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Description

In this paper, we have used a simple model to examine possible short-run and long-run allocative effects of regulations in an open-entry fishery. Our model suggests that regulation in an open-entry fishery may affect the distribution of catch between different fleets in a number of ways. Gear restrictions, by directly reducing the efficiency of larger vessels, can increase the share of smaller vessels in total catching power in the short run, and enhance the ability of smaller vessels to compete with larger vessels in the long run. Regulations which separate the fishery, forcing vessels to chose between fishing in different areas, may also affect the distribution of total catch. Examples of these regulations are exclusive area registration requirements and simultaneous scheduling of seasons in different areas. These regulations may affect the distribution of catch between fleets because the relative catching power and relative profitability of boats may be different for individual areas in the fishery than for the fishery as a whole. Data on vessel participation in the Alaska king crab fishery suggest that during the period 1969-1980, regulations in the Alaska king crab fishery benefited small, resident-owned boats. They did so by preventing the large boats which fished in the more productive western fisheries from also fishing in the eastern fisheries where most of the small, resident-owned boats were based, and by restricting gear use in these areas.

Publication Date

2-25-1984

Keywords

Fish, Renewable Resources, Regulation

Handle

http://hdl.handle.net/11122/14132

Allocative Effects of Regulations in the Alaska King Crab Fishery

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