay magistrates in the villages in the late 1960s, but then convinced itself that town-based judges could better receive the business of the court. Although it fought back attempts to redistrict the court to create new rural zones, it did provide a Bethel and a Barrow "service area" along with a superior court judge in each place.

Other rural towns (such as Dillingham) which serve as regional service centers have not been so fortunate. So, also, have 135 villages been left without a judicial officer.

The court system has rejected proposals that its magistrate act as probation or as youth services officers, that it "cover" for the failings of other state agencies even as it decries those failings when they raise difficulties for the court system (Second Magistrate Advisory Committee, 1978).¹⁹

The trooper organization is equally self-centered in its assessment of rural Alaska. However, unlike the court, its home base is in rural Alaska; its concern with effective law enforce-
ment and an increased trooper presence is genuine.

Yet one must wonder whether alternative models to rural law enforcement are overlooked in order to retain a trooper presence in rural Alaska. Do villagers want police who do three jobs instead of one and who are unarmed? Some critics suggest that three jobs in three households are more acceptable.

One must wonder whether other organizational models of policing have been dismissed or ignored because the Alaska State Troopers, like the court system, view the problem from a distinctly ingrained institutional perspective.

Development in The Villages - The Impact Statements

Planning For Change

One can argue that the Pipeline Project and its peak construction years from 1974-76 was, in fact, no more than one of several sources of change on the Alaska village scene since the early 1960s.

The pipeline had an acknowledged and direct impact on interior villages and on the villages of the Inuit North Slope. Yet its secondary impact as oil wealth was translated into state subsidies and state appropriation touched every village. Substantial improvement in communication and transportation through satellite telephones and new landing strips eroded distance as an obstacle to material improvement, but also as an obstacle to the importation of alcohol and drugs. The Molly Hootch legislative compromise caused high school construction in more than eighty villages and had as its secondary impact the
transfer of school age villagers from boarding schools and towns to year round residence in villages.

Development of state and federal services made towns which act as regional centers attractive to villagers who sought employment. Village growth near regional centers was an early expression of development in the 1960s. So, also, did significant reduction of infectious disease and infant mortality change village population patterns. A succession of housing projects in the late 1960s and early 1970s brought wage earning opportunities, new living patterns and new demands for cash payment for fuel oil.

ANCSA's influence on villages ranged from employment in village corporations to systematic reordering of village lots and public and private property. Hunting technology improved to such an extent that subsistence activities came to be matters which expended vastly less time; cash needs for such equipment demanded that the hunter find wages to pay for this new snow-go technology.

Development of Native villages has not then been as directly influenced by specific projects or events in Alaska as by the results of federal and state money spent in rural Alaska. While impact statements dealt at length with the impact of a pipeline construction project near one or more Native villages, they were not required when high schools were constructed in eighty or more villages or when telephone service was improved.

It is the secondary and tertiary waves of developmental
influences that change the texture and content of village life.

State agency information regarding villages or their law and order components was close to nonexistent during this peak period of developmental flux.

Alaska Planning and Management prepared an Alaska Community Survey of 271 villages for the state in 1972. The material provided did not include any reference to law and order services (Alaska Planning and Management:1972).

The Interior Department's pipeline impact statement (1972) stressed the overriding impact of the Claims Settlement Act as a catalyst for economic and social change (1972:252). Its authors viewed pipeline impact upon Natives as principally a product of geographical proximity to construction (1972:238).

The state's comments on the pipeline project (Alaska: 1971) foresaw little more village impact than "more money being put into the economy of rural villages through wages sent home" (1971:153).

"Little effect is expected on village family structure if the head of the household works on the pipeline project and returns periodically during his employment" (Id.).

Criminal activity would occur, the state predicted, where large numbers of persons concentrated.

"The rest of the criminal justice system will be burdened in proportion to the increase in crime that occurs" (1971:154).
When the state officially examined the impact of TAPS construction on the administration of criminal justice it stressed that with the exception of the troopers and Anchorage and Fairbanks police departments, "most police agencies in the state almost totally lack comprehensive criminal activity statistics" (Alaska:1976, 12).

Given "a lack of an overall comprehensive and systematic process for collecting, maintaining, retrieving and analyzing statistics generated by criminal justice agencies" (Id.), the Department of Law could only speculate on the reasons for a rise from two percent to four percent of statewide reported criminal activity from 1969 to 1973 in the rural Western and Northern Regions (1976:32). It suggested that the rate of crime reported related to increased Alaska State Trooper activity "rather than an unprecedented rise in crime" (Id.).

When the Rural Impact Information Program in Fairbanks attempted to study the impact of TAPS on interior Athabascan communities, it discovered that there were "no figures to determine the extent of [child abuse, rapes, assaults, and suicides] or their incidence compared with that of the pre-pipeline period. Without these figures it is impossible to judge the impact of the pipeline on crime rates" (Rural Impact Information Program, 1977:96).

What was the pipeline construction's impact then on crime in rural communities? The Rural Impact Information Program discovered that data was recorded according to detachment boundaries
which encompass urban and rural places and which do not coincide with boundaries of other state or Native organizations. (See Rural Impact Information Program, 1977:95.)

Equally problematic were the limited numbers of law enforcement personnel stationed in the interior; troopers were stationed in hub communities of Ft. Yukon, Galena, McGrath, Tok and Delta Junction and prepared to respond to major crimes (Id.).

Although the report failed to discover the direct impact of the pipeline on crime, several traits of rural villages did emerge which suggested how problems could emerge.

First, villages lost key personnel to pipeline employment leaving operation of the village to less qualified persons (1977:100). In this vein, better trained village police were siphoned off to take up jobs as pipeline security personnel.

One of the most often repeated anecdotes of the pipeline period was the story of persons who had left their village for pipeline employment including the layover in Fairbanks only to return when it was discovered that their families had been threatened by village drunks. As the rural impact program discerned, population decrease can work serious harm on small villages although impact funds appeared to be directed at places where population and the impact on services would increase.

Real income was often said to fall in villages since jobholders made their purchases elsewhere (1977:101). Charter traffic increased while the size of regularly scheduled craft was
reduced. The result was that "booze bombers" could arrive when large items such as food or construction materials were left at transfer points for long periods (1977:139).

Conclusions from the Pipeline Experience

One of the authors of the 1971 and 1976 state reports on the impact of TAPS on rural crime was candid in his appraisal of these reports in a recent interview. He said that the state had enough concentrated opposition to the pipeline construction project without feeding that opposition more ammunition in the form of predictions of crime in rural villages (Havelock interview, 1983).

Even if the state had desired to measure the impact of this developmental project, it could not. It lacked baseline data. The region involved also lacked fundamental law and order services.

Angell (1979) concluded:

Alaska has two separate and unequal justice systems. The system which exists in the commercial population centers of the state is highly articulated, readily identified, staffed, funded and extensively managed. Its problems are reasonably well documented, although not completely solved. The system in the rural Native communities of the state is invisible. It is invisible because data concerning its operations are infrequently accumulated and it has not been the subject of the kind of scrutiny given the urban system.

Due to the dearth of information about the Bush Justice system, its problems are difficult to identify and comparisons of its efficiency and effectiveness with other justice operations have not been previously done . . ." (Angell, 1979:72).

Recommendations of the Rural Impact Information Programs for
future "impact" situations in rural Alaska deserve republication:

Data on conditions in rural communities should be gathered and published on a regular basis, not just during impact periods. Adequate planning for impact situations is not possible without an understanding of existing conditions. A meaningful analysis of impact is impossible without baseline data with which to make comparisons.

State record-keeping should allow retrieval of information relating specifically to rural areas. Most state departments currently divide the state into regions containing at least one urban area, and regional reports make it impossible to differentiate between statistics for rural and urban areas.

State departments should monitor the demands made upon their services as a result of impact and should evaluate the adequacy of their response to those demands. The monitoring effort should continue throughout the impact period and should not be limited to providing justification for increased budgets.

Increase in population should not be the only criterion for determining a community's need for impact assistance. Some communities that do not experience population growth nonetheless experience indirect impacts such as loss of valuable manpower. Assistance to these communities might take the form of training of additional members of the community in vital skills so that the loss of one resident does not endanger the delivery of a community service (Rural Impact Information Program, 1977:iii).

These recommendations suggest that beneath and even more significant than the absence of legal planning for rural Alaska is the lack of accountability of the state governmental system to its rural constituency. There can be no planning because the prerequisites for planning are absent in their entirety. There is no basis for connecting need with change.

What other data might be employed, assuming that criminal justice data is limited to cases reported to the trooper organi-
zation and ultimately packaged into differing geographic boundaries?

Public Health Service data has proven useful to measure levels of alcohol-related violence in separate village settings even when this same violence does not come to the attention of the criminal justice system (Conn, 1982; see also, Kelso, 1977). Boedeker and Conn (1983) were able to evaluate the use of two different police responses to drunken behavior against levels of alcohol-related violence in the home in two Native town settings. In short, one must plan with data that is not first and foremost criminal justice data.

The state government of white, urban Alaskans has no picture of the needs in Native village Alaska and appears not to desire one. It dismisses subjective evaluations but in nearly twenty-five years of statehood has not made any significant effort to develop a plan to capture the data it needs or to provide the most basic services.

Yet even with baseline data, the components of the justice system are operated from selfish institutional perspectives which emphasize service only when that objective coincides with institutional self-interest.

In another paper, I wondered aloud whether the state of Alaska desires villages to exist (Conn, 1981). The emphasis on towns and on regional models in non-legal fields as well as legal has tended to strip away even residual power from the villages in matters governmental.
Yet it is to the villages and not to towns that those Alaska Natives who live on the land and who live for the land gravitate and reside. Villages, unlike urban centers, are staging points for the historic life of Alaskan Natives. They are not reservations or museums. As human habitations, they are not frozen in amber.

Alaska Native villages must be given the autonomy and the resources to develop systems of social control which are respectful of both individual and community values. These systems of law should mesh with readily available outside legal resources but not be overwhelmed by them.

Leeway must be granted for experimentation and evaluation. Villages that desire to Westernize their systems must be allowed to do so in a rational manner.

The rural Alaskan environment must be something more than an internal colony of state government.

Alaska government must hire and promote persons who know and love the bush. An authentic dialog between government and the villages must occur.

Until these things happen, there will never be planning. Planning requires knowledge, commitment and authority to act.

Alaska has yet to meet its legal responsibilities to its citizenry in the bush.
NOTES

1 In the 566,000 square mile state of Alaska, half of the population live in towns and villages usually accessible only by river, sea or air. Within the latter rural population are 55,000 Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts who reside in about 140 villages with populations from 25 to 700 persons and 300 persons on average. Another half dozen Native towns have populations from 1,500 to 3,000 persons.

2 So complex is this etiquette in Eskimo villages that drunken behavior may be seen as taking "time out" from the pervasive compliance with sophisticated social cues and fear of sanctions. Characterization of drunken behavior as "being crazy" means that one is not responsible for one's actions (Conn, 1977).

3 Towns are where the superior court, district attorney, public defender, corrections or youth services officers and legal services attorneys work and reside.

4 In the 1960's the Native population in the Bethel region showed an annual increase of 29.4 per thousand with a crude birth rate of 45.9, one that Tussing and Arnold noted (1969) was perhaps the highest birth rate in the world. Deaths by tuberculosis have been contained in the 1950's by Public Health service campaigns and infant mortality reduced. The net result was a young population (median age 16.5 in 1969) with increasing pressure upon elders in the villages who exercised traditional
guidance and social control (See Hippler and Conn, 1973).

Population increases were significant in both the town of Bethel and in surrounding villages.

Bethel, the only natural deep fresh water port, established itself as administrative center of the region as well as prime market for fish processing. Its population grew from 651 in 1950 to 1,258 in 1960, and 1,600 in 1966, fed primarily by young Natives who sought access to the limited but new wage opportunities available in that town. Village traffic to Bethel by snowmobile or plane in winter and by boat in summer increased.

Villages surrounding Bethel also grew in population. For example, Akiachuk grew from 179 persons in 1950 to 310 persons in 1966. Kwethluk grew from 242 to 375 persons in 1966. Napakiak grew from 139 to 254 in the same period and Napaskiak from 121 to 215. The neighboring communities of Nunapitchuck and Kasigluk on the Johnson River had, by 1969, combined populations of 626.

Bethel's share of the region's population, estimated by Tussing and Arnold to have changed from 7.9 percent in 1950 to almost 13 percent in 1967(1969:33) occurred because economic development focused there. Along with establishment of State and Federal bureaucracies for the region, came a housing fabrication plant and modern homes, establishment of a regional high school with dormitory facilities and a fishprocessing plant.

While an estimated 70 to 80 percent of the male work force could find seasonal work during the summer as commercial fisher-
men, cannery employees, or as laborers and tradesmen in Bethel's economic boom, no more than 5 percent of working-age Native population were regular wage earners (1969: 38).

Natives were thus marginal to the region's economy and still largely participants in the subsistence economy. Capital received in wage earning was used to purchase new hunting technology (such as snowmachines), technology which substantially reduced the gap between expert hunter and fisherman and non-expert with some consequent secondary influence on social control by old of young.

Transfer payments (especially welfare) went to about a fourth of the Native households (Tussing, Id.).

Thus, while Bethel as town came to have an allure and importance, not uncommon in prompting outmigration from villages by the young, especially villages distant from the town, population increase was also evident in villages surrounding Bethel. Both the towns and villages were changing from villages of yesteryear.

5 For the village leaders to make a connection between Bethel and its liquor and increasing deaths of young people who traveled to and from Bethel was entirely appropriate. Later studies of Native mortality (including homicide and suicide) especially those by Krauss (1977) show a replacement of deaths by infectious diseases with high rates of deaths by accidents, suicide and homicide, far in excess of non-Native population during the 1960-1969 period.
Village leaders correctly recognized that violent death, associated with alcohol use, had established itself as a leading cause of mortality with the decrease in infectious diseases.


8 Angell (1979) indicates that Alaska criminal justice plans from 1969 to 1977 "devote only passing reference to the rural Native villages of the state" (Angell, 1979:56). The 1978 plan listed nearly all white communities with police whatever their population while ignoring larger Native communities with police (Id:57).

"[C]rime statistics available apparently could not be arranged to reflect the crime rates in Native villages. Therefore, crime rates apparently have not been considered in rural planning" (Id).

9 The head of the Department of Public Safety, when confronted with this data, suggested that trooper involvement in the survey had caused village officials to minimize the actual length of time necessary to respond. He suggested that seven days was a more likely figure (Nix interview, 1977).

10 Redistricting to better service rural Alaska was recommended by the Alaska Judicial Council, Judicial Districting Report With Proposed Recommendations, July 1974. The court rejected the pro-
In a soon-to-be-released study on urban and rural institutionalization within the Alaska juvenile justice system, David Parry (1983) estimates that 37 percent of Alaska's young people live in villages and towns where there are no youth services officers.

"The NANA consultants were careful to explain that the new organization was to supplement rather than replace the Alaska State Trooper activity in the Borough. It is clear they did not anticipate any state trooper reduction in personnel in the North Slope" (Angell, 1977:9).

The State Supreme Court in *Gregory v. State* (1976) stated, "We also recognize that the trial court is obligated to be certain that each citizen, when involved in a criminal matter, is aware of the various rights guaranteed him by the Alaska and United States Constitution." To this was footnoted the following:

"The Anglo-American system of justice differs substantially from the traditional Indian, Eskimo and Aleut systems, which pre-dated Western cultures by hundreds of years. The cultural difficulties experienced by many of the Alaska Natives as the contemporary Anglo-American institutions reach out to the bush communities require that the State legal system use extreme care in cases of this nature. Therefore, in those areas where a substantial portion of the populations consists of Native Alaskans, we urge the administrative office of the court system to develop bilingual explanations of basic rights for those who appear in criminal proceedings so that all citizens are clearly aware of their constitutional rights." *Gregory* at p. 380.

"Policy Regarding Alternative Processes for Local
Resolution of Minor Disputes. While the court should encourage villages and appropriate agencies to experiment with alternative processes for out of court resolution of minor disputes, the court should not become actively involved in selecting, implementing, or evaluating alternative processes." Second Magistrate Advisory Committee, 1979:29.

15 When Barrow traded its town police for the trooper-style Borough Police and began a campaign to rid its streets of drunks, the social scientists were prepared to see a direct connection between oil and the resulting "crime wave" (Klausner and Foulks, 1982). In fact, the police activity was very similar in its magnitude to another rural town where no oil development had occurred (Conn and Boedeker, 1983).

16 "During . . . (1972)" wrote project director (and later head of the Department of Public Safety) Bill Nix, "the Village Policemen handled ten felony cases, 418 misdemeanors, and numerous noncriminal complaints. Seven of the felonies resulted in court action and 128 of the misdemeanors resulted in court action. One hundred and fifty-one of the misdemeanors were handled by the Village Policemen without court or Council action." (Department of Public Safety, 1972, p. 1.)

As the project director described it in presenting other statistics for the year which showed court action on 63 cases and council action on 171, "[They] also illustrate a unique relationship of two branches of government within the Criminal Justice system." (W. Nix, 1972:2) The report noted, "the council has
levied $1,835.00 in fines, and 38 days of jail time. In almost every case, days of work for the village satisfied council sentences."

Criminal Justice Planning Agency personnel discouraged training of councilmen with village police, viewing the former as inappropriate recipients of LEAA funds.

17 However, an attorney general's opinion warned against development of "judgment boards" other than courts designated by the state court system (Condon, 1982).

18 The 55 village study revealed that even in a sample skewed towards communities with magistrates, twenty-five percent of the villages surveyed continued to use extra-legal councils or the more modern "problem boards" to solve some of their criminal law disputes.

19 E.g., when rural defendants must be sent to jail for lack of adequate probation-parole services in rural Alaska.

20 Natives make up 23 percent of the state's population yet they hold only 2.8 percent of the state's jobs, according to Alaska Native Brotherhood spokesman Robert Willard. "Native Hire Efforts Promised, Questions," Tundra Times Vol. 20, No. 47 November 23, 1983, p. 4.
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APPENDIX 2

COMPARISON OF ALASKA VILLAGES, ALASKA STATEWIDE, AND UNITED STATES CRIME RATES

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*Per 100,000 population in 1977.

Appendices (Accessible)

Note, 31 Jan 2019: These appendices duplicate the content of the tables included in the original Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, but have been formatted to make them accessible for users of screen readers.
### Appendix 1.

#### PUBLIC OFFICIALS ASSESSMENTS OF QUALITY OF JUSTICE AND SELECTED PUBLIC SERVICES

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